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Abstract
Security is a crucial requirement in the applications based on information and communi-
cation technology, especially when an open network such as the Internet is used. To ensure
security in such applications several security protocols have been developed. However, the
design of complex security protocols is notoriously difficult and error-prone. Several flaws
have been found on protocols that are claimed secure. Hence, security protocols must be
verified before they are used. One approach to verify security protocols is the use of formal
methods. The use of formal methods has enabled the discovery of several flaws on security
protocols, as well as, the proof of some other protocols’ correctness. However, errors can
be introduced when the protocols are implemented. Another approach which can be
used to verify implementations individual executions is runtime verification. Runtime
verification mainly can help in the cases where verifying implementations formally is
complex and difficult.
In this thesis we contribute to security protocol verification with an emphasis on
formal verification and automation. Firstly, we study exam protocols. We propose
formal definitions for several authentication and privacy properties in the Applied pi-
Calculus. We also provide an abstract definitions of verifiability properties. We analyze
all these properties automatically using ProVerif on multiple case studies, and identify
several flaws. Moreover, we propose several monitors to check exam requirements at
runtime. These monitors are validated by analyzing a real exam implementation using
MarQ tool. Secondly, we propose a formal framework to verify the security properties
of non-transferable electronic cash protocols. We define client privacy and forgery
related properties. Again, we illustrate our model by analyzing three case studies using
ProVerif, and we re-discover known attacks. Thirdly, we propose formal definitions for
authentication, privacy, and verifiability properties of electronic reputation protocols.
We discuss the proposed definitions, with the help of ProVerif, on a simple reputation
protocol. Finally, we obtain a reduction result to verify route validity of ad-hoc routing
protocols in presence of multiple independent attackers.
Keywords: Authentication, Privacy, Verifiability, Formal Verification, RunTime Verifica-
tion, Exams, Electronic Cash, Electronic Reputation, Route Validity, Applied pi-Calculus,
ProVerif, QEA, MarQ.
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Résumé
La sécurité est une exigence cruciale dans les applications basées sur l’information et la
technologie de communication, surtout quand un réseau ouvert tel que l’Internet est utilisé.
Pour assurer la sécurité dans ces applications nombreux protocoles cryptographiques ont
été développé. Cependant, la conception de protocoles de sécurité est notoirement difficile
et source d’erreurs. Plusieurs failles ont été trouvées sur des protocoles prétendus sécurisé.
Par conséquent, les protocoles cryptographiques doivent être vérifiés avant d’être utilisés.
Une approche pour vérifier les protocoles cryptographiques est l’utilisation des méthodes
formelles. L’utilisation des méthodes formelles a permis la découverte de plusieurs failles
sur les protocoles de sécurité, ainsi que la preuve de la justesse de certains autres protocoles.
Toutefois, des erreurs peuvent être introduites lorsque les protocoles sont mis en œuvre.
Une autre approche qui peut être utilisée pour vérifier les implémentations exécutions
individuelles est la vérification de l’exécution. Vérification de l’exécution principalement
peut aider dans les cas où la vérification des implémentations formellement est complexe
et difficile.
Dans cette thèse, nous contribuons à la vérification des protocoles cryptographiques
avec un accent sur la vérification formelle et l’automatisation. Tout d’abord, nous étudions
les protocoles d’examen. Nous proposons des définitions formelles pour plusieurs proprié-
tés d’authentification et de confidentialité dans le pi-calcul appliqué. Nous fournissons
également des définitions abstraites des propriétés de vérifiabilité. Nous analysons toutes
ces propriétés en utilisant automatiquement ProVerif sur plusieurs études de cas, et avons
identifié plusieurs failles. En outre, nous proposons plusieurs moniteurs pour vérifier les
exigences d’examen à l’exécution. Ces moniteurs sont validés par l’analyse d’un exécutions
d’examens réels en utilisant l’outil MarQ. Deuxièmement, nous proposons un cadre formel
pour vérifier les propriétés de sécurité des protocoles de monnaie électronique. Nous
définissons la notion de vie privée du client et les propriétés de la falsification. Encore une
fois, nous illustrons notre modèle en analysant trois études de cas à l’aide ProVerif, et
nous redécouvrons les attaques connues. Troisièmement, nous proposons des définitions
formelles des propriétés de l’authentification, la confidentialité et le vérifiabilité des pro-
tocoles de réputation électronique. Nous discutons les définitions proposées, avec l’aide
de ProVerif, sur un protocole simple de réputation. Enfin, nous obtenons un résultat de
réduction quand vous cherchez des attaques sur la route validité en présence de plusieurs
attaquants indépendants qui ne partagent pas leurs connaissances.
Mots-clés : Authentification, La confidentialité, La vérifiabilité, La vérification formelle,
La vérification de l’exécution, Examens, Argent électronique, La réputation électronique,
Route validité, Appliqué pi-calcul, ProVerif, QEA, MarQ.
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“Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful.”
George Edward Pelham Box.
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Chapter1
Introduction
With the development and spread of the technology more and more electronic applications
have emerged, and more and more services are offered over the Internet. For instance,
several universities and other educational organizations (e.g., Coursera1, CISCO2) offer
computer/Internet-based exams. Banking and electronic payment systems such as smart
cards or, e.g., PayPal3 allow electronic payments and the online transfer of the money
around the world. Several sites allow the customers to leave feedbacks which reflect their
satisfaction (e.g., Amazon4, eBay5, Yelp6). To implement such distributed applications
several protocols have been developed. These protocols use cryptography to ensure
security properties, such as secrecy and authentication. However, the design of complex
secure protocols is error-prone. Hence, it is necessary to verify these protocols before
implementing them. The main goal of this thesis is to propose formal models and
definitions to express security properties and verify cryptographic protocols.
In this chapter we motivate our work, and provide a general overview of related works.
Then, we present the structure of the thesis and our contributions. Finally, we list
previous publications concerning the results presented in this thesis.
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1.1 Cryptographic Protocols
Cryptographic protocols are distributed algorithms that make use of cryptography to
achieve some security properties over a public network, such as the Internet. Examples of
basic security properties that are required by most Cryptographic protocols are secrecy
and message authentication.
− Secrecy: The attacker cannot compute or obtain the value of a secret. A stronger
variant of this property (strong secrecy) states that an attacker cannot distinguish
when the value of the secret changes (going back to Goldwasser and Micali [GM82]).
It ensures that the attacker cannot obtain any information about the secret.
− Message authentication (or data origin authentication): This property ensures that a
message has not been modified while in transit (data integrity) and that the recipient
can verify the source of the message. To this end some protocols use primitives such
as digital signatures which provide an evidence that a message was not modified and
was sent by someone possessing the proper signing key. Properties such as message
authentication can be modeled as correspondence assertions [RSG+00,RS11]: “on
every execution trace an event e2 is preceded by an event e1”.
However, up-to-date protocols such as electronic exam, cash, and reputation protocols
require more complex properties like privacy properties, which include:
− Anonymity: The ISO/IEC standard 15408 [ISO12] defines anonymity as ensuring
that a user may use a service or resource without disclosing the user’s identity. This
definition is close to what is called anonymity in terms of unlinkability by Pfitzmann
et al. [PK00]. In this sense, anonymity hides the link between a user’s identity and
a service or a resource rather than hiding the identity itself. For instance, sender
anonymity says that the attacker cannot link a sender to a given message, and
student anonymity says that the attacker cannot link a student to a given answer.
− Untraceability: The attacker cannot tell whether two actions are made by the same
participant. For example, a bank cannot trace two payments to the same user, or
an attacker cannot link two sessions which involve the same RFID tag.
− Receipt-Freeness: A participant cannot prove to the attacker that he takes a certain
action. For example, a customer cannot prove (provide a receipt) to a coercer that
he provided a certain feedback.
Other interesting properties include verifiability, that is a user can check that a certain
information is correct. An example of verifiability properties is to verify the eligibility of
users attempting to use a service or a resource. This requires authenticating the users
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and verifying that they are authorized to use the service or the resource. Moreover, some
protocols require specific security properties. For instance, validity of the obtained route
is a crucial property that has to be ensured by a routing protocol. An important property
that is specific to electronic cash protocols is the ability to identify the client that spends
a coin twice.
There are two main classes of security properties: trace (reachability) and equivalence
(indistinguishability) properties. Trace properties are defined on every execution trace
of the protocol. Primary examples of trace properties are secrecy and authentication
properties. For instance, secrecy is expressed as a state where the secret is revealed
cannot be reached on every execution trace of the protocol. Verifiability properties can be
expressed using verification tests [DJL13,KRS10a]. A verification test is an algorithm or
a logical formula that has to satisfy certain conditions with respect to the related property.
Verifiability properties can be expressed as (un)reachability properties [DJL13,SRKK10].
Route validity can also be expressed as a reachability property [ACD10]. Equivalence
properties are defined as equivalences between protocol executions. Two executions
are equivalent if the attacker cannot distinguish between them. Equivalence properties
include strong secrecy and other privacy properties (e.g., anonymity, untraceability, and
receipt-freeness).
A natural question is: how we can prove that a cryptographic protocol ensures a given
security property?
The flaws (e.g., [MSS98,DKS10,ACC+08,HSD+05,CS11]) found over the recent 20
years show that designing security protocols is error-prone. Hence, provided that security
failures can have serious financial and privacy consequences, cryptographic protocols
verification is a necessity.
1.2 Symbolic Verification of Cryptographic Protocols
Due to the difficulty of designing secure protocols in general, as we argued before, several
flaws were discovered on cryptographic protocols, even without breaking the underlying
cryptography. For instance, the attack on Needham-Schroeder protocol works without
breaking any of the used cryptographic primitives. Instead, it requires two parallel
executions of the protocol with an attacker in the middle of two honest participants.
Hence, proving the security of cryptographic primitives is not sufficient, and verification
in needed to argue that a protocol is secure or correct.
An approach to verify cryptographic protocols is the use of formal methods. Formal
methods provide mathematically based techniques for modeling and verifying crypto-
graphic protocols. They allow to detect the shortcomings in protocols design, and give
evidence of security within a given model if no flaws are found. Moreover, in case where a
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flaw is found they might provide a counter-example which gives insight to fix the analyzed
protocol.
In formal verification, we can distinguish two main approaches: the symbolic and the
computational approaches. In symbolic approach, abstracted models such as constraint
systems [MS01], process algebra (e.g., [Hoa85,AF01]), and dedicated logics (e.g., [BAN90,
Bla01]) are used to represent a protocol and a security property. Then, the protocol
is checked whether it satisfies the property or not, for instance, by exploring the state
space searching if an invalid state can be reached. Whereas in computational approach,
probabilistic arguments are used to analyze the security of protocols. Typically, a security
property is defined as a game that involves an attacker. A game corresponds to an attack
scenario for which the advantage of the attacker can be computed. If the advantage of the
attacker is not negligible, he breaks the property. In this thesis, we adopt the symbolic
approach to verify security properties of exam, reputation, and cash protocols. Moreover,
we provide a reduction result for verifying route validity in wireless sensor networks. In
the following, we give an overview of symbolic models and tools, and the successful results
of their use in verification of cryptographic protocols.
In the symbolic model, messages are represented by terms, and cryptographic primitives
such as encryption, signature, hash, etc. are abstracted as black boxes and assumed to be
perfectly secure. Such a model was first proposed by Dolev and Yao [DY81,DY83] who
developed the idea of an attacker that has full control of the communication network and
unbounded computational power, but can apply only some specific predefined rules on the
messages in his knowledge. In addition to Dolev and Yao model the symbolic approach
encompasses a variety of techniques including: logics such as the BAN-logic [BAN90]
used to model authentication and Horn clauses [Bla01], process algebras such as the
Communicating Sequential Processes [Hoa85] and the Applied pi-Calculus [AF01], and
typing methods such as F7 [BFG10,BBF+11] and F∗ [SCF+13] for verifying protocols
implementations.
Several flaws were found by using symbolic methods to verify security protocols. For
example, Mitchell et al. [MSS98] found anomalies in Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 3.0 using
finite-state analysis, Delaune et al. [DKS10] discovered several attacks on the PKCS
11 standard which defines an API to cryptographic tokens, Armando et al. [ACC+08]
found a server security flaw on Google’s Single Sign-On protocol, the attack allows a
dishonest service provider to impersonate a user at another service provider. Several
weaknesses have been identified by Cortier and Smyth [CS11] on Helios 2.0 voting
system [ADMPQ09], and Dreier et al. [DLL13] discovered several attacks on auction
protocols due to Brandt [Bra06] and Curtis et al. [CPS07]. Formal methods can also be
used to prove the absence of attacks in a formal model under certain assumptions. For
example, He et al. [HSD+05] carried out a modular proof of IEEE 802.11i and Transport
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Layer Security (TLS) using a Protocol Composition Logic (PCL). However, the main
challenges in protocols verification remain: (i) in the choice of the model to represent
the protocol and the security properties, (ii) the formalization of security properties
as informal definitions tend to contain imprecisions, (iii) and the development of tools
to automatically verify security protocols as human proofs tend to be error-prone as
complexity increase.
The main goal of this thesis is to propose formal models and definitions to express
security properties and verify security protocols. We propose models and definitions for
privacy, authentication and verifiability properties of electronic exam (e-exam) protocols
(also suitable for pencil-and-paper exams). Privacy can mean secrecy of the exam questions,
anonymity of a student that submits a given answer, or anonymity of an examiner that
attributes a given mark. Authentication includes authenticating the student that submits
an answer, and verifiability includes verifying that all answers are accepted from registered
candidates. Then, we study electronic cash (e-cash) and propose formal definitions for
client privacy (ensuring that the attacker can link neither a client to a coin he spend nor
two coins spent by the same client) and forgery related properties such as unforgability,
and double spending identification. We also propose a formal framework for security
analysis of electronic reputation (e-reputation) protocols. Again we consider privacy,
authentication and verifiability properties. We also discuss several case studies to validate
our models on existing security protocols. We re-discover some known flaws, and we
also discover several new flaws on the analyzed protocols. Moreover, we generalize the
reduction result for analyzing route validity presented in [CDD12] to the case of multiple
independent attackers, which do not share their knowledge.
1.2.1 Attacker Model
Flaws on the security of protocols highly depend on the capabilities of the attacker. For
instance, considering too restrictive attacker model can lead to missing some flaws. For
example, Needham-Schroeder protocol was proven secure using BAN logic for a single
protocol execution, while the flaw found by G. Lowe requires two parallel executions of
the protocol between the attacker and two participants. On the other hand, too powerful
attacker can lead to unrealistic attacks which are difficult to be applied in practice. For
example, when analyzing routing protocols of wireless sensor networks it is not realistic to
assume that the attacker controls all the communications. However he has to be located
somewhere in the network, and thus can control only a finite number of nodes [ACD10].
In the symbolic model the cryptography is assumed to be perfect, and the attacker
is usually assumed to has a full control of the (public) network, such as the Dolev-
Yao attacker [DY81,DY83]. The Dolev-Yao attacker can eavesdrop, remove, substitute,
duplicate and delay messages that the parties are sending one another, and insert messages
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of his choice on the public channels. However, he can manipulate messages, e.g., extract
data from messages or compose new messages from known data, only under the assumption
of perfect cryptography. For instance, the only way to decrypt an encryption enc(m, k)
of a message m with a key k is to know the corresponding inverse key inv(k), where
enc is an encryption function and inv is a key inverse function. Provided that dec is
the corresponding decryption function of enc, the latter feature can be expressed by the
equation dec(enc(m, k), inv(k)) which captures the notion that the encryption function
enc is perfect. In the case where the encryption function has some additional features,
e.g., if it is a homomorphic function, then it is important to have equations that capture
such features. Otherwise, some attacks might be missed. Note that, usually a set of
equations or a set of inference deduction rules is defined to captures all the capabilities of
the attacker.
In this thesis, we adopt a Dolev-Yao like attacker to analyze the security properties
of exam, cash and reputation protocols. Additionally we consider corrupted parties to
model e.g., bribing and coercion. Whereas for analyzing the security of routing protocols
in wireless sensor networks, we consider multiple independent local attackers that do not
share their knowledge. We assume that each attacker has Dolev-Yao like capabilities,
but compromises only one node and thus only controls the communications between this
node and its neighbors.
1.2.2 Automation
Protocol designers often manually prove the security of their protocols. However, manual
proofs are often cumbersome and tend to be error-prone. In order to overcome the
weaknesses of manual proofs an automated support is needed. To this end, several
tools [ABB+05,Bla01,Cre08a,Cre08b,SMCB12,MSCB13,CcCK12] have been developed
to support automated protocol verification in symbolic model. Note that, as protocol
verification problems are in general undecidable [EGS85, DLM04]–in particular with
unbounded message length and an unbounded number of parallel instances– these tools
employ techniques such as approximations, restrictions to bounded number of instances
and limited attacker capabilities, or they do not always terminate. In the following, we
summarize some of the existing symbolic automatic tools:
AVISPA [ABB+05] provides a common interface for four different back-ends which
implement different analysis techniques:
− On-the-fly Model-Checker (OFMC) [BMV05] performs protocol falsification and
bounded verification by exploring the transition system of the protocol (over a
bounded set of sessions) in a demand-driven way.
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− The Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher (CL-Atse) [Tur06] applies simplification
heuristics and redundancy elimination techniques to analyzes a bounded number of
sessions of the protocol using constraint solving. Note that, OFMC and CL-Atse
are open to extensions for handling algebraic properties.
− The SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC) [ACC14] translates the possible finite
protocol runs into a propositional formula, which is then given to a SAT solver and
any model found is translated back into an attack.
− The Tree Automata based on Automatic Approximation for the Analysis of Security
Protocols (TA4SP) [BHKO04] approximates the attacker knowledge by using regular
tree languages and rewriting. TA4SP is the only back-end supporting an unbounded
number of sessions (for reachability properties) by over-approximation. However, no
attack trace is provided by the tool and only the secrecy (reachability) is considered
in presence of algebraic properties.
All the four tools take as input a common language called HLPSL (High Level Protocol
Specification Language) which is compiled automatically into an intermediate format
(named IF). AVISPA was extended in the AVANTSSAR [AAA+12] project, but still relies
on the same (although improved) back-ends.
ProVerif [Bla01] is an automatic verification tool based on Horn clauses. It supports
trace properties such as secrecy and authentication properties [Bla02], as well as, strong
secrecy [Bla04] and equivalences [BAF08] which allows the verification of privacy properties.
It can analyze protocols for unbounded number of sessions, and supports user-defined
equational theories [AB05a]. ProVerif uses some approximations. It is sound but not
complete, and sometimes does not terminate. However, it can reconstructs attack traces
if possible [AB05c].
Scyther [Cre08a,Cre08b] verifies protocol using a symbolic backwards search based on
ordered patterns. It supports bounded and unbounded number of sessions, however it
does not always conclude for the unbounded case. In such a situation however it still
gives a verdict for the bounded case. It supports authentication and secrecy properties.
It also handles multi-protocols analysis, but no user-definable algebraic functions.
Tamarin [SMCB12, MSCB13] is a security protocol prover supports an unbounded
number of sessions. The security properties are specified as multiset rewriting systems
with respect to a special subset of (temporal) first-order properties. It also supports
Diffie-Hellman exponentiation and a user-defined subterm-convergent rewriting theory.
AKISS [CcCK12] allows to prove trace equivalence properties for bounded processes,
featuring user-defined equational theories. It is based on KISS [cCDK12], a tool allowing
to prove static equivalence for complex equational theories.
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For a comparison of the performance of different tools (in particular Scyther, ProVerif
and the different AVISPA back-ends) see [CLN09,LTV09,PBP+10,DSHJ10]. We chose
ProVerif for many verification tasks throughout the thesis because of its performance,
its support for authentication and equivalence properties (to analyze different notions of
Privacy) and its support of user-defined equational theories (to model special cryptographic
operations as well as the properties of physical objects (see [DJL14])). Furthermore,
it supports the verification of a protocol modeled in a process calculus [AB05a] which
resembles the Applied pi-Calculus. ProVerif has been used to verify many secrecy,
authentication and privacy properties, see e.g., [AB05b,ABF07,KR05,DKR09,BHM08,
DRS08,SRKK10,DLL12b,DJP12].
The tools mentioned so far only verify the specification of protocols but not their
implementations. Such verification does not tackle side-channel attacks and other imple-
mentation attacks, simply because they cannot be modeled without implementing the
protocol. Hence, it is necessary to prove security properties on protocols implementations
in order to capture the latter attacks. In this context, tools such as [PS10,PSD04,SPP01]
have been proposed to translate a model into an implementation using a suitable com-
piler. So that they can be used to translate a model of formally secure protocol into an
implementation, thus reducing the risk of introducing security flaws in the coding phase.
Another approach is to extract specification from an implementation in order to formally
analyze it. For example, FS2PV [BFGT08] translates a protocol implementation written
in a subset of F# into the input language of ProVerif. One can also analyze directly an
implementation of a protocol written in a standard programming language such as F#,
C or Java. Several tools were adopted and new tools were designed to analyze protocol
implementations. The tool CSur [GP05] analyzes protocols written in C by translating
them into Horn clauses that can given as an input to H1 prover [Gou05]. Similarly,
JavaSec [Jür06] translates Java programs into first-order logic formulas, which are then
given as input to first-order theorem prover e-SETHEO. The tools F7 [BFG10,BBF+11]
and F∗ [SCF+13] use a dependent type system in order to prove security properties
of protocols implemented in F#. ASPIER [CD09] uses software model-checking, with
predicate abstraction and counter-example guided abstraction refinement in order to
verify C implementations of protocols assuming the size of messages and the number of
sessions are bounded.
However, such techniques usually suffer from complexity and scalability limitations. For
instance, tools that depends on model checking such as ASPIER limits the size of systems
that can be verified as model checkers suffer from state explosion problem, and tools based
on theorem proving usually involves significant amount of manual effort that, effectively,
limits the size of the system that can be verified. Moreover, as formal tools operate on
models they may introduce additional proof obligations on the correctness of abstraction
or model creation. For example, tools that translate models into implementations require
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a proof for the correctness of the used compilers. Note that, the latter tools also suffer from
the fact that the protocol modeling language offers less flexibility in the implementation
of the protocol than a standard programming language. Furthermore, the problem of
finding all possible runtime errors in an arbitrary program is undecidable (going back to
Alonzo Church [Chu36] and Alan Turing [Tur 7]).
1.3 Runtime Verification
Another research area concerned with monitoring and analysis of implementations (and
systems) executions is runtime verification. It is mainly motivated by the scalability
limitations of exhaustive design formal verification. Runtime verification allows to
have automatic analysis, that does not require much abstraction, of traces extracted
from systems executions. Runtime verification can provide a weaker result than formal
verification. Whilst formal verification verifies correctness against all possible system
executions, runtime verification only considers traces observed on individual executions.
Although incomplete, in the latter sense, runtime verification has an advantage that
the actual behavior is analyzed. At the end, runtime verification is not a replacement
of formal verification since as famously stated by Edsger Dijkstra decades ago “testing
can only find bugs, not prove their absence”. However, a combination between formal
verification and runtime verification can provide an invaluable infrastructure for systems
verification which can significantly decrease the complexity of formal verification (for
examples see [CK10,CL07,KTAK07,CKK11]). In the thesis, we use runtime verification
to monitor executions of exam implementations. Particularly, we analyze real exam
executions carried out at Université Joseph Fourier.
Runtime verification is a computing analysis based on observing system executions
to check certain properties. It performs conventional testing by building monitors from
formal specifications. Runtime verification has emerged as a practical application of formal
verification. It is particularly useful, when exhaustive design verification is impractical
due to inherent complexity of the systems. However, the quality of runtime analysis
depends on test scenarios, which makes it less robust compared to formal analysis.
During the last decade, many important tools to monitor systems at runtime have been
developed and successfully employed [CR09,MJG+12,CPS09,BH11,RCR15]. To monitor a
property is to check whether it is satisfied by a trace, a finite sequence of events, extracted
from a system execution. In this context, we can distinguish between the propositional
and the parametric approaches. The propositional approach operates on events consisting
of simple names without data values. Several tools and techniques adopt the propositional
approach. For example, Lee et al. [LBaK+98, KVB+99] proposed a Monitoring and
Checking (MaC) framework which provides the means to monitor and checks running
systems against formally specified requirements. Later, the DMaC [ZSLL09] tool has
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been built on the MaC framework and declarative networking (see [LCH+05,LHSR05]) to
specify and verify distributed network protocols. Another tool that adopts propositional
approach is TemporalRover (TR) [Dru00], which is a commercial runtime verification tool
developed by Doron Drusinsky in 2000. TR can be used to verify implementations written
in C, C++, Java, Verilog and VHDL, using specifications written in Linear Temporal
Logic (LTL) [Pnu77] or Metric Temporal Logic (MTL) [Koy90,AH91]. In the other hand,
parametric approaches deal with events that are parameterized by data values. Recently,
researchers have focused on parametric monitoring. In parametric approach, we again
distinguish between the two following categories:
− Slicing : in slicing approach a trace is sliced into a set of propositional values. Slicing
technique can be used in combination with any propositional trace analysis by
applying the latter on each trace slice. Tools that adopt the slicing approach include:
JavaMOP [CR09,MJG+12], Larva [CPS09], and Tracematches [AAC+05,BHL+10].
Recently, Barringer et al. introduced Quantified Event Automaton [BFH+12,Reg14],
a slicing based formalism for concisely capturing expressive specifications with
parameters. They extended the trace slicing approach by allowing free variables,
and formalizing the notions of quantification and acceptance. Later, Reger et
al. [RCR15] developed MarQ, a monitoring Java based tool for QEA.
− Rule-based : in this approach a parametric rule system is defined by rules which
rewrite a set of facts about the monitored system. Examples of this approach are:
the EAGLE [BGHS04] tool, which is based on a restricted first order, fixed-point,
linear-time temporal logic with chop over finite traces; the RuleR [BRH10,BHRG09]
tool, which is developed as a practically useful and more efficiently executable
subset of EAGLE; and the TraceContract [BH11] tool, an API for trace analysis
(implemented in the SCALA programming language) which offers writing properties
in a notation that combines parameterized state machines with temporal logic.
We use QEA to formalize exam requirements, and we carry out an oﬄine runtime
analysis using the MarQ tool. Our choice of using QEA mainly stems from two reasons.
First, QEAs is one of the most expressive specification formalism to express monitors.
The second reason stems to the fact that QEA is supported by MarQ tool, which came
top in the 1st international competition on Runtime Verification [BBF14], showing that
MarQ is one of the most efficient existing monitoring tools for both oﬄine and online
monitoring 7. Moreover, QEAs turned out to be a specification language that is accepted
and understood by the engineers who were collaborating with us and responsible for the
development of the e-exam software.
7 http://rv2014.imag.fr/monitoring-competition/results
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1.4 Contributions and structure of the thesis
In Chapter 2, we first recall the Applied pi-Calculus [AF01] which is used throughout
the thesis to formally model protocols and properties. Then, we briefly introduce
ProVerif [Bla01] tool which is used to carry automatic formal verification. Finally, we
provide a brief overview about QEA and MarQ tool which are used to perform runtime
verification.
In Chapter 3, we study security properties of exam protocols. Firstly, we propose
a formal model for authentication and privacy properties. We apply this model, using
ProVerif, to the e-exams due to Huszti & Pethő [HP10] and Giustolisi et al. [GLR14], and
pencil-and-paper exam at Université Grenoble Alpes8. Secondly, we propose an abstract
model for verifiability properties, and we discuss with the help of ProVerif the verifiability
of Giustolisi et al. [GLR14] exam, and Université Grenoble Alpes exam. Finally, we study
exam monitoring at runtime. We propose several monitors expressed as Quantified Event
Automata. We validate our monitors by verifying using MarQ real e-exams executions
conducted by Université Joseph Fourier at pharmacy faculty. Our approach allows to
report the individuals responsible of potential failures. Note that, our results shows
several flaws on the analyzed exams.
In Chapter 4, we propose a formal framework to define, analyze, and verify security
properties of e-cash protocols. We define two client privacy properties and three properties
to prevent forgery. Then, we apply our definitions and analyze using ProVerif the Chaum
protocol [Cha82], the DigiCash protocol9, and the Chaum et al. protocol [CFN88]. Our
analysis confirms several already known attacks, and reveal a flaw confirming the necessity
of synchronization in online cash protocols.
In Chapter 5, we model reputation protocols, and formally define several related
authentication and privacy properties. Then, we define two verifiability properties in an
abstract way. Finally, we validate our model by analyzing, using ProVerif, the security of
a simple reputation protocol presented in [PRT04].
In Chapter 6, we consider multiple independent attackers, and show that when analyz-
ing route validity property it is sufficient to verify only five topologies, each containing
four nodes, and to consider only three malicious (compromised) nodes. Particularly, we
generalize the result obtained in [CDD12] where attackers share their knowledge to the
case of attackers that do not share knowledge.
In Chapter 7, we sum up our results and discuss directions for future work.
8 www.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr 9 DigiCash Inc. was an electronic money corporation founded by
David Chaum in 1990. The protocol used by DigiCash has been presented by Berry Schoenmakers
in [Sch97].
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1.5 Publications
All the works presented in this thesis have already been published. The work on authen-
tication and privacy of exam protocols was presented at SECRYPT 2014 [DGK+14]. An
extended version was submitted to be published by Springer-Verlag in their “Lecture Notes”
(CCIS) series. Note that, this work was accomplished by collaboration with: Jannik Dreier
from Institute of Information Security, ETH Zurich; Rosario Giustolisi, Gabriele Lenzini,
and Peter Y. A. Ryan from SnT/University of Luxembourg; and Pascal Lafourcade from
“Université Grenoble Alpes”. The definition of exam verifiability was published at ISPEC
2015 [DGK+15] by collaboration with Jannik Dreier, Rosario Giustolisi, Gabriele Lenzini,
and Pascal Lafourcade. The work on runtime verification of e-exam was achieved by
collaboration with Yliès Falcone and Pascal Lafourcade from “Université Grenoble Alpes”,
and was accepted at RV 2015 [KFL15]. The work of Chapter 4 on cash protocols was
achieved by collaboration with Jannik Dreier and Pascal Lafourcade, and was presented
at SECRYPT 2015 [DKL15]10. Finally, the results of Chapter 5 on reputation protocols,
and Chapter 6 on route validity were achieved by collaborating with Pascal Lafourcade
and Yassine Lakhnech from “Université Grenoble Alpes”, and were respectively presented
at FPS 2014 [KLL14] and FPS 2013 [KLL13].
10 Our paper on e-cash [DKL15] is selected by ICETE 2015 to submit an extended version in order to be
published by Springer-Verlag in their “Lecture Notes” (CCIS) series.
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Preliminaries
In order to formally verify whether a protocol satisfies a certain property, we need first to
model them. In this chapter, we introduce the Applied pi-Calculus [AF01] in Section 2.1.
Then, we present a general overview about ProVerif. Finally, we provide a brief description
of the Quantified Event Automata and the MarQ tool in Sections 2.2 and 2.4.
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2.1 Applied pi-Calculus
The Applied pi-Calculus [AF01] is a process calculus designed for analyzing cryptographic
protocols. It is a variant of the pi-Calculus [Mil99], a language for modeling and analyzing
concurrent systems. The Applied pi-Calculus allows a wide variety of cryptographic
primitives to be defined using equational theories. Moreover, it is enriched by relations
to check equivalences between processes, which allows us to define and analysis privacy
properties. In the following, we recall its syntax, semantics and equivalence relations.
2.1.1 Syntax and Semantics
The Applied pi-Calculus assumes an infinite set of names used to model channels and
other atomic data, an infinite set of variables, and a signature Σ which consists of a finite
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set of function symbols each with an arity. Function symbols capture primitives used
by cryptographic protocols, such as hash functions, digital signatures, encryption and
decryption schemes. A function symbol with arity 0 is a constant.
Example 2.1. (Signature). An example of a signature is Σsym = {enc, dec} which
captures symmetric encryption enc and decryption dec, each with arity 2. The encryption
of message m with key k is enc(m, k), and the decryption of the cipher c with the key k
is dec(c, k).
Terms are defined by names, variables, or function symbols applied to terms according
to the grammar shown in Figure 2.1. A term is ground when it does not contain variables.
We rely on a type (or sort) system for terms. It includes a set of base types such as
M,N ::= term of type t
n name of type t
x variable of type t
f(M1, . . . ,Ml) application of symbol f ∈ Σ : t1 × . . .× tl → t such
that l matches the arity of f and Mi is of type ti
Figure 2.1: Grammar for terms
Nonce, Key or simply a universal base type Data. Additionally, if ω is a type, then
Channel 〈ω〉 is a type (intuitively, the type of a channel transmitting terms of type ω).
Names and variables can have any type. Function symbols can only be applied to, and
return, terms of base type. Terms equality is modeled using an equational theory E, a
finite set of equations, which defines an equivalence relation =E that is closed under
substitutions of terms for variables. For simplicity, we may omit the subscript E when it
is clear from the context.
Example 2.2. (Equational Theory). The equation dec(enc(x, y), y) =E x, where x
and y are variables, says that dec, representing decryption, is the inverse function of enc,
representing encryption, and that they related in E as one expects in a correct symmetric
encryption scheme.
The grammar for processes (or plain processes) in the Applied pi-Calculus is shown
in Figure 2.2. The null process 0 does nothing; P | Q is the parallel composition of
P and Q; and the replication !P executes infinitely many copies of P in parallel. The
name restriction νn.P generates a new private name n and then continues like P . The
conditional process “if M = N then P else Q” behaves as P if M =E N and as Q
otherwise. We may omit sub-term “else Q” when Q is 0. The process in(u, x).P inputs
a message on channel u of type Channel 〈ωx〉, assigns it to the variable x of type ωx,
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P,Q ::= plain processes
0 null process
P | Q parallel composition
!P replication
νn.P name restriction (new)
if M =E N then P else Q conditional
in(u, x).P message input
out(u,M).P message output
Figure 2.2: Grammar for plain processes
and then continues like P . Finally, out(u,M).P outputs a term M of type ωM on the
channel u of type Channel 〈ωM 〉, and then continues like P . The sub-term ‘.P ’ is usually
omitted when P is 0. Plain processes are extended with active substitutions and variable
A,B ::= extended processes
P plain process
A | B parallel composition
!P replication
νn.A name restriction
νx.A variable restriction
{M/x} active substitution
Figure 2.3: Grammar for extended processes
restriction. The grammar of extended processes is shown in Figure 2.3. The variable
restriction νx.A bounds the variable x in the process A. The active substitution {M/x}
replaces the variable x with a term M in any process that comes into parallel with it. We
use σ to denote a substitution, xσ to denote the image of x by σ, and Mσ to denote the
result of applying σ to the term M . Substitutions are well-sorted (i.e., x and σ(x) have
the same type), and cycle-free (i.e., dom(σ) = {x ∈ X | σ(x) 6= x}). Moreover, two active
substitutions are not allowed to define the same variable, and there is exactly one defining
each restricted variable. We abbreviate tuple of names or variables u1, . . . , ul, and tuple
of terms M1, . . . ,Ml to u˜ and M˜ , respectively. Accordingly, we abbreviate νu1, . . . , νul.A
and {M1/x1 , . . . ,Ml /xl} to νu˜.A and {M˜/x˜}, respectively. As an additional notion, we
write Ak for A| · · · |A (k times) where k ∈ N, in particular A0 = 0 as 0 is the neutral
element of parallel composition. Also, following ProVerif, we write let x˜ = M˜ in P for
15
Chapter 2. Preliminaries
νx˜.(P | {M˜/x˜}). Note that, names and variables have scopes. A name n is bound if it is
in the scope of a restriction νn. A variable x is bound if it is in the scope of a restriction
νx or of an input in(u, x). Names and variables are free if they are not bounded by
restrictions or by inputs. We respectively denote by fv(A), bv(A), fn(A) and bn(A)
the free variables, bound variables, free names and bound names of the process A. An
extended process is closed when all variables are either bound or defined by an active
substitution. Bound names and variables can be renamed without changing the semantics
of the process, this is called α-conversion.
Example 2.3. (α-conversion). Consider the following process, where a, d, m, n, s are
names, and x, y are variables, P0 = νa.νn.νs.(out(a, n)|in(a, x).out(d, x)|out(d,m)|{s/y}).
Then, we have, fv(P0) = {y}, bv(P0) = {x}, fn(P0) = {d,m}, and bn(P0) = {a, n, s}.
An α-conversion that renames the bound names a, n, and s respectively to c, l, and k,
and the bound variable x to z can be applied to P0 to obtain the following process which
has the same semantics as P0: νc.νl.νk.(out(c, l)|in(c, z).out(d, z)|out(d,m)|{k/y}).
A frame φ is an extended process built up from 0 and active substitutions by parallel
composition and restriction. The domain dom(φ) of a frame φ is the set of the variables
x for which φ contains an active substitution {M/x} such that x is not under restriction.
Every extended process A can be mapped to a frame φ(A) by replacing every plain
process in A with 0. The domain dom(A) of A is the domain of φ(A) The frame φ(A)
can be seen as a representation of the static knowledge known about the process to its
exterior environment. A context C[ ] is an extended process with a hole. An evaluation
context C[ ] is a context whose hole is not in scope of replication, a conditional, an input
or an output. We say that a context C[ ] closes A when C[A] is closed.
Example 2.4. (Frame). Consider again the process P0 of Example 2.3.
P0 = νa.νn.νs.(out(a, n)|in(a, x).out(d, x)|out(d,m)|{s/y})
Then, the frame φ(P0) = νa.νn.νs.(0|0|0|{s/y}), and dom(A) = dom(φ(A)) = {y}.
The operational semantics of processes in the Applied pi-Calculus is defined by Struc-
tural Equivalence (see Figure 2.4), Internal Reduction (see Figure 2.5), and Labeled
External Transitions (see Figure 2.6). Two processes with different structure are struc-
turally equivalent if they model the same thing. A process can be structured to a
structurally equivalent process using the Structural Equivalence relation (≡), which
is the smallest equivalence relation on extended processes closed under application of
evaluation contexts and α-conversion on bound names and bound variables such that the
rules of Figure 2.4 hold. The rules for parallel composition and restriction are standard.
ALIAS enables the introduction of an arbitrary active substitution with restricted scope.
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PAR-0 A ≡ A | 0
PAR-A A | (B | C) ≡ (A | B) | C
PAR-C A | B ≡ B | A
REPL !P ≡ P | !P
NEW-0 νn.0 ≡ 0
NEW-C νu.νv.A ≡ νv.νu.A
NEW-PAR A | νu.B ≡ νu.(A | B) if u /∈ fn(A) ∪ fv(A)
ALIAS νx.{M/x} ≡ 0
REWRITE {M/x} ≡ {N/x} if M =E N
SUBST {M/x} | A ≡ {M/x} | A{M/x}
Figure 2.4: Semantics of Structural Equivalence
REWRITE allows to replace a term with an equal term modulo an equational theory.
SUBST describes the nature of the active substitution which can be applied to any process
that comes in parallel to it. Using structural equivalence, every closed extended process
A can be written as νn˜.{M˜/x˜} | P , where P is a closed plain process. In particular, every
closed frame φ can be written as νn˜.{M˜/x˜}.
Example 2.5. (Structural Equivalence). We can use Structural Equivalence to re-
structure our running process P0 as follows:
P0 = νa.νn.νs.(out(a, n)|in(a, x).out(d, x)|out(d,m)|{s/y})
≡ νa.νn.νs.(out(a, n)|in(a, x).out(d, x)|0|out(d,m)|{s/y}) PAR-0
≡ νa.νn.νs.(out(a, n)|in(a, x).out(d, x)|(νx.{n/x})|out(d,m)|{s/y}) ALIAS
≡ νa.νn.νs.(νx.(out(a, n)|in(a, x).out(d, x)|{n/x})|out(d,m)|{s/y}) NEW-PAR
≡ νa.νn.νs.(νx.({n/x}|out(a, n)|in(a, x).out(d, x))|out(d,m)|{s/y}) PAR-C
≡ νa.νn.νs.(νx.({n/x}|out(a, x)|in(a, x).out(d, x))|out(d,m)|{s/y}) SUBSET
A process can be evolved internally without any contact with its environment (other
processes and the attacker) represented by a context. This can happen based on the
Internal Reduction (→), which is the smallest relation on extended processes closed
by Structural Equivalence and application of evaluation contexts such that the rules of
Figure 2.5 hold. Note that, we write P →∗ P ′ for P → . . .→ P ′. The rule COMM allows
the internal communication of a variable. This simplicity entails no loss of generality
because ALIAS and SUBST can introduce a variable to stand for a term (see Example 2.6).
The conditional rules (THEN and ELSE) say that a process takes the P branch if the
compared terms are equal under the equational theory E, and that it takes the branch Q
otherwise.
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COMM out(a, x).P | in(a, x).Q→ P | Q
THEN if M =E M then P else Q→ P
ELSE if M =E N then P else Q→ Q
for any ground terms M,N such that M 6=E N
Figure 2.5: Semantics of Internal Reduction
Example 2.6. (Internal Reduction). Consider our running example process P0 of
Example 2.3. Then, we can execute the following transition using Internal Reduction:
P0 = νa.νn.νs.(out(a, n)|in(a, x).out(d, x)|out(d,m)|{s/y})
≡ νa.νn.νs.(νx.({n/x}|out(a, x)|in(a, x).out(d, x))|out(d,m)|{s/y}) Example 2.5
→ νa.νn.νs.(νx.({n/x}|out(d, x))|out(d,m)|{s/y}) COMM
≡ νa.νn.νs.(out(d, n))|out(d,m)|{s/y}) reverse of Example 2.5
An extended process can interacts with its environment based on the Labeled External
Transitions rules ( α→) described in Figure 2.6, where α can be an input or an output of a
channel name or variable of base type. According to IN, a term M may be input from
IN in(a, x).P
in(a,M)−−−−−→ P{M/x}
OUT-ATOM out(a, u).P
out(a,u)−−−−−→ P
OPEN-ATOM
A
out(a,u)−−−−−→ A′ u 6= a
νu.A
νu.out(a,u)−−−−−−−→ A′
SCOPE
A
α−→ A′ u does not occur in α
νu.A
α−→ νu.A′
PAR
A
α−→ A′ bv(α) ∩ fv(B) = bn(α) ∩ fn(B) = ∅
A | B α−→ A′ | B
STRUCT
A ≡ B B α−→ B′ B′ ≡ A′
A
α−→ A′
Figure 2.6: Semantics of Labeled External Transitions
the external environment. OUT-ATOM allows to output only for free channel names and
for free variables of base type. To output restricted channel name, or a term the rule
OPEN-ATOM is needed. A term has to be assigned to a variable, which can then be
output. This can be done by rewriting out(a,M).P as νx.(out(a, x).P | {M/x}) using
the Structural Equivalence. Note that, the Labeled External Transitions are not closed
under evaluation contexts.
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Example 2.7. (Labeled External Transitions). Consider our running example pro-
cess P0 of Example 2.3. Then, we can execute the following external transition:
P0 = νa.νn.νs.(out(a, n)|in(a, x).out(d, x)|out(d,m)|{s/y})
≡ νa.νn.νs.(out(a, x)|in(a, x).out(d, x)|νz.({m/z}|out(d, z))|{s/y})
similar to Example 2.5
νz.out(d,z))−−−−−−−→ νa.νn.νs.(out(a, n)|in(a, x).out(d, x)|{m/z}|{s/y})
by OUT-ATOM, PAR, and OPEN-ATOM
Additionally, we use the definitions introduced in [DKR09] for the bribed and coerced
parties, which are defined by the means of a processes P ch1 and P ch1,ch2 respectively.
The process P ch1 allows us to model parties which are willing to reveal their secret data
to the attacker (e.g., a coercer). It is a variant of P that reveals on channel ch1 (on which
the attacker is listening) all its inputs of base type and any freshly generated name of
base type. For instance, the process (νn.P )ch1 outputs on the channel ch1 the freshly
generated name n if it is of base type, then continues like P )ch1 . Similarly, the process
(in(u, x).P )ch1 outputs on ch1 the value it receives if this value is of base type, then
continues like P ch1 . However, P ch1 does not forward restricted channel names, as these
are used for modeling, e.g., physically secure channels or a public key infrastructure which
securely distributes keys. Note that in the latter example the keys are forwarded to the
attacker, but not the secret channel names on which the key are received.
Definition 2.1. (Process P ch1 [DKR09]). Let P be a plain process and ch1 be channel
name. The process P ch1 is defined follows:
− 0ch1 =ˆ 0,
− (P |Q)ch1 =ˆ P ch1 |Qch1,
− (!P )ch1 =ˆ !P ch1,
− (νn.P )ch1 =ˆ νn.out(ch1, n).P ch1 if n is a name of base type, or
(νn.P )ch1 =ˆ νn.P ch1 otherwise,
− (if M =E N then P else Q)ch1 =ˆ if M =E N then P ch1 else Qch1,
− (in(u, x).P )ch1 =ˆ in(u, x).out(ch1, x).P ch1 if x is a variable of base type, or
(in(u, x).P )ch1 =ˆ in(u, x).P ch1 otherwise,
− (out(u, x).P )ch1 =ˆ out(u, x).P ch1 .
The application of the transformation is distributed on the parallel composition ‘|’ and
on the replication ‘!’ since in these two cases it is enough for each parallel process to
output its data that are required to reveal. In the case of the conditional process, the
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transformation is applied to the taken branch. Finally, 0ch1 =ˆ 0 as the null process does
nothing, and (out(u, x).P )ch1 =ˆ out(u, x).P ch1 as the output messages are not revealed.
Note that in the remainder, we assume that ch1 /∈ fn(P ) ∪ bn(P ) before applying the
transformation.
The second process P ch1,ch2 does not only reveal the secret data on channel ch1, but
also takes orders from an outsider (attacker) on the channel ch2 before sending a message
or branching. This models a completely corrupted party. For instance, the attacker can
control which branch to take in the case of the conditional process, and can provide a
message of his choice to output in the case the output process.
Definition 2.2. (Process P ch1,ch2 [DKR09]). Let P be a plain process and ch1, ch2
be two channel names. The process P ch1,ch2 is defined follows:
− 0ch1,ch2 =ˆ 0;
− (P |Q)ch1,ch2 =ˆ P ch1,ch2 |Qch1,ch2;
− (!P )ch1,ch2 =ˆ !P ch1,ch2;
− (νn.P )ch1,ch2 =ˆ νn.out(ch1, n).P ch1,ch2 if n is a name of base type, otherwise
(νn.P )ch1,ch2 =ˆ νn.P ch1,ch2;
− (if M =E N then P else Q)ch1,ch2 =ˆ in(ch2, x).if x = true then P ch1,ch2 else
Qch1,ch2, where x is a fresh variable and true is a constant;
− (in(u, x).P )ch1,ch2 =ˆ in(u, x).out(ch1, x).P ch1,ch2 if x is a variable of base type,
otherwise (in(u, x).P )ch1,ch2 =ˆ in(u, x).P ch1,ch2;
− (out(u, x).P )ch1,ch2 =ˆ in(ch2, x).out(u, x).P ch1,ch2, where x is a fresh variable.
To hide the outputs of an extended process on a certain channel, we use the following
definition.
Definition 2.3. (Process A\out(ch,·) [DKR09]). Let A be an extended process and ch
be a channel name. We define the process A\out(ch,·) as νch.(A | !in(ch, x)).
The process A\out(ch,·) is as the process A, but hiding the outputs on the channel ch. We
also use the following two lemmas from [DKR09].
Lemma 2.1. (Process (P ch)\out(ch,·) [DKR09]). Let P be a closed plain process and
ch a channel name such that ch /∈ fn(P )∪bn(P ). Then, we have that (P ch)\out(ch,·) ≈l P .
Lemma 2.2. (Context Commutativity [DKR09]). Let C1 = νu˜1.( |P1) and C2 =
νu˜2.( |P2) be two evaluation contexts such that u˜1 ∩ (fv(P2) ∪ fn(P2)) = ∅, and u˜2 ∩
(fv(P1) ∪ fn(P1)) = ∅. Then, C1[C2[A]] ≡ C2[C1[A]] for any extended process A.
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2.1.2 Equivalences
Two processes are equivalent if an external observer cannot tell them apart. The Applied
pi-Calculus has two relations to define equivalence between processes are Observational
Equivalence, and Labeled Bisimilarity. Two processes are observationally equivalent if for
every context each output or internal transition of the first process can be simulated by
the second process.
Definition 2.4. (Observational Equivalence [AF01]). Observational Equivalence
(≈) is the largest symmetric relation R between closed extended processes with the same
domain such that A R B implies:
1. if A ⇓ a, then B ⇓ a, where A ⇓ a means that the process A sends a message on the
channel a, i.e., when A→∗ C[out(a,M).P ] for some evaluation context C[ ] that
does not restrict a;
2. if A→∗ A′, then B →∗ B′ and A′ R B′ for some B′;
3. C[A] R C[B] for all closing evaluation contexts C[ ].
Example 2.8. (Observational Equivalence). Let f be a unary function symbol with no
equations. Then, we have νs.out(a, s) ≈ νs.out(a, h(s)), although this is not easy to prove.
As an another example, we have that out(a, s1) 6≈ out(a, s2) where s1 and s2 are names.
We can prove that using the context C[ ] ≡ in(a, x). if x = s1 then out(a, s1)| , which
does not satisfies the clause 3 of Definition 2.4. Indeed, we have that C[out(a, s1)] →∗
out(a, s1) thus C[out(a, s1)] ⇓ a, but C[out(a, s2)] can never outputs on a.
It is difficult to prove Observational Equivalence due to the quantification over all
contexts. Therefore, Labeled Bisimilarity (≈l) is introduced, which is more suitable
for both manual and automatic reasoning. Labeled Bisimilarity relies on the notion of
Static Equivalence (≈s), which is based on the equivalence of two terms in a given frame.
Note that, the two relations ≈ and ≈l coincide [AF01,Liu11], that is, for any two closed
extended processes A and B we have A ≈ B, if and only if, A ≈l B.
Definition 2.5. (Equality in a Frame [AF01]). Two terms M and N are equal in
the frame φ, written (M = N)φ, if and only if, φ ≡ νn˜.σ, Mσ = Nσ and {n˜}∩ (fn(M)∪
fn(N)) = ∅, for some names n˜ and substitution σ.
Definition 2.6. (Statical Equivalence [AF01]). Two closed frames φ and ψ are
statically equivalent, written φ ≈s ψ, if dom(φ) = dom(ψ), and if for all terms M and
N , we have that (M = N)φ, if and only if, (M = N)ψ. Two extended processes A and
B are statically equivalent, written A ≈s B if their frames are statically equivalent.
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Two frames are statically equivalent if any test (M = N) that holds on one frame
should also hold on the other frame. Two processes are statically equivalent if all their
previous operations gave the same results, so that they cannot be distinguished from the
messages they previously exchanged with the environment. However, they may evolve in
different ways in future.
Example 2.9. (Statical Equivalence [CK14]). Let φ1 = νk.{k/x,enc(0,k) /y} and
φ2 = νk.{k/x,enc(1,k) /y}. Then, φ1 6≈s φ2 since we have that (enc(0, x) = y)φ1, but
(enc(0, x) 6= y)φ2. Adding some randomness to the encryption will result into statically
equivalent frames. For instance, νk.νr.{k/x,enc((0,r),k) /y} ≈s νk.νr.{k/x,enc((1,r),k) /y}.
The idea of Static Equivalence can be extended to labeled bisimilarity.
Definition 2.7. (Labeled Bisimilarity [AF01]). Labeled bisimilarity (≈l) is the
largest symmetric relation R on closed active processes, such that A R B implies:
1. A ≈s B
2. if A→∗ A′, then B →∗ B′ and A′RB′ for some B′
3. if A α→ A′, fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α) ∩ fn(B) = ∅, then B →∗ α→→∗ B′ and
A′ R B′ for some B′.
Example 2.10. (Labeled Bisimilarity [RS11]). For any closed process P , we have
νa.(out(a,m).P | in(a, x).Q) ≈l νa.(P | Q{m/x})
The equivalence holds because the only choice that the left-side process can take, and
which the right-side process cannot is the internal reduction over the private channel a by
COMM. This reduction results in the right-side process.
2.2 ProVerif Tool
Throughout the thesis, we use ProVerif to perform automatic verification tasks. ProVerif
is an automatic verification tool based on Horn clauses originally developed by Bruno
Blanchet [Bla01] to verify secrecy (reachability). It is then extended to support corre-
spondence properties between events to verify authentication properties [Bla02], strong
secrecy [Bla04], and equivalences [BAF08] which allows the verification of privacy proper-
ties. It also supports user-defined equational theories [AB05a], which allows the modeling
of a large class of cryptographic primitives, as well as, the properties of physical objects.
Furthermore, Küster and Truderung have shown how to reduce the derivation problem
for Horn theories with XOR (⊕) to the XOR-free case in [KT11]. Their reduction allows
one to carry out the analysis of the protocols that involve XOR operator using tools,
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such as ProVerif. The authors then adopted their approach to the case of Diffie-Hellman
exponentiation [KT09].
ProVerif takes a protocol and a property modeled in a process calculus [AB05a] which
resembles the Applied pi-Calculus, and translates them into Horn clauses (Prolog rules).
ProVerif then determines whether the property is satisfied by the protocol or not. In case
of failure, ProVerif may provide a trace of the obtained attack [AB05c]. For more details
about modeling protocols in ProVerif and its output we refer to the manual [BSC15].
Note that, ProVerif assumes a Dolev-Yao like attacker that can intercept all messages,
compute new messages from the messages it has received, and send any message it can
build.
Secrecy of a term (can the attacker get the secret s?) is defined in ProVerif as the
attacker cannot obtain the term by communicating with the protocol and performing
computations. It is modeled as a predicate: query attacker(s). ProVerif determines
whether the term s can be inferred from the Prolog rules. Authentication is captured by
correspondence assertions of events “on every execution trace an event e2 is preceded by
an event e1”. Events are annotations that do not change the behavior of the processes,
but help to reason about authentication properties. A basic correspondence assertion
is a formula of the form: e2(N) =⇒ e1(M). That is, for each occurrence of the event
e2(N) there is a previous execution of event e1(M). One can also define some relations
(to be satisfied) between M and N . A more general correspondence can be defined by
replacing the event e1(M) by conjunctions and disjunctions of events. ProVerif can also
capture the one-to-one relationship between events using injective correspondence, that
is: for each occurrence of event e2(N) there is a distinct earlier execution of event e1(M).
Moreover, ProVerif supports nested correspondence, that is some of the events in the
right hand side of =⇒ are replaced with correspondences.
To capture strong secrecy and other privacy properties ProVerif provides the ability
to verify observational equivalences. Strong secrecy of a value x can be questioned
using noninterf x. Other privacy properties such as anonymity are questioned using an
equivalence between two processes that differ only in the choice of some terms. Such an
equivalence is written in ProVerif by a single biprocess that encodes the two processes
by using the construct choice[M,N ] to represent the terms that differ between the
two processes, where the first component of the choice M is used in the first process
while the second component N is used in the second process. ProVerif can also prove
equivalence P ≈ Q between two processes P and Q presented separately, using the
command equivalence P Q where P and Q are processes that do not contain choice.
ProVerif will in fact try to merge the processes P and Q into a biprocess and then prove
equivalence of this biprocess. Note that ProVerif is not always capable of merging two
processes into a biprocess: the structure of the two processes must be fairly similar.
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As we noted in the Chapter 1 ProVerif is sound but not complete. This means
that, if ProVerif claims that a property is true or false, then this claim is correct.
However, ProVerif may say that a property “cannot be proved”, which is a “do not know”
answer. Furthermore, ProVerif may not terminate. The incompleteness is due to some
approximations that are performed by the translation of protocol into Horn clauses. The
main abstractions are (more details can be found in [BSC15]):
− Actions can be repeated any number of times.
− Generation of a fresh name n is represented as functions of the inputs located above
νn. So the more the νn is moved downward in the process, the more arguments
they have, and in general the more precise (but more costly) the analysis is.
− Some approximations are made when dealing with private channels. Particularly,
when a is a private channel, the process P in out(a,M).P can only be executed
when some input listens on channel a; ProVerif does not take that into account and
considers that P can always be executed.
− Further approximations are made when proving observational equivalence. In order
to show that P and Q are observationally equivalent, ProVerif proves that at each
step P and Q reduce in the same way: the same branch of a test or destructor
application is taken, communications happen in both processes or in neither of
them. This property is sufficient for proving observational equivalence, but it is not
necessary. For instance, the biprocess out(a, choice[m,n]) | out(a, choice[n,m])
satisfies observational equivalence as the difference in the first output is compensated
by the second output, but ProVerif cannot show this. For ProVerif to prove
observational equivalence, we have to rewrite the biprocess into the structurally
equivalent one out(a, choice[m,m]) | out(a, choice[n, n]). It becomes more difficult
when a configuration similar to the one above happens in the middle of the execution
of the process. We faced such a problem when we analyze some of our case studies
with ProVerif. We tackle it by defining an additional process that takes the outputs
messages on private channels, shuﬄes them, and then outputs them on a public
channel. Note that, Ben Smyth et al. are working on an extension of ProVerif to
tackle such cases [DRS08].
2.3 Quantified Event Automata
In this section, we present the Quantified Event Automata, an expressive formalism to
represent parametric specifications. We refer to [BFH+12,Reg14] for full syntax and
definitions.
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A finite-state automaton is a mathematical model of the allowable operations used
to design, e.g., computer programs. It is conceived as an abstract machine that can
be in one of a finite number of states. It can change from one state to another when
initiated by a triggering event or condition; this is called a transition. An event automaton
(EA) is a non-deterministic finite-state automaton whose alphabet consists of parametric
events and whose transitions may be labeled with guards and assignments. We use the
notation [guard ]assignment to write guards and assignments on transitions: (:=ˆ) for variable
declaration then assignment, (:=) for assignment, and (=) for equality test. A quantified
event automaton (QEA) is a generalization of event automaton where zero or more of
the EA variables are quantified. It formally defines a language (i.e., a set of accepted
traces) over instantiated parametric events. Acceptance is decided by replacing these
quantified variables by each value in their domain to generate a set of EA and then using
the quantifiers to determine which of these EA must accept the given trace. Unquantified
variables are left free, and they can be manipulated through assignments and updated
during the processing of the trace. Moreover, new free variables can be introduced while
processing the trace.
To illustrate Quantified Event Automata and their languages, we consider the following
example: “for any i: e2(i) is preceded by an event e1(i)” (see Figure 2.7). The associated
input alphabet contains only the events e1(i) and e2(i), so any other events in the trace
are ignored. The QEA of Figure 2.7 has two final (accepting) states (shaded in gray),
∀i
1 2
e1(i)
Figure 2.7: A QEA describing e2(i) is preceded by an event e1(i).
zero failure states (white color is used to represent failure states), one quantified variable
i, and zero free variables. The initial state has an arrow pointing to it. Square states are
closed to failure (next) states, i.e., if no transition can be taken, then there is a transition
to an implicit failure state. Whereas circular states are closed to self (skip) states, i.e., if
no transition can be taken, then there is an implicit self-looping transition. The empty
trace is accepted by the QEA since the initial state is accepting. State (1) is a square
state, so an event e2(i) that is not preceded by event e1(i) leads to a failure. An event
e1(i) in state (1) leads to state (2) which is a skipping state, so after event e1(i) any
sequence of events (for same i) is accepted. The quantification ∀i means that the property
must hold for all values that i takes in the trace, i.e., the values obtained when matching
the symbolic events in the specification with concrete events in the trace. For instance,
consider the following trace: e1(i1).e2(i2).e2(i1).e1(i2). To decide whether it is accepted
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or not, the trace is sliced based on the values that can match i, resulting in the two slices:
i 7→ i1: e1(i1).e2(i1), and i 7→ i2: e2(i2).e1(i2). Then, each slice is checked against the
event automaton instantiated with the appropriate value for i. The slice associated to i1
is accepted as it reaches the final state (2), while the slice associated to i2 does not reach
a final state since event e2(i2) leads from state (1) to an implicit failure state. Therefore,
the whole trace is not accepted by the QEA.
2.4 MarQ Tool
The MarQ [RCR15] tool is suitable for oﬄine (on reduced system executions) and
online (on running system) monitoring of Java programs using AspectJ [KHH+01] for
instrumentation. It won the oﬄine monitoring and online monitoring for Java tracks
in the 1st international Runtime Verification competition [BBF14]. Typically runtime
monitoring consists of three stages: firstly, a property denoting a set of valid traces
is specified in a formal language. Secondly, the system of interest is instrumented to
produce the required events recording information about the state of the system. Thirdly,
a monitor is generated from the specification, which processes the trace to produce a
verdict.
To specify QEA as input to the MarQ system, QEABuilder is used. A builder object
is used to add transitions and record information about quantification and states. These
are used to construct a QEA that is passed to the MonitorFactory. Figure 2.8 shows how
QEABuilder can be used to construct the QEA given in Figure 2.7.
QEABuilder q = new QEABuilder("Correspondence Assertion");
int E1 = 1; int E2 = 2;
int i=-1;
q.addQuantification(FORALL, i);
q.addTransition(1,E1, new int[]{i},2);
q.addFinalStates(1,2);
q.setSkipStates(2);
return q.make();
Figure 2.8: Using QEABuilder to construct the QEA of Figure 2.7.
A builder object q is first created. Then, event names and variables are declared.
Quantified variables are negative integers, whereas free variables are positive integers.
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After that, the universal quantifications are identified. In our example we have one
quantified variable i. Transitions are then added using addTransition. For each
transition, the start state, event name, parameters, guards, assignments, and end state
are specified. The builder object of Figure 2.7 has one transition from state (1) to state
(2) labeled with event E1 which has one parameters i. This single transition has neither
guards nor assignments. However, MarQ tool includes a library of guards and assignments
for dealing with equality, integer arithmetic, and sets. Moreover, it is possible for the user
to define a new guard or assignments by implementing a simple interface. The final step
of QEA building is to specify the accepting states, and skipping states. By default, states
are failure and next states. Once the QEA is constructed the monitor can be created by
a call to the MonitorFactory. This will inspect the structure of the QEA and produce
an optimized monitor. Two modes of monitoring are possible: oﬄine monitoring and
online monitoring. In oﬄine monitoring, a trace in CVS or XML format is given as a
log file and processed by a translator then by the monitor to produce a verdict. The
translator converts each event from “string” into the format used by the monitor. Whereas
in online monitoring, a program is instrumented to emit events which are feed to the
monitor. The monitor then produces a verdict on each event. Note that, in case of online
monitoring it is necessary to deliver each event to the monitor at the time it is generated
by the system. This can be done, for example, using AspectJ [KHH+01]. Details about
monitoring process and the algorithm used in MarQ can be found in [Reg14].
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we recalled the Applied pi-Calculus [AF01], the formal language we use
in the thesis to model protocols. Then, we provided an overview about ProVerif, the tool
we use to perform symbolic automatic verification tasks throughout the thesis. Finally,
we given a brief description of the Quantified Event Automata and the MarQ tool, as we
use them in Chapter 3 respectively to model exam requirements and to perform runtime
monitoring for real exam executions.
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Exam Protocols
Exams are systems employed to assess the skills, or the knowledge of candidates. In
an exam process, candidates may cheat to get a higher mark, examiners may be bribed,
and exam authorities may manipulate the results. Thus, security is significant to ensure
fairness and correctness.
In this chapter, we propose a formal model for authentication and privacy properties
of exams. We analyze using ProVerif the exams due to Huszti & Pethő [HP10], Giustolisi
et al. [GLR14], and pencil-and-paper exam at Université Grenoble Alpes1 (in short,
Grenoble exam). Then, we propose an abstract model of verifiability, and discuss with the
help of ProVerif the verifiability of Giustolisi et al. [GLR14] exam, and Grenoble exam.
Finally, we study exam monitoring at runtime. We propose several monitors, expressed
as Quantified Event Automata, to monitor the main properties of e-exams. We validate
our monitors by verifying, using the Java tool MarQ, real e-exam executions conducted
by Université Joseph Fourier2 at pharmacy faculty. Our approach allows to report the
individuals responsible of potential failures.
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3.1 Introduction
Exams are assessment tools used to measure skills, or knowledge. Typically, candidates
sit for the exam, and submit some answers which are collected by an authority; examiners
evaluate the candidates’ answers and deliver marks; and finally marks are notified by an
authority to the candidates.
Traditionally, exams are taken pencil-and-paper at hand. In contrast, nowadays several
exams rely on information and communication technology. They are called electronic
exams, in short e-exams. For instance, universities such as MIT, Stanford, and Berkeley,
just to cite a few, have began to offer university courses remotely using the Massive Open
Online Course platforms (e.g., Coursera3 and edX4) which offer e-exams. Even in a less
ambitious and more traditional setting, universities start adopting e-exams to replace
traditional exams, especially in the case of multiple-choice questions and short open
answers. For example, pharmacy exams at Université Joseph Fourier (UJF) have been
organized electronically using tablet computers since 2014 [Fig15]. Other institutions,
such as ETS5, CISCO6, and Microsoft7, have for long already adopted their own platforms
to run, generally in qualified centers, electronic tests required to obtain their program
certificates.
To ensure fairness between candidates, it is important to prevent cheating, and
manipulation of answers and marks during the exam process. In general, candidates may
try to cheat in order to get a higher mark. Candidates’ cheating is the main concern
of exam authorities. Usually, authorities try to prevent the candidates from cheating
with invigilated tests, and by using student cards, or login/password to authenticate the
candidates. Even for remote exams where it is not possible to have human invigilators
(proctors), a software running on the student computer is used, e.g., ProctorU8, and
webcam or biometrics may be used for authentication. However, such measures are
insufficient, as the trustworthiness and the reliability of exams are today threatened not
only by candidates. Indeed, threats and errors may come from the use of information
technology, as well as, from bribed examiners and dishonest exam authorities which
are willing to tamper with exams as recent scandals have shown. For example, in the
3 www.coursera.org 4 www.edx.org 5 www.etsglobal.org 6 www.cisco.com
7 www.microsoft.com/learning/en-us/default.aspx 8 www.proctoru.com
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Atlanta scandal, school authorities colluded in changing student marks to improve their
institution’s rankings and get more public funds [Lar13]. All such diverse exam systems
must be verified for the presence/absence of threats and irregularities. However, properties
of exam protocols have to be clearly defined and formalized before. In this chapter, we
formalize and analyze the following security properties of exam protocols:
− Authentication: Exam authority concerned in Answer Origin Authentication
which ensures that only registered candidates take the exam, and that one exam-
form (copy) is collected from each candidate. For the candidate it is crucial to
preserve the associations between her identity, her answer, and her mark. We
define three properties for that purpose, each covers a certain exam phase: i)
Form Authorship ensures that the contents of every accepted (collected) exam-
form (identity, questions, and answers) are not modified after submission, ii) Form
Authenticity ensures that the content of every exam-form is not modified after the
collection and until after the form is marked by an examiner, iii) Mark Authenticity
ensures that every candidate receives the mark which was assigned by the examiner
to his exam-form.
− Privacy: During examination process the anonymity of critical parties has to be
ensured in order to prevent bribing, and guarantee fairness among the candidates
to avoid favoritism. For instance, in order to guarantee the main goal of the exam,
which is assessing the knowledge and skills, the exam questions should not be
disclosed until the examination phase begins, this is ensured by our first privacy
property Question Indistinguishability. To prevent favoritism between candidates
at marking, an exam protocol should also satisfies privacy notions like, Anonymous
Marking, which ensures that the examiner evaluates the exam-forms without being
aware of their authors, and Anonymous Examiner which prohibits a candidate from
knowing which examiner is going to grade his exam-form, this is to avoid bribing.
Finally, to preserve the particularity of each candidate some notions are needed
like Mark Privacy which ensures that a candidate’s mark remains secret, and Mark
Anonymity, a weaker variant, which ensures that the attacker is unable to associate
a mark to its corresponding candidate.
− Verifiability: A verifiable exam protocol should allow a candidate to verify that
her questions are valid, that her answers were not manipulated, and that her
mark is correct. It should also allow a generic observer (e.g., judge) to verify
that only registered candidates participated in the exam, that no answer were
manipulated, that all answers were marked correctly, and that all marks were
assigned for corresponding candidates.
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− Monitoring: The verifiability properties operate on abstract models of protocol
specification. However, some errors may introduced by the implementation. In
order to ensure that protocol executions are correct, we discuss exam monitoring.
We propose several monitors based on Quantified Event Automata, which allows
to verify actual exam executions at runtime. Namely, no unregistered candidate
try to participate in the exam by submitting an answer; answers are accepted only
from registered candidates; all accepted answers are submitted by candidates, and
for each question at most one answer is accepted per candidate; all candidates
answer the questions in the required order; answers are accepted only during the
examination time; another variant of the latter that offers flexibility in the beginning
and the duration of the exam; all answers are marked correctly; and the correct
mark is assigned to each candidate. Our formalization also allows us to detect the
cause of the potential failures and the responsible parties.
Note that, our definitions apply not only to educational assessments and skill tests, but
also to situations where the properties discussed above are desirable such as peer review
systems, project proposal, public tender, and benchmarks. For example in academic
peer reviews, we have authors which submit academic papers in analogs to candidates
which submit answers in educational assessments. The papers are then evaluated by some
reviewers (in analogue to examiners) after being collected by a certain authority. Note
that, properties such as Form Authorship, Form Authenticity, and Anonymous Marking
are highly desirable in peer review systems.
Contributions. In this chapter, we provide the following contributions:
− In the first part, we propose a formal framework in the Applied pi-Calculus to
model and analyze the authentication and privacy properties of exam protocols.
We validate the proposed framework by analyzing using ProVerif three case studies:
the protocols by Huszti & Pethő [HP10], Giustolisi et al. [GLR14], and Grenoble
exam.
− In the second part, we propose abstract definitions of verifiability properties related
for exam protocols. We apply the proposed verifiability definitions to the protocol
by Giustolisi et al., and Grenoble exam, and again we use ProVerif to verify these
two protocols.
− In the final part, we define several QEAs which allow to monitor at runtime exam
requirements of exams. We also define for each property an alternative variant that
additionally collects and reports at the end some data in case of failure. Then, we
implement these QEAs using MarQ tool, and we perform oﬄine monitoring, based
on the available data logs, for an e-exam organized by Université Joseph Fourier.
32
Chapter 3. Exam Protocols
Outline of the Chapter. In Section 3.2, we discuss the related work. We formally
model exam protocol in Applied pi-Calculus to define authentication and privacy properties
in Section 3.3.1. Then, we define the authentication and privacy properties in Section 3.3.2.
In Section 3.3.3, we analysis the authentication and privacy properties of our three case
studies. In the second part (Section 3.4): we define an abstract model of exam protocols
and our verifiability properties. We split our properties into individual (Section 3.4.1)
and universal properties (Section 3.4.2). Then, we analysis the two related case studies in
Section 3.4.3. In the final part (Section 3.5): we introduce QEA syntax and present the
events we considered to define the monitors in Section 3.5.1. We defined our monitors as
QEAs in Section 3.5.2. Then, we perform an analyze of actual e-exam executions at UJF
in Section 3.5.3. We finally conclude in Section 3.6.
3.2 Related Work
In this section we discuss related work on exam protocols, and the link to other applications
such as auction and voting.
Exam Protocols. The majority of works on exam protocols argue the security of the
proposed protocols only informally. Castellà-Roca et al. [CHD06] proposed an e-exam
system, and claimed that it guarantees a number of authentication and privacy properties
in presence of a trusted exam manager. Huszti & Pethő [HP10] proposed an exam protocol
which relies on the reusable anonymous return channel [GJ03]. The proposed protocol
considers minimal trust requirements, but a trusted registry. Giustolisi et al. [GLB13]
listed some relevant requirements for exam protocols, yet only informally. Latter, an
extension for these requirements and an internet-based exam protocol, Remark! protocol,
have been presented in [GLB13]. The authors also provided some arguments to show that
their protocols meets the presented requirements. The majority of these requirements
are formalized herein in this thesis. Bella et al. [BGL14] presented an exam protocol
(WATA IV), which relies on visual cryptography [NS94]. It considers corrupted examiners,
but assumes a honest-but-curious anonymizer. WATA IV is the latest in a family of
protocols [BCR10,BCCR11,BGL14] with prototypes used to run exams at University of
Catania [BCCR11]. WATA IV was informally analyzed by its authors who claim that
WATA IV meets several authentication and privacy properties.
Few other works formally tackle exam protocols. Foley et al. [FJ95] proposed a
formalization for functionality and confidentiality requirements of Computer Supported
Collaborative Working (CSCW) applications. They illustrated their formalization using
an exam example as a case study. Arapinis et al. [ABR13] propose a cloud-based protocol
for conference management system that supports applications, evaluations, and decisions.
They identify a few privacy properties (secrecy and unlinkability) that should hold despite
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a malicious-but-cautious cloud, and they prove, using ProVerif, that their protocol satisfies
them. Recently in 2015, Bella et al. [BGLR15] presented an exam protocol that does
not require trusted third party (TTP). They also analyzed the proposed protocol using
Proverif. The considered six out of the nine authentication and privacy properties we
formalize in this thesis. All our exam privacy properties but Anonymous Examiner
are considered. Concerning authentication properties, they consider Answer Origin
Authentication and Form Authorship. They also proposed a new definition for Mark
Authenticity, which says that “an examiner correctly attributes the mark computed on a
given answer to the candidate that submitted this answer”. Whereas, our definition of
Mark Authenticity says that a candidate receives the mark attributed by an examiner to
the answer handed by the exam authority as it is accepted from this candidate. Note
that, our property Form Authenticity guarantees that the examiner computes the mark
on the answer accepted from the candidate (that is the correct answer is handed by the
authority to the examiner). So together our two properties Mark Authenticity and Form
Authenticity ensure that a candidate receives the mark computed on the answer accepted
from him. This is a bit stronger than their definition of Mark Authenticity which only
guarantees that a mark is attributed to a candidate, but not necessarily received by him.
Note also that, the authors of the paper [BGLR15] used a different meaning for the event
notified. That is, it emitted when an examiner attributes a given mark to a given
candidate. Whereas, in our definition notified is emitted when the candidate receives
the mark. Additionally, they defined the following four properties:
− Candidate Authorisation which says that only registered candidates can take the
exam. Note that, we consider a similar property (Candidate Registration) to monitor
exam executions. Our goal is to check if an unregistered candidate was trying to
spoof the system by submitting an answer. However, when one wants to check
protocol specification, we think what is important is to be sure that no answer will
be accepted from an unregistered candidate (which can submit answers). The latter
is ensured by our property Answer Origin Authentication.
− Notification Request Authentication which says that a mark can be associated
with the candidate only if she requests to learn her mark. The intuition behind
this unusual property is to allow a candidate to withdraw from the exam before
notification.
− Mark Verifiability which says that a candidate can verify that she has been assigned
with the mark attributed to her answer. This property is similar to our property
Correct Mark Reception. Additionally, we propose a property Mark Correctness
that allows a candidate to check that her mark was computed correctly. Moreover,
we propose several properties that allow a candidate, as well as, an external observer
to verify several steps during the examination process (see Section 3.4).
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− An accountability property, Testing Dispute Resolution, which allows to identify
the responsible party when a candidate fails to submit an answer or to receive
the corresponding mark. Note that, we do not tackle accountability in this thesis.
However, each of our verifiability properties covers a certain step in the examination
process which helps to identify the source of potential failures. Moreover, our
monitors for exam executions allow us to identify the responsible parties in case of
failure.
The analysis shows that the proposed protocol satisfies all the considered properties.
Link to the Other Applications. There are several works presenting the formalization
and verification of authentication and privacy properties in domains that seem related
to e-exams, namely e-voting [DLL11,DLL12b,DLL12a,BHM08,DKR09,DKR06] and
e-auction systems [DJP10,DLL13,DJL13]. Some of the security properties therein studied
remind those we are presenting for e-exams. For instance, Answer Origin Authentication
is analogous to voter and bidder authentication. Mark Privacy reminds ballot privacy
and losing bids privacy. Yet, there are fundamental differences. In e-exams, Answer
Authorship should be preserved even in the presence of colluding candidates. Conversely,
vote (bid) authorship is not a problem for e-voting (e-auction), in fact unlinkability
between a voter (bidder) and her vote (bid) is a desired property. Another important
property for e-exams is to keep exam questions secret until the exam starts. We do
not find such a property in e-voting where the candidates are previously known to the
voters, and in e-auction where the goods to bid for are previously known to the bidders.
Moreover, properties such as Anonymous Marking, meaning that an examiner can not
know whose copy they are grading, evaluates to a sort of fixed-term anonymity. This
property is meant to hold during the marking, but is trivially falsified when the marks
are assigned to the candidates.
Verifiability has been also studied in other domains than exams, specially in voting and
in auctions. In these domains formal models and definitions of security properties exist,
e.g., [DJL13,KTV10,KRS10b]. In voting, individual verifiability ensures that a voter can
verify her vote has been handled correctly, that is, cast as intended, recorded as cast,
and counted as recorded [BT94,HS00]. The concept of universal verifiability has been
introduced to express that voters and non-voters can verify the correctness of the tally
using only public information [CF85,BT94,Ben96]. Kremer et al. [KRS10b] formalize
both individual and universal verifiability in the Applied pi-Calculus. They also consider
eligibility verifiability, a specific universal property assuring that any observer can verify
that the set of votes from which the result is determined originates only from eligible
voters, and that each eligible voter has cast at most one vote. Smyth et al. [SRKK10] use
ProVerif to check different verifiability notions that they express as reachability properties.
Verifiability for e-auction is studied by Dreier et al. [DJL13]. The manner in which they
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express sound and complete tests for their verifiability properties has been a source of
inspiration for what we present, concerning verifiability, in this thesis.
Notable notions related to verifiability are accountability and auditability. Generally
speaking, a protocol is verifiable when it allows anyone (or a specific party) to verify that
a certain goal is satisfied. In its turn accountability allows to identify which party is
responsible when the protocol fails to meet one of its goals. Verifiability allows a party
to detect that there is something wrong when the protocol fails. However, this may
not be sufficient as it should be possible to specify the party that is responsible of this
failure, and by this, resolve the dispute. In this sense, accountability is closely related
to verifiability. Küsters et al. have been proposed a formal definition for accountability
in [KTV10]. They also provided symbolic and computational definitions of verifiability,
which they interpreted as a restricted form of accountability. However, their framework
needs to be instantiated for each application by identifying relevant verifiability goals.
In another hand, auditability is the quality of a protocol that stores sufficient evidence
to convince an honest judge that specific properties are satisfied [GFN09]. Auditability
revisits the universal verifiability defined: anyone, even an outsider without knowledge
of the protocol execution, can verify the system relying only on the available pieces of
evidence.
Concerning monitoring, oﬄine monitoring of user-provided specifications over logs
has been addressed in the context of several tools in the runtime verification com-
munity [BBF14]: Breach [Don10] for Signal Temporal Logic, RiTHM [NJW+13] for
(variant of) Linear Temporal Logic, LogFire [Hav15] for rule-based systems, and Java-
MOP [JMLR12] for various specification formalisms provided as plugins. Moreover,
oﬄine monitoring was successfully applied to other industrial case studies, e.g., for
monitoring financial transactions with LARVA [CP12], and monitoring IT logs with
MonPoly [BCE+14].
3.3 Authentication and Privacy in Exams
We present our model of exam protocols in the Applied pi-Calculus [AF01], and we propose
formal definitions for the authentication and privacy properties. Then, we discuss our
three case studies: the protocols by Huszti & Pethő [HP10], Giustolisi et al. [GLR14],
and Grenoble exam.
3.3.1 Modeling Exam Protocols in The Applied pi-Calculus
An exam protocol specifies the processes executed by the exam parties. The processes
can exchange messages on public or private channels, create keys or fresh random values
36
Chapter 3. Exam Protocols
and perform tests and cryptographic operations, which are modeled as functions on terms
with respect to an equational theory describing their properties.
We distinguish the following parties: candidates who sit for the exam; the examiners
who mark the answers submitted by the candidates; the question committee, which
prepares the exam questions; the exam authorities, which conduct the exam, and include
registrars, invigilators, exam collectors, and a notification committee. In some protocols,
an authority can be responsible of two or more roles. Furthermore, we organize the exam
in four phases:
− Registration: the exam authority (the registrar) creates a new examination and
checks the eligibility of the candidate who attempts to register for it;
− Examination: the exam authority authenticates the candidate, and sends to her an
exam-form that contains the exam questions. The candidate fills the form with her
answer, and submits it to the exam collector;
− Marking: the authority distributes the form submitted by the candidate to an
examiner, who in his turn evaluates and marks it;
− Notification: once the form has been evaluated, the mark is notified to the candidate.
Note that, each candidate can pass through the exam phases independently from the
others.
Definition 3.1. (Exam Protocol). An exam protocol is a tuple (C,E,Q,A1, . . . , Al, n˜p),
where C is the process executed by the candidates, E is the process executed by the exam-
iners, Q is the process executed by the question committee, Ai’s are the processes executed
by the authorities, and n˜p is the set of private channel names.
All candidates execute the same process C, and all examiners execute the same process
E. However, different candidates and examiners are instantiated with different variable
values, e.g., keys, identities, and answers.
In our definitions, we reason about privacy using concrete instances of an exam protocol.
An instance is called an exam process. Only honest parties are modeled in an exam
process. Dishonest parties are under the control of the attacker. They are not modeled
in the exam process, but subsumed by the attacker. We assume a single attacker, i.e., all
attackers and all dishonest parties share information and trust each other. The attacker
forms the environment in which the exam process runs. He has complete control to the
network, except private channels (e.g., Dolev-Yao attacker [DY83]). For instance, he
can eavesdrop, remove, substitute, duplicate and delay messages that the parties are
sending one another, and insert messages of his choice on the public channels. He can
also manipulate data contained within his knowledge under the restriction of perfect
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cryptography, for instance the only way to decrypt a ciphertext is to know the inverse
key.
Definition 3.2. (Exam Process). An exam process of an exam protocol given by
the tuple (C,E,Q,A1, . . . , Al, n˜p) is a closed process EP = νn˜.(Cσidc1σa1 | . . . |Cσidcjσaj |
Eσide1σm1 | . . . |Eσidekσmk |Qσq|A1σdist | . . . |Al′), where 1 ≤ l′ ≤ l, n˜ is the set of all
restricted names, which includes some of the private channel names n˜p; Cσidciσai are the
processes executed by the candidates, the substitutions σidci and σai respectively specify the
identity and the answers of the ith candidate; Eσideiσmi are the processes executed by the
examiners, the substitution σidei specifies the i
th examiner’s identity, and σmi specifies
for each possible question/answer pair the corresponding mark; Q is the process executed
by the question committee, the substitution σq specifies the exam questions; Ai are the
processes executed by the exam authorities that are required to be honest, the substitution
σdist determines which answers will be submitted to which examiners for grading. Without
loss of generality, we assume that A1 distributes the copies to the examiners.
Definition 3.2 equally handles examiners that are machines and those that are humans:
they are both entities that mark answers. Moreover, the definition does not specify how
the mark is computed. To ensure a fair marking we ought to assume the marking is
deterministic: given the same answer to the same question, the examiner will attribute
the same mark (at least during the same exam). This should be the case for a fair marking
system, and this assumption avoids unrealistic corner cases in the definitions later on. In
the real world, however, marking may not be necessarily deterministic, especially in tests
with open-answer questions where same mark may given to “similar” but not identical
answers. Note that, Q and A1 can coincide when there is only one authority A: in that
case, Qσq|A1σdist is simplified as Aσqσdist .
In addition to the attacker, threats may also come from corrupted parties, who
communicate with the attacker, share personal data (e.g., secret keys) with him, or
receive orders (e.g., how to answer a question) from him. For instance, the attacker may
control a legitimate user. Similarly to the approach used by Dreier in his thesis [Dre13],
we model a corrupted party as P ch1,ch2 (see Definition 2.2 in Section 2.1.1). If process P
is honest, then P ch1,ch2 is its corrupted version. This variant is exactly as P , but uses
channels ch1 and ch2 to communicate with the attacker. Through ch1, P ch1,ch2 sends
all its inputs and freshly generated names (but not other channel names). From ch2,
P ch1,ch2 receives messages that can influence its behavior. Given an exam process any
process P can be replaced by P ch1,ch2 . Corrupted parties, unlike dishonest parties, do
not reveal (give access to) the private channels to the attacker. The messages received
on private channels are revealed to the attacker but not the private channels themselves.
Moreover, using P ch1,ch2 the attacker can send and receive messages on private channels
the candidate has access to, if necessary. In contrast, for the attacker to play the role of
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the, e.g., candidate one would have to make certain private channels public (otherwise
the attacker cannot be a candidate), which makes the transformation more difficult to
write and may lead to false attacks depending on the protocol (but at the same time help
termination). Note that, this distinction between corrupted parties and the attacker also
makes corrupted parties explicit in the definition of the properties (see Section 3.3.2).
Note also that in practice, notably in ProVerif this distinction is not a limitation due to
the implicit replication9.
To improve the readability of our definitions, we introduce the notation of exam context.
An exam context EP I [ ] is the process EP without the processes of the parties included
in the set I; they are replaced by “holes”. We use this notation, for instance, to specify
exactly the processes for candidates c1 and c2 without repeating the entire exam process;
in that case we rewrite EP as EP{idc1,idc2}[Cσidc1σa1 |Cσidc2σa2 ].
Definition 3.3. (Exam Context). Let I be a set such that I ⊆ IC ∪ IE ∪ {idQ, idA1}
where IC is the set of all candidates, IE is the set of all examiners, idQ identifies the ques-
tion committee Q, and idA1 identifies the exam authority A1. Then, given an exam process
EP = νn˜.(Cσidc1σa1 | . . . | Cσidcjσaj | Eσide1σm1 | . . . |Eσidekσmk |Qσq|A1σdist | . . . |Al′), we
define the exam context EP I [ ] as follows:
EP I [ ] ≡ νn˜.(|C
idci /∈I
σidciσai |E
idei /∈I
σideiσmi | |(Qσq)k1 |(A1σdist)k2 |A2| . . . |Al′)
where k1 = 0 if idQ ∈ I and k1 = 1 otherwise, and k2 = 0 if idA1 ∈ I and k2 = 1
otherwise10.
In order to reason about reachability and authentication properties we consider events.
Events are annotations that do not change a process behavior, but are inserted at precise
locations to allow reasoning about the exam’s execution. Events allow us to verify
properties such as “event bad” is unreachable, or “on every trace event ε2 is preceded
by event ε1”. Following the technique used in [ABF07, SRKK10], events are outputs
out(ε, (M1, . . . ,Mn)) on a special channel ε different from the ordinary channels. In
accordance to ProVerif syntax, we write ε(M1, . . . ,Mn) instead of out(ε, (M1, . . . ,Mn)),
where ε is the name of the event (channel) and M1, . . . ,Mn are the event’s parameters.
In our model for exam protocols, we use the following events, where idc is the candidate
identity, ques the question(s), ans the answer(s), mark the mark, idform is an identifier
of the exam-form used during marking, and ide is the examiner’s identity:
− register(idc): is the event inserted into the registrar process at the location where
candidate idc has successfully registered for the exam.
9 In our case studies using ProVerif, we model the corrupted parties as dishonest ones that are subsumed
by the attacker. 10 Recall, (Qσq)0 = 0, and (Qσq)1 = Qσq.
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− submit(idc, ques, ans): is the event inserted into the process of candidate idc in the
examination phase, at the location where she sends her answer ans corresponding
to the question ques.
− accept(idc, ques, ans): is the event inserted into the exam collector’s process in
the examination phase, just after it received and accepted the exam-form (idc, ques,
ans) from candidate idc.
− distribute(idc, ques, ans, idform, ide): is the event inserted into the authority pro-
cess in the marking phase, when it assigns (distributes) the exam-form (idc, ques, ans)
from candidate idc to the examiner ide using the identifier idform.
− attribute(ques, ans,mark, idform, ide): is the event inserted into the process of
the examiner ide in the marking phase, at the location where he marked the
question/answer pair (ques, ans) identified by idform with the grade mark.
− notify(idc,mark): is the event inserted into the process of candidate idc in the
notification phase, just after she received and accepted the grade mark from the
responsible authority.
Note that, idform is only used to identify an exam-form during marking. This could be a
pseudonym to allow anonymous marking, or simply the candidate identity if the marking
is not anonymous.
3.3.2 Authentication and Privacy Properties
Usually in traditional exams, a central authority (trusted third party) authenticates
candidates and checks whether they are registered for the exam, before handing the exam
questions to them. Then, each candidate writes down his identity, which is often covered
for anonymous marking, and his answer in an exam paper, which is collected by the
authority at the end of the examination phase. Note that, each candidate also visibly
writes his pseudonym. When examination phase ends, the authority hands the answers to
an examiner without any modification. The examiner evaluates the answers, and assigns
a mark for each pseudonym without revealing his real identity. Then, the authority maps
the pseudonyms to the real identities, stores the pairs identities/marks, and publishes the
pairs pseudonyms/marks.
In absence of a trusted third party, we require some guarantees concerning the
correctness of the examination process, the integrity of the answers and the marks, and
the privacy of the candidates and the examiners. To this end, we define property Answer
Origin Authentication which ensures that only registered candidates can take the exam,
properties Form Authenticity and Form Authenticity which ensure answers integrity
and their link to the candidates until marking, and property Form Authenticity which
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ensures marks integrity and that they are notified to the correct candidates. Moreover,
we define five privacy properties: Question Indistinguishability ensures the secrecy of the
questions before the examination phase, Anonymous Marking and Anonymous Examiner
respectively ensure the anonymity of the candidates and examiners during marking, Mark
Privacy ensures the secrecy of the marks, and Mark Anonymity hides the link between a
candidate and his mark.
We model our authentication properties as correspondence properties among events, a
well-known approach [RSG+00,RS11]. The first authentication property is Answer Origin
Authentication which ensures that only exam-forms submitted by registered candidates
are actually accepted (collected), and that one exam-form from is accepted from each
candidate.
Definition 3.4. (Answer Origin Authentication). An exam protocol ensures Answer
Origin Authentication if for every exam process EP on every possible execution trace,
each occurrence of the event accept(idc, ques, ans) is preceded by a distinct occurrence
of the event register(idc).
At examination phase, each candidate submits her exam-form with an answer, and the
collector collects the forms. Form Authorship ensures that the content of each collected
exam-form (idc, ques, and ans) are not modified after submission.
Definition 3.5. (Form Authorship). An exam protocol ensures Form Authorship if
for every exam process EP on every possible execution trace, each occurrence of event
accept(idc, ques, ans) is preceded by a distinct occurrence of event submit(idc, ques, ans).
Similarly, Form Authenticity ensures that the content of each exam-form is not modified
after the collection and until after the form is marked by an examiner.
Definition 3.6. (Form Authenticity). An exam protocol ensures Form Authenticity
if for every exam process EP on every possible execution trace, each occurrence of the
event attribute(ques, ans,mark, idform, ide) is preceded by a distinct occurrence of the
events accept(idc, ques, ans) and distribute(idc, ques, ans, idform, ide).
At notification phase, the candidate should receive the mark which was assigned by the
examiner to her answer. We call this property Mark Authenticity.
Definition 3.7. (Mark Authenticity). An exam protocol ensures Mark Authen-
ticity if for every exam process EP on every possible execution trace, each occur-
rence of the event notify(idc,mark) is preceded by a distinct occurrence of the events
attribute(ques, ans,mark, idform, ide) and distribute(idc, ques, ans, idform, ide).
Note that Mark Authenticity ensures that the candidate is notified with the mark delivered
by the examiner on the answer distributed for him by the authority. This answer may
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be different from that submitted by the candidate. Only if also Form Authorship and
Form Authenticity hold then the candidate can be sure that the assigned and submitted
answers are identical. Moreover, Mark Authenticity does not guarantee that the mark is
computed correctly. However in Section 3.4.1, we define Marking Correctness individual
verifiability which allows a candidate to verify that his mark was computed correctly. We
also define Marking Correctness universal verifiability, in Section 3.4.2, which allows any
auditor to check the correctness of the delivered marks.
We model our privacy properties as observational equivalence, a standard choice for
such kind of properties [RS01,RS11]. We use the labeled bisimilarity (≈l) to express the
equivalence between two processes [AF01]. Informally, two processes are equivalent if an
observer has no way to tell them apart. In this section, we use the notation EP |ph which
denotes the process EP without the code that follows the phase ph. The first privacy
property Question Indistinguishability says that questions are kept secret until the exam
starts.
Definition 3.8. (Question Indistinguishability). An e-exam protocol ensures Ques-
tion Indistinguishability if for any e-exam process EP that ends with the registration
phase, any questions q1 and q2, we have that:
EP{idQ}[Qσq1 ]|reg ≈l EP{idQ}[Qσq2 ]|reg
Question Indistinguishability states that two processes with different questions have to
be observationally equivalent until the end of the registration phase. This prevents the
attacker from obtaining information about the exam questions before the examination
phase starts. This property requires the question committee to be honest; otherwise the
property is trivially violated since the committee reveals the questions to the attacker.
However, it is particularly interesting to consider corrupted candidates, as they might
be interested in obtaining the questions in advance. We can do this by replacing honest
candidates with corrupted ones. For example, if we assume that candidate idc1 is
corrupted, we obtain:
EP{idc1,idQ}[(Cσidc1σa1)
ch1,ch2 |Qσq1 ]|reg ≈l EP{idc1,idQ}[(Cσidc1σa1)ch1,ch2 |Qσq2 ]|reg
The same technique can be employed to add more corrupted candidates. Note that,
this can also be applied to all the following privacy properties to add corrupted parties
if required. The next property ensures that the marking process is done anonymously,
i.e., that two instances where candidates swap their answers cannot be distinguished
until after the end of the marking phase. This may be desirable to ensure fairness of
the grading, and is a requirement in some exam settings (at some universities or for
competitive examinations).
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Definition 3.9. (Anonymous Marking). An e-exam protocol ensures Anonymous
Marking if for any e-exam process EP that ends with the marking phase, any two
candidates idc1 and idc2, and any two answers a1 and a2, we have that:
EP{idc1,idc2}[Cσidc1σa1 |Cσidc2σa2 ]|mark ≈l EP{idc1,idc2}[Cσidc1σa2 |Cσidc2σa1 ]|mark
Anonymous Marking ensures that the process where idc1 answers a1 and idc2 answers a2
is equivalent to the process where idc1 answers a2 and idc2 answers a1. This prevents
the attacker from obtaining the identity of the candidate who submitted a certain answer
before the marking phase ends. For this property, it is interesting to consider corrupted
examiners. It can be done using the same technique employed for corrupted candidates
above. We can also have some corrupted candidates, however the candidates idc1 and idc2
who are assigned the two different answers have to be honest – otherwise the property
can be trivially violated by one of them revealing her answer to the attacker. Note that
by controlling a candidate, the attacker could be able to compromise privacy by trying to
relate the corrupted candidate’s answer to the targeted candidate’s answer. To prevent
bribing or coercion of the examiners, it might be interesting to ensure their anonymity, so
that no candidate knows which examiner marked her copy. This is ensured by Anonymous
Examiner.
Definition 3.10. (Anonymous Examiner). An e-exam protocol ensures Anonymous
Examiner if for any e-exam process EP , any two candidates idc1, idc2, any two examiners
ide1, ide2, and any two marks m1, m2, we have that:
EP{idc1,idc2,ide1,ide2,idA1}[Cσidc1σa1 |Cσidc2σa2 |Eσide1σm1 |Eσide2σm2 |A1σdist1 ]
≈l
EP{idc1,idc2,ide1,ide2,idA1}[Cσidc1σa1 |Cσidc2σa2 |Eσide1σm2 |Eσide2σm1 |A1σdist2 ]
where σdist1 attributes the exam-form of candidate idc1 to examiner ide1 and the exam-
form of candidate idc2 to examiner ide2, and σdist2 attributes the exam-form of candidate
idc1 to examiner ide2 and the exam-form of candidate idc2 to examiner ide1.
Anonymous Examiner ensures that a process in which examiner ide1 grades the exam-form
of candidate idc1 and examiner ide2 grades that of candidate idc2 cannot be distinguished
from a process in which ide1 grades the exam-form of idc2 and ide2 grades that of idc1.
Note that to ensure that in both cases the candidates receive the same mark, we also
have to swap σm1 and σm2 between the examiners. Similar to Anonymous Marking, this
property prevents the attacker from obtaining the identity of the examiner who marked
a certain answer. Note that, Anonymous Examiner requires that the examiners ide1
and ide2 are honest, otherwise it will trivially violated by one of them revealing the
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mark he gave. We can again include corrupted candidates as they might be interested in
finding out which examiner marked their copies. Note also that, if all the exam-forms are
assigned to the same examiner to mark them (or simply if we have only one examiner),
then all the candidates may know whom is going to evaluate their exam-forms. To avoid
such cases, it is required to have properties that ensures the secrecy of the examiners’
number, and the number of exam-forms assigned for each examiner. However, in practice
a countermeasure for such issues is to have at least two examiners and to uniformly
distribute the exam-forms between them.
In some exams settings the marks have to remain private. This is ensured by Mark
Privacy. Mark Privacy guarantees that two processes where the examiner ide assigns for
the same answer (entailed by the same context EP) two different marks (specified by the
substitutions σm1 and σm2) cannot be distinguished from each other.
Definition 3.11. (Mark Privacy). An e-exam protocol ensures Mark Privacy if for
any e-exam process EP , any examiner ide, any two substitutions σm1 and σm2 , we have
that:
EP{ide}[Eσideσm1 ] ≈l EP{ide}[Eσideσm2 ]
Note that, as σm1 and σm2 are different then at least one of the answers assigned to
the examiner ide is attributed with different marks. Depending on the exam policy this
can be an optional property since some exams system may publicly disclose the marks
of the candidates. However, the intuition here is that candidate’s performance should
not be known to any other candidate. Note that our formalization does not contradict
our hypothesis that the marking within one exam is deterministic, as we consider two
different instances of an exam (notably differing in the marking). Again, we can assume
that some candidates are corrupted and try to find out the marks of their colleagues,
or that an examiner tries to find out the mark achieved by a candidate. The candidate
who is assigned the two different marks has to be honest – otherwise the property is
violated by her revealing her mark to the attacker. Similarly the examiner assigning the
marks has to be honest, otherwise he can reveal the mark himself. Note that, considering
corrupted candidates allows us to capture attacks such as copying someone else’s answers.
For instance, the attacker may copy a honest candidate’s answer and order a corrupted
candidate to submit the same answer. Then, the attacker can compromise the privacy of
the honest candidate’s mark in case of deterministic marking11 (as both the corrupted
and honest candidates will get the same mark).
The previous definition of Mark Privacy ensures that the attacker cannot know the
mark of a candidate. A weaker variant of Mark Privacy is Mark Anonymity, i.e., the
attacker might know the list of all marks, but is unable to associate a mark to its
11 Similar to the attack found against 2.0 voting system by Cortier and Smyth [CS13].
44
Chapter 3. Exam Protocols
corresponding candidate. This is often the case in practice, where a list of pseudonyms
(e.g., student numbers) and marks is published.
Definition 3.12. (Mark Anonymity). An e-exam protocol ensures Mark Anonymity
if for any e-exam process EP , any candidates idc1, idc2, any examiner ide, any answers
a1, a2 and a distribution σdist that assigns the answers of both candidates to the examiner
ide, and two substitutions σmb and σmc which are identical, except that σmb attributes
the mark ma1 to the answer a1 and ma2 to a2, whereas σmc attributes ma2 to the answer
a1 and ma1 to a2, we have that:
EP{idc1,idc2,ide,idA1}[Cσidc1σa1 |Cσidc2σa2 |Eσideσmb |A1σdist]
≈l
EP{idc1,idc2,ide,idA1}[Cσidc1σa1 |Cσidc2σa2 |Eσideσmc |A1σdist]
Mark Anonymity states that if an examiner ide, who is assigned the same answers a1 and
a2 to mark as σdist is unchanged, swaps the marks between these answers, then the two
situations cannot be distinguished by the attacker. This means that a list of marks can be
public, but the attacker must be unable to link the marks to the candidates. Again, we
can consider corrupted parties, but this definition requires the two concerned candidates
and the concerned examiner to be honest. Otherwise they can simply reveal the answer
and the associated mark, which allows to distinguish both cases. A protocol that ensures
Mark Privacy also ensures Mark Anonymity. In fact, σmb and σmc are special cases of
σm1 and σm2 .
Theorem 3.1. If an exam protocol satisfies Mark Privacy, it also satisfies Mark Anonymity.
Proof. Suppose that Mark Privacy is satisfied, then for any exam context EP{ide}, any two
mark substitutions σm1 and σm2 , we have that: EP{ide}[Eσideσm1 ] ≈l EP{ide}[Eσideσm2 ].
Let EP ′[ ] ≡ EP{idc1,idc2,ide,idA1}[Cσidc1σa1 |Cσidc2σa2 |A1σdist| ] be an exam context,
where EP{idc1,idc2,ide,idA1}[ ] is any exam context, and σdist distribute the answers a1
and a2 to an examiner ide. Also let σmb be a substitution that assigns a mark ma1 to a1
and a mark ma2 to a2, whereas σmc be a substitution that assigns a mark ma2 to a1 and
a mark ma1 to a2. Then, as Mark Privacy is satisfied, we have that: EP
′[Eσideσmb ] ≈l
EP ′[Eσideσmc ]. Hence
EP{idc1,idc2,ide,idA1}[Cσidc1σa1 |Cσidc2σa2 |Eσideσmb |A1σdist]
≈l
EP{idc1,idc2,ide,idA1}[Cσidc1σa1 |Cσidc2σa2 |Eσideσmc |A1σdist]
Therefore, Mark Anonymity is satisfied.
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3.3.3 Case Studies
We analyze using ProVerif12 the authentication and privacy properties of three exam
protocols: the protocol by Huszti & Pethő [HP10], the protocol by Giustolisi et al. [GLR14],
and the protocol of Grenoble exam.
3.3.3.1 Protocol by Huszti & Pethő
We first analyze the protocol by Huszti & Pethő [HP10] (in short, H&P protocol). This
protocol aims to ensure authentication and privacy for e-exams in presence of corrupted
candidates, examiners, and exam authorities; the guarantees are argued only informally
in [HP10]. Notably from a point of view of the protocol paper [HP10], all arguments
supporting privacy rely on the reliability of a single component, the reusable anonymous
return channel, or RARC [GJ03]. The description of RARC channel is outlined below.
Reusable Anonymous Return Channel (RARC). A RARC implements anony-
mous two-way conversations. A sender posts a message to a recipient and the RARC
ensures its anonymity; in its turn, the recipient can reply to that message without knowing
nor learning the sender’s identity, sure that the RARC will dispatch it to actual sender.
RARC ensures the anonymity of the messages, and the entire conversation remains
untraceable to an external attacker, but it does not guarantee the secrecy of the mes-
sages [GJ03]. A RARC is implemented by a re-encryption mix networks, first proposed
by Chaum [Cha81]. The mix servers jointly generate and share an ElGamal [ElG85] key
pair (PKMIX , SKMIX ) and a pair of public/private signing keys (SPKMIX , SSKMIX ).
The sender A and the receiver B also hold ElGamal public/private key pairs, (PKA,
SKA) and (PKB , SKB) respectively. A and B are represented by IDA and IDB , identity
tags which can be for example A’s and B’s email addresses. To send the message m
to B, the sender A submits to the mix networks the tuple Mix (m,A,B) which denotes
({IDA,PKA}PKMIX , {m}PKMIX , {IDB , PKB}PKMIX )13 and proves knowledge of {IDA,PKA}
and of {IDB,PKB}. The proofs of knowledge are claimed to impede the attacker from
decrypting the triplets by using the mix networks as an oracle (we falsify this claim
below). The mix networks waits to collect more triplets and shuﬄes them. Then, it adds
a checksum to the triplets, which is supposed to vouch for integrity (again, we disprove
this claim below). The message m is then re-encrypted with the public key of B using a
switching encryption keys technique. The mix networks signs the encrypted public key
of A. Thus B receives (sign({IDA,PKA}PKMIX ,SKMIX ), {m}PKB ) where sign(x, sk) is
message x plus the signature with the secret key sk. Then B replies to A with a new
message m′ by sending to the mix networks(Mix (m′, B,A), sign({IDA,PKA}PKMIX ,SKMIX ))
12 All the verification code used in this thesis is available on line at the link
http://www-verimag.imag.fr/ plafourc/kassem-thesis-code.zip 13 {x}PK denotes the public-key encryp-
tion of x by the key PK.
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and proving only knowledge of {IDB,PKB}. The mix networks checks the proof and the
signature, and then processes the tuples like a normal message.
Protocol Description. A symbolic representation of the H&P protocol is depicted
in Figure 3.1. Note that all messages, except step 2, are sent via RARC. H&P protocol
relies upon different cryptographic building blocks. The ElGamal cryptosystem [ElG85]
is used to provide parties with public/private key pairs. A RARC implements anonymous
two-way communication. A network of servers (NET) provides a timed-release service.
The NET creates and revokes a candidate’s pseudonym. More precisely, the NET’s
contribution to the pseudonym is shared among the servers using the threshold Shamir
secret sharing system [Sha79]. At notification, a subset of the NET servers use their
shares to recover the secret and de-anonymize the candidate: the exam authority can
so associate the answer with the corresponding candidate. To avoid plagiarism, the
protocol assumes that no candidate reveals his private key to another candidate, and that
invigilators supervise candidates during the examination.
The original protocol has the following phases: setup, registration, exam (combines
examination and marking), and grading (notification). To match this structure with
our exam model, we merge the setup and registration but we split between candidate
registration and examiner registration for better readability. We also split between
examination and marking phases as they are considered one phase in the original paper,
called exam.
Examiner Registration: the exam authority (EA) publishes the public parameters (h, g)14,
which identify a new examination (step 1). The question committee (QC) then signs
and sends to EA the questions and the starting time of the examination phase time1
encrypted with the public key of the RARC mix networks PKMIX (step 2). The mix
networks forwards the message only when the examination begins. Thus, even the exam
authority cannot learn the questions. Then, a pseudonym of the examiner is jointly
created by the exam authority and the examiner (steps 3-4). Note that, gE is a part of
examiner’s public key, we have PKE = gSKEE . The examiner (i.e., the verifier) verifies the
correctness of the pseudonym using an interactive zero-knowledge proof on the equality
of the discrete logarithms ZKPeq with the exam authority as the prover (steps 5-6). This
verification requires several exchanges of messages between the two parties, which is
denoted by (↔). Then, the examiner sends his pseudonym (t, q, q′) to the exam authority
(step 7), and proves the knowledge of his secret key using an interactive zero-knowledge
proof ZKPsec (step 9). Finally, exam authority stores examiner pseudonym, transcript
of ZKPsec, the identity of the examiner encrypted with the mix networks public key, and
the subject of the exam (step 10).
14 Note that, s ∈ ZQ and s ∈ GQ, where GQ denotes Z∗P ’s multiplicative subgroup of order Q such that
P and Q are large primes and Q|(P − 1).
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Candidate Registration: the registration of the candidate (C) slightly differs from the
registration of an examiner. The candidate pseudonym is jointly calculated by the exam
authority, the candidate, and also the NET to provide anonymity for the candidates. The
NET stores the secret values used for the pseudonym generation, which can be used to
de-anonymize the candidate after the examination has finished. The involvement of the
NET is needed to revoke the anonymity of the candidate at notification. The candidate
pseudonym is initially calculated by the exam authority (step 11), then anonymized
by the NET (steps 13), and finally computed by the candidate using his private key
(step 15). Again, the candidate finally verifies the correctness of his pseudonym using
ZKPeq (steps 16).
Examination: the candidate sends his pseudonym via the RARC to the exam authority
and proves the knowledge of his private key (steps 17-19). Then, the exam authority
checks whether the candidate is registered for the examination, and sends to him the
questions signed by the question committee (step 20). The candidate sends his answer,
again via the RARC (steps 21), thus the exam authority cannot learn the answer. The
exam authority replies with a receipt which consists of the hash (H) of all parameters
seen by the exam authority during the examination, the transcription transC of ZKPsec,
and the time when the answer was submitted time2 (step 22).
Marking : the exam authority chooses an examiner who is eligible for the examination,
and forwards him the answer via the RARC (step 23). Note that, IDEAP is a specially
generated identification exam tag, and that EA stores ({IDE ,PKE}PKMIX ). Then,
the examiner assigns a mark to the answer (step 24), and authenticates them with
the transcript verzkp of a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of equality of discrete
logarithm of (H(mark, answer), [H(mark, answer)]SKE , q, q′) (step 25).
Notification: when all the answers are marked, the NET de-anonymizes the pseudonyms
linked to the answers (step 26-28). The exam authority publishes the marks (step 29).
Formal Analysis. The equational theory depicted in Figure 3.2 models the crypto-
graphic primitives used within the H&P protocol. It includes the well-known mod-
els for probabilistic encryption (functions pk, enc, dec) and digital signature (func-
tions sign, getmess, and checksign). We use the equation exp(exp(exp(g, x), y), z) =
exp(exp(exp(g, y), z), x) to model a commutative feature of the exponentiation function
exp. This feature is needed to captures the checks by EA in steps 8 and 18 of Figure 3.1.
Inspired by Backes et al. [BMU08], we model the ZKP of knowledge of a secret exponent
as two functions: zkp_proof for proof, and zkp_sec for verification. The function
zkp_proof(public; secret) takes as arguments a secret e′ and public parameters exp(g, e)
and exp(exp(g, e), e′). It can be constructed only by the prover who knows the secret pa-
rameter. The verification function zkp_sec(zkp_proof(public; secret), verinfo) takes
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Examiner Registration
1- EA publishes g and h = gs
2- QC → EA : {sign((question, time1),SSKQC)}PKMIX
3- EA checks E eligibility, and calculates q˜ = PKsE
4- EA→ E : (q˜, gE)
5- E calculates q′ = q˜α, t = gαE , and q = t
SKE , where α is randomly chosen.
E pseudonym is (t, q, q′)
6- EA↔ E : ZKPeq((q, q′), (g, h))
7- E → EA : (t, q, q′, subject), where subject is exam name
8- EA checks qs = q′
9- E ↔ EA : ZKPsec(SKE)
10- EA stores (t, q, q′), ZKPsec data plus {IDE ,PKE}PKMIX and subject
Candidate Registration
11- EA checks C eligibility, and calculates p˜ = PKsC
12- EA→ NET : (p˜, gC)
13- NET calculates p′ = p˜Γ, and r = gΓC , where Γ is randomly chosen.
The NET then stores the time when gC can be revealed, p˜, gC ,
and yi which is its share applied for secret sharing [Sha79]
14- NET → C : (r, p′)
15- C calculates p = rSKC
16- EA↔ C : ZKPeq((p, p′), (g, h))
Then C pseudonym is (r, p, p′)
Examination
17- C → EA : (r, p, p′, subject)
18- EA checks ps = p′
19- C ↔ EA : ZKPsec(SKC)
20- EA→ C : (sign(question,SSKQC), time1)
21- C → EA : (r, p, {answer}PKMIX , time2)
22- EA→ C : H(r, p, p′, subject, transC , question, time1, time2, {answer}PKMIX )
Marking
23- EA→ E : ({IDEAP ,PKEAP }PKMIX , answer, {IDE ,PKE}PKMIX )
24- E → EA : (mark,H(mark, answer), [H(mark, answer)]SKE , verzkp)
25- E ↔ EA : ZKPeq(H(mark, answer), [H(mark, answer)]SKE ), (t, q))
Notification
26- EA→ NET : p′
27- NET calculates p′ = p˜Γ
28- NET → EA : {(p′, p˜)}PKEA
29- EA publishes : (mark,H(mark, answer), [H(mark, answer)]SKE , verzkp)
Figure 3.1: A symbolic representation of the H&P protocol. All messages, except step
2, are sent via RARC.
as arguments the proof function and the verification parameters verinfo (i.e., exp(g, e)
and exp(exp(g, e), e′)). The verifier only accepts the proof if the relation between verinfo
and secret is satisfied. Similar to zkp_proof, the function xproof(public; secret) takes
a secret e and public parameters p, p′, g, exp(g, e). In its turn check_proof takes as
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arguments the xproof function and verinfo. Note that, in addition to the function
check_proof, we use tables to support the model for the ZKP of the equality of discrete
logarithms. This is due to the difficulties of ProVerif when dealing with associativity
of multiple exponents, which is used in the H&P protocol (see Figure 3.1). Particu-
larly, we use tables to allow the candidate to verify that p˜ and p′ have been correctly
generated respectively by the exam authority and the NET (see steps 11 and 13 in
Figure 3.1). This approach is mainly needed to let ProVerif terminate for Mark Privacy
and Mark Anonymity. It is sound because it limits the attacker capability to generate
fake ZKPs, as he cannot write and read ProVerif’s table. Nevertheless, ProVerif still finds
counterexamples that falsify these two properties, as shall we see later.
Note also that, we assume the same generator for the pseudonyms of both candidates
and examiners. This is sound because we distinguish the roles, and each principal is
identified by its public key. We replace the candidate identity with his corresponding
pseudonym inside the events to check authentication properties. This replacement is also
sound because the equational theory preserves the bijective mapping between the keys
that identify the candidate and his pseudonym.
dec(enc(m, pk(k), r), k) = m
getmess(sign(m, k)) = m
checksign(sign(m, k), pk(k)) = m
exp(exp(exp(g, x), y), z) = exp(exp(exp(g, y), z), x)
zkp_sec(zkp_proof(exp(g, e), exp(exp(g, e), e′), e′), exp(g, e), exp(exp(g, e), e′)) = true
check_proof(xproof(p, p′, g, exp(g, e), e), p, p′, g, exp(g, e)) = true
Figure 3.2: Equational theory for our model of H&P protocol.
Attack on RARC. First we analyze the RARC alone and show that there are attacks
on anonymity and privacy. ProVerif shows that the RARC fails to guarantee both secrecy
of messages and anonymity of sender and receiver identities, which is its main purpose
inside the H&P protocol. We refer the triplet (c1, c2, c3) as the encrypted messages that
A submits to the mix networks when she wants to send a message to B. From the
description of RARC given at the beginning of this section, we recall that c1 encrypts
the A’s public key, c2 encrypts the message to B, and c3 encrypts the B’s public key.
All ciphertexts are encrypted with the mix networks’s public key. The attacker uses
the RARC as a decryption oracle, letting the RARC reveal any of the plaintexts. The
attack works as follows. The attacker chooses one of the three ciphertexts (depending on
whether he wants to target the contents of the message, or the identities of the sender
and receiver) and submits this as a new message. For example, if the attacker targets
c1 = {IDA, PKA}PKMIX , he resubmits c1 as a new encrypted message, which means that
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c′2 = c1 in the new triplet (see Figure 3.3). He can leave the encryption of the senders key
and the proof concerning the key unchanged, but replaces the encryption of the receiver’s
key with a public key PKI for which he knows the corresponding secret key SKI . In our
example this means c′3 = {IDI , PKI}PKMIX . The attacker can also provide the necessary
proof of knowledge of plaintext, since he knows this plaintext. The RARC then mixes
the input messages, and sends the encryption of the message under the receiver’s public
key to the receiver. In our example the attacker receives d = {IDA, PKA}PK I . Since the
attacker knows the secret key SKI he can obtain the original message. In our example he
gets IDA, the identity of the sender which should have remained anonymous. Since the
attacker can substitute any of the items in the triplet as the new message, the RARC does
neither ensure secrecy of the messages nor the anonymity of the sender or the receiver.
Note that, the checksum meant to guarantee the integrity of the triplet is only added
after the submission of the message and is only used inside the mix networks. Hence, the
checksum does not prevent the attacker from submitting a modified triplet. Even if it
were added before, it would not prevent the attack as the knowledge of the ciphertexts
is sufficient to compute the checksum. Note that, the RARC was originally designed to
withstand a passive attacker that however can statically corrupts parties [GJ03]. This is
not realistic in the e-exam setting where corrupted parties could actively try to cheat.
A Attacker I MIX
(c1, c2, c3)
(c1, c1, c
′
3)
(c1, s, d)
c1 = {IDA, PKA}PKMIX c2 = {m}PKMIX
c3 = {IDB , PKB}PKMIX c′3 = {IDI , PKI}PKMIX
s = sign(c1, SKMIX) d = {IDA, PKA}PK I
Figure 3.3: A symbolic representation for an attack on RARC.
All properties fail with such a RARC. However, even if we replace this RARC with an
ideal implementation – which, according to the RARC original requirements [GJ03],
ensures anonymity of senders and receivers but not message secrecy, implemented as an
anonymous channel in ProVerif – the H&P protocol does not satisfy any of our properties.
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The next paragraphs details the findings, and Table 3.1 summarizes the results found
using ProVerif.
Authentication properties. We verified the authentication properties without and
with an ideal RARC. All the following counterexamples remain valid in both cases.
ProVerif finds a counterexample for Answer Origin Authentication where the attacker
can create a fake pseudonym that allows him to take part in an exam for which he
did not register. This is possible because the exam authority does not check whether
the pseudonym has been actually created using the partial information provided by the
timed-release service. The attacker generates his own secret key SKA, and calculates an
associate pseudonym, which sends to the exam authority. The exam authority successfully
verifies the received data and that the attacker knows SKA, thus the exam authority
accepts the answer. Regarding Form Authorship, ProVerif shows the same attack trace
that falsifies Answer Origin Authentication. In fact, the exam authority may collect an
exam-form where the pseudonym is exchanged with one chosen by the attacker.
ProVerif also shows that the H&P protocol does not ensure Form Authenticity, because
there is no mechanism that allows the examiner to check whether the answers have been
forwarded by the exam authority. Even if the original RARC is used and the answer is
encrypted with the public key of the mix networks, this does not guarantee that the exam
authority actually sent the message. Regarding Mark Authenticity, ProVerif provides a
counterexample in which the attacker can forward any answer to any examiner, even if
the answer was not collected by the exam authority. Moreover, the attacker can notify
the candidate by himself with a mark of his choice.
Privacy properties. ProVerif finds an attack trace on Question Indistinguishability.
This is because the attack on the RARC exposes the message and the identities of the
sender and receiver. As the questions are sent through the RARC, the attacker can obtain
them. Since the candidate’s answer is also sent through the RARC, Anonymous Marking
does not hold: the answer can be linked to its corresponding sender. The protocol ensures
neither Mark Privacy nor Anonymous Examiner, as the marks are also sent through the
RARC. Hence, they can be decrypted and the examiner can be identified.
We checked the H&P protocol in ProVerif assuming ideal RARC. In this case, ProVerif
shows an attack for each property. Anonymous Examiner can be violated because the
attacker can track which examiner accepts the ZKP when receiving the partial pseudonym,
and then associate to the examiner the answer that the latter grades. Moreover, a similar
attack on Anonymous Marking remains: the attacker can check whether a candidate
accepts the ZKP to associate him with a pseudonym, and then identify his answer. Mark
Privacy fails because the examiner sends the mark to the exam authority via the RARC,
which does not ensure secrecy. Finally, ProVerif shows that the H&P protocol does
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not satisfy Mark Anonymity : the attacker can track which pseudonym is assigned to a
candidate and the mark is not secret, and link a candidate to the assigned mark.
Fixing Authentication. We believe that, in H&P protocol, authentication is compro-
mised due to inaccuracies in the protocol design, whereas most of attacks that invalid
privacy are due to compromising secrecy and anonymity over the RARC. Note that,
even when assuming an ideal RARC ensuring anonymity, we still have attacks on all
properties. Thus, we think that fixing the RARC is not sufficient to ensure privacy – the
protocol requires fundamental changes. However, we propose four simple modifications
to the H&P protocol in order to achieve a set of authentication properties. In particular,
we prove in ProVerif that the modified protocol achieves Answer Origin Authentication,
Form Authenticity, and Mark Authenticity. However, the protocol fails to satisfy Form
Authorship even after applying our fix. We found no easy solution for Form Author-
ship as the protocol sees no signatures for candidates, and RARC does not guarantee
authentication.
Concerning Candidate registration, we observe that EA and NET do not need to
communicate anonymously via RARC, as the original protocol prescribes. Conversely,
they both need to authenticate each other messages to avoid considering attacker mes-
sage injections. Thus, the first modification consists on the NET receiving the partial
pseudonyms generated by EA via a secure channel instead via a RARC. In doing so,
the attacker cannot use the NET to generate fake pseudonyms. As second modification
we let NET send via secure channel the eligible pseudonyms to the EA, who, in doing
so, can generate ZK proofs of equality of discrete logarithm to eligible pseudonyms only.
The EA can also store the eligible pseudonyms, which can be checked at examination
before accepting a test from a candidate. Concerning Marking, we note that the examiner
cannot verify whether a test has been sent by the EA. Since the anonymity requirement
is on the examiner but not on the EA, the latter can sign the test. Thus, the third
modification consists on EA signing the test prior to forward it to the chosen examiner,
who authenticates the signature. The last issue concerns the form identifier the EA affixes
to the test before forwarding it to the examiner. Since the candidate is unaware of such
identifier, the attacker can notify him any other examiner’s mark. The forth modification
sees the EA adding the form identifier to the candidate’s submission receipt, which is
also signed by the EA. Also the examiner adds the form identifier to the marking receipt,
so the candidate can verify whether he has been notified with the correct mark.
3.3.3.2 Protocol by Giustolisi et al.
In this section, we analyze the protocol by Giustolisi et al. [GLR14], also called Remark!
protocol. We first describe the protocol before presenting the results of our analysis.
53
Chapter 3. Exam Protocols
Property Result Time
Answer Origin Authentication × 26 s
Answer Origin Authentication∗ X (E,EA,C,NET) 3 s
Form Authorship × 3 s
Form Authenticity × 33 s
Form Authenticity∗ X (E,EA,C,NET) 3 s
Mark Authenticity × 52 s
Mark Authenticity∗ X (E,EA,C,NET) 4 s
Question Indistinguishability × < 1 s
Anonymous Marking × 1h 58 m 33 s
Anonymous Examiner × 6h 37 m 33 s
Mark Privacy × 23 m 59 s
Mark Anonymity × 49 m 5 s
Table 3.1: Results of our analysis on the formal model of the H&P protocol. The
parties which are assumed to be honest for the result to hold are in brackets. (×)
indicates that the property does not hold despite all parties being honest. (∗) is the
result after applying our fixes.
Protocol Description. The Remark! protocol mainly relies on several servers (NET)
that implement an exponentiation mix networks [HS11]. The specialty of exponentiation
mix networks is that each server blinds its entries by a common exponent value ri. That
is, given an input X to the mix networks, it outputs Xr where r =
∏
i ri is the product
of the secret exponent values of the servers. Note that only one of the mix networks
servers is required to be honest. Remark! protocol particularly uses the exponentiation
mix networks to create the pseudonyms for the candidates and examiners at registration
(see below). The mix networks is also used at notification to revoke the candidates
pseudonyms and retrieve their identities. Remark! protocol also uses a bulletin board15
to publish some data such as the pseudonyms, the test questions and the receipts of test
submissions.
Remark! protocol has the following parties: exam authority (EA, called manager in
the original paper), mix networks servers (NET), examiners (E), and candidates (C).
Each party is assumed to have a pair of public/private key with a common generator
g, i.e., the private key x and the public key y = gx. In the following, we present the
Remark! protocol within the four exam phases. A symbolic representation of Remark!
protocol is depicted in Figure 3.4.
Registration: at registration, the NET creates the pseudonyms for the candidates and
examiners without involving any of them. The list of eligible candidates’ public keys is
sent as a batch to the NET. For each candidate (C), the NET calculates the pseudonyms
PKC by raising the initial public key PKC = gSKC to a common secret value rc,
where SKC is the candidate’s secret key (Step 1). Then, along with the pseudonym
15 A public append-only memory.
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PKC = PK
rc
C = (g
SKC )rc , the NET publishes on the bulletin board (BB) the new
generator hc = grc (all signed by its secret key SKNET , Step 2). The candidates can
identify their own pseudonyms by raising h to their secret key x, i.e., PKC = hSKCc
(Step 3). The pseudonym PKC eventually serve as public keys which corresponds to the
secret key SKC with the new generator hc (as PKC = hSKCc ). This is to allow parties to
communicate anonymously. The NET creates the pseudonym of each examiner (E) in
the same way (Steps 4-6). Note that, two different batches are used for candidates and
examiners because only the identities of candidates are revealed at notification.
Examination: the exam authority signs and encrypts the test questions with the candi-
date’s pseudonym and publishes them on the bulletin board (Step 7). Each candidate
submits his answer, which is signed with the candidate’s private key (but using the
generator h instead of g) and encrypted with the public key of the exam authority PKEA
(Step 8). The exam authority collects the test answer, checks its signature using the
candidate’s pseudonym, re-signs it, and publishes its encryption with the corresponding
candidate’s pseudonym as receipt (Step 9).
Marking : the exam authority encrypts the signed test answer with an eligible examiner
pseudonym and publishes the encryption on the bulletin board (Step 10). The corre-
sponding examiner marks the test answer, and signs it with his private key (again using
the generator h instead of g). The examiner then encrypts it with the exam authority
public key, and submits its marks to the exam authority (Step 11).
Notification: when the exam authority receives all the candidate evaluations, it pub-
lishes the signed marks, each encrypted with the corresponding candidate’s pseudonym
(Step 12). Then, the NET de-anonymize the candidate’s pseudonyms by revealing its
secret exponent rc (Step 13). Hence the candidate anonymity is revoked, and the mark
can finally be registered. Note that, the examiner’s secret exponent is not revealed to
ensure his anonymity even after the exam concludes.
Formal Analysis. We analyze Remark! protocol with ProVerif, following similar
techniques as the one used in the analysis of the H&P protocol. Table 3.2 sums up the
results together with the time required for ProVerif to conclude on the same PC used for
H&P. We model the bulletin board as a public channel, and use the equational theory
depicted in Figure 3.5. The equations for encryption and signatures are standard, but we
also added the possibility of using the pseudonym keys to encrypt or sign. The public
pseudonym, which also serves as exam-form identifier, is obtained using the function
pseudo_pub on the public key and the random exponent. The function pseudo_priv
can be used to decrypt or sign messages, using the private key and the new generator gr
(modeled using the function exp) as parameters. The function checkpseudo allows us to
check if a pseudonym corresponds to a given secret key (or its pseudonym variant).
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Candidate Registration:
1- NET calculates rc =
∏k
i=1 rec , PKC = PK
rc
C and hc = g
rc
2- NET publishes on the BB sign((PKC , hc),SKNET )
3- C checks if PKC = hSKCc
Examiner Registration
4- NET calculates re =
∏k
i=1 rei , PKE = PK
re
E and he = g
re
5- NET publishes on the BB sign((PKE , he),SKNET )
6- E checks if PKE = hSKEe
Examination:
7- EA publishes on BB {sign(question,SKEA)}PKC
8- C → EA : {Ca, sign(Ca, SKC , hc)}PKEA , where Ca = {question, answer, PKC}
9- EA publishes on BB {Ca, sign(Ca, SKEA)}PKC
Marking:
10- EA publishes on BB {Ca, sign(Ca, SKEA)}PKE
11- E → EA : {sign(Ma, SKE , he)}PKEA , where Ma = (sign(Ca, SKEA),mark)
Notification:
12- EA publishes on BB {Ma, sign(Ma, SKE , he)}PKC
13- NET → EA : {rc, sign(rc, SKNET )}PKEA
Figure 3.4: A symbolic representation of the Remark! protocol.
checkpseudo(pseudo_pub(pk(k), r), pseudo_priv(k, exp(r))) = true
decrypt(encrypt(m, pk(k), c), k) = m
decrypt(encrypt(m, pseudo_pub(pk(k), r), c), pseudo_priv(k, exp(r))) = m
getmess(sign(m, k)) = m
checksign(sign(m, k), pk(k)) = m
checksign(sign(m, pseudo_priv(k, exp(r))), pseudo_pub(pk(k), r)) = m
Figure 3.5: Equational theory for our model of Remark! protocol.
Authentication properties. Assuming an attacker in control of the network and all
parties to be honest, we can successfully verify all authentication properties in ProVerif.
To model properly authentication in ProVerif, where events need to refer to candidates
along the whole code, it was necessary to replace the candidate key (used to identify
the candidate) with the candidate’s pseudonym inside the events. This is sound because
there is a bijective mapping between keys and pseudonyms, and pseudonyms are always
available. We also verified the authentication properties considering corrupted parties.
In this case, all properties are guaranteed except Form Authenticity. The attack trace
shows that a corrupted candidate can pick the examiner of his choice by re-encrypting
the signed receipt received from the exam authority. It means that the candidate can
influence the choice of the examiner who will correct his exam. As the protocol description
envisages an access control for publishing into the bulletin board, a feature that we did
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Property Result Time
Answer Origin Authentication X (NET) < 1 s
Form Authorship X (C, EA, NET) < 1 s
Form Authenticity X (C, E, EA, NET) < 1 s
Form Authenticity∗ X (E, EA, NET) < 1 s
Mark Authenticity X (E, EA, NET) < 1 s
Question Indistinguishability X (E, EA, NET) < 1 s
Anonymous Marking X (C, NET) 1 s
Anonymous Examiner X (E, NET) < 1 s
Mark Privacy X (EA, NET) 3 m 39 s
Table 3.2: Results of our analysis on the formal model of the Remark! protocol. The
parties which are assumed to be honest for the result to hold are in brackets. NET is
the process that models the mix networks. (∗) after applying our fix.
not code in ProVerif, we cannot claim this to be an attack as the candidate may not be
allowed to post on the bulletin board. However, we demonstrate that with a simple fix
there is no need of access control policies for publishing into the bulletin board. The fix
consists in making the intended pseudonym of an examiner explicit within the signature
that designates the examiner as evaluator of an exam. In doing so, the exam authority’s
signature within the receipt cannot be used by a candidate to designate any examiner
because the receipt includes no examiner’s pseudonym. The exam authority will only
accept exam evaluations that contain its signature on examiner’s pseudonym. Considering
the fix, ProVerif confirms that Remark! guarantees Form Authenticity, even in presence
of corrupted candidates.
Privacy properties. All the privacy properties are satisfied. For Question Indistin-
guishability, we only assume the exam authority to be honest, and then conclude that
the property holds. For Mark Privacy, we assume only the concerned candidate and
examiner, as well as the exam authority, to be honest. All other candidates and examiners
are corrupted, and ProVerif still concludes successfully. Note that, this subsumes a case
with multiple honest candidates and examiners, since a dishonest party can behave like a
honest party. This also implies that the protocol ensures Mark Anonymity as noted above.
For Anonymous Examiner, we assume only the examiners and the NET to be honest.
If the NET publishes the pseudonyms in random order, ProVerif concludes successfully.
Similarly for Anonymous Marking, we assume only the candidates and the NET to be
honest. Again, if the NET publishes the pseudonyms in random order, ProVerif concludes
successfully.
3.3.3.3 Protocol of Université Grenoble Alpes
The third case study we analyze is Grenoble exam, which is paper-and-pencil procedure
used to evaluate undergraduate students at the Université Grenoble Alpes.
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Figure 3.6: Special exam paper used in Grenoble exam.
Protocol Description. The protocol involves candidates (C), an examiner (E), a
question committee (QC), and an exam authority (EA). It has four phases:
Registration: in Grenoble exam each student has an identity (student name + her birth-
day), and a pseudonym (student number) which is assigned to her by the exam authority
when she registered to the course. All the students of the course are automatically
enrolled as eligible candidates for the exam; they are informed about the exam’s date,
time and location. The QC, the course’s lecturer(s), prepares the questions and hands
them securely to EA.
Examination: after EA authenticates all candidates, EA lets them take a seat. There,
each C finds a special exam paper: the top-right corner is glued and can be folded. Each
C signs it, and writes down her name in such a way that the corner, when folded, hides
both the signature and the name. Figure 3.6 shows the special paper used in Grenoble
exam: a paper with open corner to the left, and a paper with folded corner to the right.
Each C also writes down visibly her pseudonym. EA checks that each C writes down
her correct name and pseudonym, then the glued part can be folded and sealed. After
that, EA distributes the questions and the exam begins. At the end, EA collects the
exam-forms, checks that all copies have been returned, that all corners are correctly glued,
and gives the exam-forms to E.
Marking: E evaluates the exam-forms: each pseudonym is given a mark. E returns them,
along with the marks, to EA.
Notification: for each exam-form, EA checks that the corner is still glued and maps the
pseudonym to the real identity without opening the glued part. Then, EA stores the pairs
identities/marks, and publishes the pairs pseudonyms/marks. After that, C can review
her exam-form in presence of E to check the integrity of her exam-form and verify the
mark. If, for instance, C denies that the exam-form containing her pseudonym belongs to
her, the glued part is opened.
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checksign(sign(m, k), pk(k)) = m
getmess(sign(m, k)) = m
unfold(fold(m, k), k) = m
authcheck(auth(m, s), generate(s)) = m
openauth(auth(m, s)) = m
seen(unseen(m, pk(k), r), k) = m
Figure 3.7: Equational theory for our model of Grenoble exam.
Formal Analysis. We analyze Grenoble exam with ProVerif, using the equational
theory depicted in Figure 3.7. The obtained results together with the time required for
ProVerif to conclude, on the same PC used for the previous case studies, are summarized
in Table 3.3. We made a few choices when modeling the Grenoble exam’s “visual
channels”. These are face-to-face channels that all the participants use to exchange data
(exam-sheets, student pseudonyms, marks). Intrinsically, all such communications are
mutually authenticated. To model visual channels in ProVerif, we could have used private
channels, but this would have made the channels too strong, preventing the attacker
even from knowing if a communication has happened at all. More appropriately, visual
channels are authenticated channels, where authentication is expressed by an equational
theory similar to the one commonly used for cryptographic signatures, but with the
assumption that the verification key is only known to the intended receiver, namely:
openauth(auth(m, s)) = m, and authcheck(auth(m, s), generate(s)) = m. Function
auth takes as input a message m and a secret s that only the sender knows, and outputs
an authenticated value. The verification key that corresponds to this secret, generate(s),
is possessed only by the receiver/verifier. Anyone can get the message, m, but only the
owner of generate(s) can verify its origin. The function fold, similar to symmetric
encryption, is used to hide candidate’s identity and signature. The key necessary to
reveal the hidden data using the function unfold is included inside the message, so that
anyone can unfold it. The function unseen, similar to asymmetric encryption, is used
to model that the attacker cannot see the content of some exchanged messages. For
instance when a candidate submits an answer, the others can see that she is submitting
an answer but cannot look into its content (this is prevented by the authority which is
controlling the exam room). The function seen is the inverse of unseen. We also use
the equational theory of digital signature (functions: sign, checksign and getmess) to
model candidate’s signature. Note that, we use private channel for the transmission of
the questions from QC to EA, as in reality this happen in a secure way (so nobody can
see this transmission). Similarly, the authority provides a pseudonym (student number)
to the candidate securely. We use a table to model this; EA inserts the identity of the
candidate together with her pseudonym in the table, then the candidate gets it. Note
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that, in ProVerif, tables cannot be accessed by the attacker. Finally, we assume that an
examiner cannot register as a candidate. This is normal since a candidate cannot be an
examiner at the same time.
Authentication properties: ProVerif verifies that all the authentication properties
are satisfied, if the parties that emits events (necessary for the considered property) are
honest. This is necessary for authentication properties, since otherwise the processes may
not emit some events when reached.
We make one assumption: the EA only accepts one exam-form per pseudonym. This is
realistic as the authority collects only one exam copy from each candidate, which then has
to leave the exam room. This assumption is necessary for Answer Origin Authentication
to hold. Otherwise, the attacker can simply re-submit the candidate’s exam-form, and
thus the EA will collect twice the same exam-form from the same candidate.
Privacy properties: ProVerif shows that Question Indistinguishability is satisfied by
Grenoble exam if QC and EA are honest. Otherwise, one of them could reveal the exam
questions, and thus break its secrecy. Anonymous Marking is satisfied if EA, E, and the
two candidates are honest. However, since it is desirable for Anonymous Marking to hold
even if the examiner is corrupted, we also consider the case where we have a corrupted E.
In that case we assume that the examiner still cannot open the glued part (which would
trivially break Anonymous Marking), as this would be detectable. Given this assumption,
ProVerif confirms that Anonymous Marking is satisfied by Grenoble exam even if E is
corrupted. Concerning Anonymous Examiner, ProVerif finds a counterexample even if all
parties are honest. The attacker can distinguish which “unseen” exam-form is accepted
by the examiner to mark (the one he can “seen” using his secret key). This is not a real
attack, since the examiner will only accept exam-forms from the exam authority, not
an attacker. If we assume a private channel between the EA and E, ProVerif confirms
that Anonymous Examiner is satisfied by Grenoble exam even with corrupted candidates.
ProVerif finds an attack against Mark Privacy (when all parties are honest), this was
expected as in Grenoble exam the marks are published in clear-text by the EA. However,
Mark Anonymity is satisfied in case where we have honest EA, E and two Cs.
3.4 Verifiability in Exams
The authentication properties discussed in the previous section ensure, when satisfied,
that only registered candidates can take the exam that no answer can be manipulated,
and that each candidate gets the mark attributed to her answers. However, they may
require some parties to be honest, e.g., a certain authority, and thus in practice have to
be trusted by the other parties, e.g., candidates. In this section we discuss Verifiability
properties, which allow parties to check after the end of the exam for the presence or
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Property Result Time
Answer Origin Authentication X(EA) < 1 s
Form Authorship X(C, EA) < 1 s
Form Authenticity X(E, EA) < 1 s
Mark Authenticity X(C, E, EA) < 1 s
Question Indistinguishability X(EA, QC) < 1 s
Anonymous Marking X(C, E, EA) < 1 s
Anonymous Marking∗ X(C, EA) < 1 s
Anonymous Examiner × < 1 s
Anonymous Examiner † X(E, EA) < 1 s
Mark Privacy × < 1 s
Mark Anonymity X(C, E, EA) 30 s
Table 3.3: Results of our analysis on the formal model of the Grenoble protocol. (∗) E
corrupted, but cannot open the glued part. (†) private channel between EA and E.
the absence of irregularities and provide evidence about the correctness of the marking
procedures. They should be welcome by authorities since exam verifiability is also about
to be transparent about an exam being compliant with regulations as well as being able
to inspire public trust.
We classify our properties into individual and universal verifiability properties. The
individual properties allow each candidate to verify herself after the end of the exam
that none of the answers she submitted were manipulated, that the mark she get was
correctly computed on her answers. In their turn verifiability properties allow a generic
observer to verify that only registered candidates participated in the exam, that all the
accepted (collected) answers were marked without any manipulation, and that all marks
were correctly computed and assigned to the corresponding candidates.
We define a new model of exam protocols, which is more general than the previous one.
It is inspired by the work of Jannik et al. [DJL13]. We propose eleven abstract verifiability
properties, then we instantiate them using Applied pi-Calculus and we analyze two case
studies: the protocols by Giustolisi et al. [GLR14], and Grenoble exam. Note that, we
do not analyze the verifiability of H&P protocol as it does not provide any verifiability
means. We consider the same exam parties: candidates, examiners, question committee,
and exam authorities. We also consider the same four phases: Registration, Examination,
Marking, and Notification. Assuming such roles and such phases, our model of exam
consists of four sets — a set of candidates, a set of questions, a set of answers (questions
and answers together are called exam-forms) and a set of marks. Three relations link
candidates, exam-forms, and marks along the four phases: Accepted (corresponds to the
event accept), Marked (corresponds to the event attribute), and Assigned. They are
assumed to be recorded during the exam or build from data logs such as registers or
repositories. Note that, the set Assigned is different from the event notify previously
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seen. The former reflects the fact that the authority stores the mark in its database
or sends it to the corresponding candidate, while the latter reflects the fact that the
candidate receives the mark (in analogues to “submit” and “accept” an answer).
Definition 3.13. (Exam). An exam E is a tuple (I, Q, A, M, α) where I of type I is a set
of candidate identities, Q of type Q is a set of questions, A of type A is a set of answers,
M of type M is a set of marks, and α is the set of the following relations:
− Accepted ⊆ I× (Q× A): the candidates’ exam-forms accepted by the authority;
− Marked ⊆ I× (Q× A)× M: the marks delivered on the exam-forms;
− Assigned ⊆ I× M: the marks assigned (i.e., officially linked) to the candidates;
− Correct : (Q×A)→M: the function used to mark an exam-form;
Definition 3.13 is simple but expressive. It can model electronic as well as paper-and-pencil
exams, and exams executed honestly as well as exams with frauds. It is the goal of
verifiability to test for the absence of anomalies. For this aim we recognize two specific
subsets: (a) Ir ⊆ I as the set of candidates who registered for the exam (thus, I \ Ir are
the identities of the unregistered candidates who have taken the exam), and (b) Qg ⊆ Q as
the questions that the question committee has prepared (thus, Q\Qg are the additional and
illegitimate questions that appear in the exam). Note that, set Ir corresponds to event
register previously seen. The function Correct models any objective mapping that
assigns a mark to an answer. This works well for single-choice and with multiple-choice
questions. However, it is inappropriate for long open questions because marking an open
question is hardly objective: the ambiguities of natural language can lead to subjective
interpretations by the examiner. Thus, independently of the model, we cannot hope to
verify the marking in such a context. Since in our framework the function Correct is
used to verify the correctness of the marking, exams that do not allow a definition of
such a function cannot be checked for that property; however, all other properties can
still be checked.
To be verifiable with respect to specific properties, an exam protocol needs to provide
tests to verify these properties. A test t is a function from E → bool, where E is the set
of data used to run the test. Abstractly, a verifiable property has the format t(e)⇔ c,
where t is a test, e is the data used, and c is a predicate that expresses the property the
test is expected to check. Direction ⇒ says that the test’s success is a sufficient condition
for c to hold (soundness); direction ⇐ says that the test’s success is a necessary condition
for c to hold (completeness).
Definition 3.14. (Verifiable Exam). An exam for which it exists a test for a property
is testable for that property. An exam is verifiable for that property when it is testable
and when the test is sound and complete.
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To work, a test needs pieces of data from the exam’s execution. A verifier, which is the
entity who runs the test, may complementary use personal knowledge about the exam’s
run if he has any. We assume data to be taken after the exam has ended, that is, when
they are stable and not subject to further changes.
To be useful, tests have to be sound even in the presence of an attacker or of dishonest
participants: this ensures that when the test succeeds the property holds despite any
attempt by the attacker or the participants to falsify it. However, many sound tests
are not complete in such conditions: a misbehaving participant can submit incorrect
data and, in so doing, causing the test to fail although the property holds. Unless said
differently, we check for soundness in presence of some dishonest participants (indeed
we seek for the maximal set of dishonest participants that preserve the soundness of the
test), but we check for completeness only with honest participants.
A verifiability test can be run by the exam participants or by outsiders. This brings
to two distinct notions of verifiability properties: individual and universal. In exams,
individual verifiability means verifiability from the point of view of a candidate. She
can feed the test with the knowledge she has about the exam, namely her personal data
(identity, exam-form, mark) and the messages she exchanged with the other participants
during the exam. Universal verifiability means verifiability from the point of view of
an external observer. In practical applications this might be an auditor who has no
knowledge of the exam: he has no candidate ID, he has not seen the exam’s questions and
answered any of them, and he did not receive any mark. Besides, he has not interacted
with any of the exam participants. In short, he runs the test only using the exam’s public
pieces of data available to him.
In the next two sections, we respectively define seven individual and five universal
verifiability properties. These properties cover the verifiability of all phases of a typical
exam. We define one property about registration verifiability, one about the validity of
questions, two about the integrity of exam-test, two about the process of marking, and
one about the integrity of notification. More details are given in the remainder of the
section. Generally speaking, an exam is fully (individual or universal) verifiable when it
satisfies all the properties. Of course, on a particular exam each property can be verified
separately to clearly assess its strengths and weaknesses.
3.4.1 Individual Verifiability Properties
Here is the candidate that verifies the exam. She knows her identity i, her submitted
exam-form q and a, and her mark m. She also knows her perspective p of the exam
run, that is, the messages she has sent and received. Her data is a tuple (i, q, a,m, p).
Note that, the candidate’s perspective p is not necessary to define the properties, for this
reason it does not appear in the right-hand-side of the equivalent. However, it might
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be necessary to implement the test depending on the case study. There is no individual
verifiability (I.V.) property about registration as a candidate knows whether she has
registered, and she might even have a receipt of it. Instead, what a candidate does not
know, but wishes to verify, is whether she got the correct questions, and whether she got
her form correctly marked.
To verify the validity of her question, we propose the property Question Validity which,
when satisfied, allows the candidate to check whether the questions she received are
actually generated by the question committee. This is modeled by a test which returns
true, if and only if, the questions q received by the candidate belong to the set of the
valid questions Qg generated by the question committee.
Definition 3.15. (Question Validity I.V.). Given an exam E and a set of tests β,
then (E, β) is question validity verifiable if there is a test QVIV : E → bool in β s.t.:
QVIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇔ (q ∈ Qg)
The test QVIV could be implemented by e.g., checking a signature coming with q, but other
implementations are possible. For the candidate to verify that her mark is correct, we
propose the property Marking Correctness which allows the candidate to check whether
the mark she received is correctly computed on her exam-form.
Definition 3.16. (Marking Correctness I.V.). Let E be an exam and β be a set of
tests, then (E, β) is marking correctness verifiable if there is a test MCIV : E → bool in β
s.t.: MCIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇔ (Correct(q, a) = m)
Verifying Marking Correctness could e.g., be realized by giving access to the marking
algorithm, so that the candidate can compute again the mark that corresponds to her
exam-form and compare it to the mark she received. This is feasible with multiple-choice
questions or short open-questions, but rather difficult in other cases such as the case of
long and open questions.
In case that the implementation does not support the verification of Marking Correct-
ness, a candidate may wish to verify whether at least the mark she received is the one
attributed to her answers. This is ensured by Correct Mark Reception.
Definition 3.17. (Correct Mark Reception I.V.). Let E be an exam and β be a set
of tests, then (E, β) is correct mark reception verifiable if there is a test CMRIV : E → bool
in β s.t.: CMRIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇔ ((i, (q, a),m) ∈ Marked))
Correct Mark Reception is sufficient for the candidate to be convinced that she got the
correct mark, provided the examiner follows the marking algorithm correctly. Note that,
even if Marking Correctness is satisfied by an exam, Correct Mark Reception may helps
when MCIV fails to identify the source of error. For instance, when MCIV fails and CMRIV
succeeds, the candidate can be sure that the failure of MCIV is due to the fact that the
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examiner corrected her answer wrongly, and not related to the exam-form integrity before
marking or mark integrity after marking.
Again when Correct Mark Reception is not satisfied, or if CMRIV fails more properties
about candidate’s exam-form and mark can be verified in order to grantee some points
about them or to identify in which step of the exam the error happened. Precisely whether
the integrity of the candidate’s exam-form is preserved upon acceptance, whether the
accepted exam-form is the one that is marked, and whether the integrity of the candidate’s
mark is preserved from delivery through assignment until reception. Preserving the
integrity of the exam-form and that of the mark is sufficient for the candidate to be
convinced that she got the mark delivered on her exam-form. Each these properties covers
a different step from exam-form submission until mark reception. The next property
Exam-form Integrity ensures that the candidate’s exam-form is accepted as she submitted
it without any modification.
Definition 3.18. (Exam-form Integrity I.V.). Let E be an exam and β be a set of
tests. (E, β) is exam-form integrity verifiable if there is a test ETIIV : E → bool in β s.t.:
ETIIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇔
(
(i, (q, a)) ∈ Accepted)
Another property that also concerns the integrity of the exam-form is Exam-form Marked-
ness which ensures that the exam-form accepted from the candidate is marked without
modification.
Definition 3.19. (Exam-form Markedness I.V.). Let E be an exam and β be a set of
tests, then (E, β) is exam-form markedness verifiable if there is a test ETMIV : E → bool in
β s.t.: ETMIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇔ (∃! (q′, a′) : (i, (q′, a′)) ∈ Accepted ∧ ∃! m′ : (i, (q′, a′),m′) ∈
Marked))
Running the Exam-form Markedness test after the end of the exam does not invalidate
the property since if an exam-form is lost or modified before being marked, it remains
modified also after the exam is over. But the event consisting of an exam-form that is first
changed before the marking, and then restored correctly after marking, is not captured
by Exam-form Markedness.
The remaining two properties ensure that the integrity of the mark attributed to a
candidate by the examiner is preserved until reception. The property Mark Integrity
ensures that the mark attributed to a candidate is assigned to that candidate by the
responsible authority without any modification.
Definition 3.20. (Mark Integrity I.V.). Let E be an exam and β be a set of tests,
then (E, β) is mark integrity verifiable if there is a test MIIV : E → bool in β s.t.:
MIIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇔ ∃! (q′, a′) :
(
(i, (q′, a′),m′) ∈ Marked ∧ ∃! m′ : (i,m′) ∈ Assigned).
The last individual property Mark Notification Integrity ensures that the candidate
receives the mark assigned to her by the authority.
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Definition 3.21. (Mark Notification Integrity I.V.). Let E be an exam and β
be a set of tests, then (E, β) is mark notification integrity verifiable if there is a test
MNIIV : E → bool in β s.t.: MNIIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇔ (i,m) ∈ Assigned
Relations. If Correct Mark Reception is not satisfied, then probable Exam-form Marked-
ness and Mark Integrity are not satisfied to as this could related to the set Marked.
However, Exam-form Integrity and Mark Notification Integrity are independent and may
be satisfied. If it is the case, then MIIV and MNIIV guarantee when they succeed that
the candidate’s exam-form is accepted as submitted, and that the mark she received
is the one assigned to her. This allows the candidate to be sure that no problem was
encountered during neither answers collection nor mark notification. However, this pro-
vides no guarantees about whether the mark she received is actually the correct mark
corresponding to his answers, which generally is not satisfying for the candidate.
Now, assuming that all the five properties Correct Mark Reception, Exam-form Integrity,
Exam-form Markedness, Mark Integrity, Mark Notification Integrity are satisfied by an
exam. If CMRIV fails, ETIIV, ETMIV, MIIV, MNIIV allows to detect in which step of the exam
the error happened. For instance, if CMRIV fails but ETIIV and MNIIV succeeds, then the
candidate’s exam-form is accepted as submitted, and that the mark she received is the
one assigned to her. Thus, the candidate can be sure that an error was happened during
marking, that is either her exam-form is modified before marking (ETMIV fails), or she
assigned a mark different from the one attribute to her exam-form (MIIV fails).
Note that, the success of ETIIV, ETMIV means that the exam-form submitted by the
candidate is marked without any modification (Lemma 3.1), and the success of MIIV and
MNIIV means that the mark received by the candidate is the one attributed to her by the
examiner during marking (Lemma 3.2).
Lemma 3.1. Providing that Exam-form Integrity, and Exam-form Markedness are
satisfied by a given exam, then
ETIIV(i, q, a,m, p) ∧ ETMIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇒ ∃! m′ : (i, (q, a),m′) ∈ Marked
Proof. We have that, ETIIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇔ (i, (q, a)) ∈ Accepted. On the other hand, we
have that ETMIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇔ ∃! (q′, a′) : (i, (q′, a′)) ∈ Accepted∧∃!m′ : (i, (q′, a′),m′) ∈
Marked. Then, (q′, a′) = (q, a) since, ∃! (q′, a′) : (i, (q′, a′)) ∈ Accepted and (i, (q, a)) ∈
Accepted. Thus ∃! m′ : (i, (q, a),m′) ∈ Marked.
Lemma 3.2. Providing that Mark Integrity, Mark Notification Integrity are satisfied by
a given exam, then
MIIV(i, q, a,m, p) ∧ MNIIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇒ ∃! (q′, a′) : (i, (q′, a′),m) ∈ Marked
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Proof. We have that, MIIV(i, q, a,m, p) ⇔ ∃! (q′, a′) : (i, (q′, a′),m′) ∈ Marked ∧ ∃! m′ :
(i,m′) ∈ Assigned. On the other hand, we have that MNIIV(i, q, a,m, p) ⇔ (i,m) ∈
Assigned. Then, m = m′ since (i,m) ∈ Assigned and ∃! m′ : (i,m′) ∈ Assigned. Thus,
∃! (q′, a′) : (i, (q′, a′),m) ∈ Marked.
Theorem 3.2. Providing that Correct Mark Reception, Exam-form Integrity, Exam-form
Markedness, Mark Integrity, Mark Notification Integrity are satisfied by a given exam,
then
ETIIV(i, q, a,m, p) ∧ ETMIV(i, q, a,m, p) ∧ MIIV(i, q, a,m, p) ∧ MNIIV(i, q, a,m, p)
⇒ CMRIV(i, q, a,m, p)
Proof. By Lemma 3.1 we have that ∃! m′ : (i, (q, a),m′) ∈ Marked, and by Lemma 3.2 we
have that ∃! (q′, a′) : (i, (q′, a′),m) ∈ Marked. Then, we deduce that (q′, a′,m′) = (q, a,m).
Thus, (i, (q, a),m) ∈ Marked. Hence, CMRIV(i, q, a,m, p) succeeds, by Correct Mark
Reception.
3.4.2 Universal Verifiability Properties
The universal verifiability (U.V.) properties are designed from the viewpoint of a generic
observer. In contrast to the individual viewpoint, the observer does not have an identity
and does not know an exam-form or a mark, because he does not have an official exam
role. The observer runs the test on the public data available after a protocol run. Hence,
we simply have a general variable e containing the data.
In the universal perspective, properties such as Question Validity, Correct Mark
Reception, and Mark Notification Integrity are not relevant because the external observer
has no knowledge of the exam-forms submitted nor of the marks received by the candidates.
However, an observer may want to verify other properties revealing whether the exam
has been carried out correctly, or he may want to check that the exam authorities and
examiners have played by the rules. Precisely, an observer would be interested in verifying
that only registered candidates were participated in the exam, all accepted exam-forms
are marked without any modification, all exam-forms are marked correctly, and all marks
are assigned to the corresponding candidates.
The five universal verifiability properties cover all the exam steps. Thus, an exam
system is fully universally verifiable if it guarantees these five properties. However, again
each property can be checked independently from the others. The first universal property
is Registration, which allows to verify that all accepted exam-forms were submitted by
registered candidates.
Definition 3.22. (Registration U.V.). Let E be an exam and β be a set of tests, then
(E, β) is registration verifiable if there is a test RUV : E → bool in β s.t. RUV(e))⇔ {i :
(i, (q, a)) ∈ Accepted} ⊆ Ir.
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An observer may wish to test that all the marks attributed by the examiners to the
exam-forms are computed correctly. This property, Marking Correctness, raises the same
practical questions as the individual case and therefore the same discussion applies here.
However, even in case of open questions, to increase their trustworthiness, universities
should allow auditors to access their log for an inspection to the marking process.
Definition 3.23. (Marking Correctness U.V.). Let E be an exam and β be a
set of tests, then (E, β) is marking correctness universally verifiable if there is a test
MCUV : E → bool in β s.t. MCUV(e))⇔ (∀(i, (q, a),m) ∈ Marked, Correct(q, a) = m).
One may also want to check that no exam-form is modified, added, or deleted until the
end of the marking phase. The next property Exam-form Integrity allows an observer to
verify that all and only accepted exam-forms are marked without any modification.
Definition 3.24. (Exam-form Integrity U.V.). Let E be an exam and β be a set of
tests, then (E, β) is exam-form integrity universally verifiable if there is a test ETIUV :
E → bool in β s.t. ETIUV(e)⇔ Accepted = {(i, (q, a)) : (i, (q, a),m) ∈ Marked}.
Another property that could be useful when ETIUV fails is Exam-form Markedness, which
allows us to verify that all the accepted exam-forms are marked without modification.
Definition 3.25. (Exam-form Markedness U.V.). Let E be an exam and β be a set
of tests, then (E, β) is exam-form markedness universally verifiable if there exists a test
ETMUV : E → bool in β s.t. ETMUV(e))⇔ Accepted ⊂ {(i, (q, a)) : (i, (q, a),m) ∈ Marked}.
In case that ETIUV fails but ETMUV succeeds, then there is at least one extra marked
exam-form which is not accepted by the exam authority during the examination phase.
However, all the accepted exam-forms are marked.
Lemma 3.3. Providing that Mark Integrity, Mark Notification Integrity are satisfied by
a given exam, then ETIUV(e)⇒ ETMUV(e).
Proof. Suppose that ETIUV(e) succeeds then, by Exam-form Integrity U.V., we have
that Accepted = {(i, (q, a)) : (i, (q, a),m) ∈ Marked}. Thus, Accepted ⊂ {(i, (q, a)) :
(i, (q, a),m) ∈ Marked}. Hence, by Exam-form Markedness U.V., ETMUV(e) succeeds.
Finally, an observer may wish to check that all and only the marks assigned to exam-forms
are assigned to the corresponding candidates with no modifications. This is guaranteed
by Mark Integrity.
Definition 3.26. (Mark Integrity U.V.). Let E be an exam and β a set of tests, then
(E, β) is mark integrity universally verifiable if there exists a test MIUV : E → bool in β
s.t. MIUV(e)⇔ Assigned = {(i,m) : (i, (q, a),m) ∈ Marked}.
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3.4.3 Case Studies
We validate our framework and show its flexibility by analyzing using ProVerif the
verifiability properties of two exam protocols: the pencil-and-paper Grenoble exam, and
the electronic exam protocol by Giustolisi et al. [GLR14].
3.4.3.1 Protocol of Université Grenoble Alpes
The first exam that we analyze is the paper-and-pencil procedure used to evaluate
undergraduate students at the University of Grenoble. It involves candidates (C), an
examiner (E), a question committee (QC), and an exam authority (EA). It has four
phases already described in Section 3.3.3.3.
Formal Model. We use the same equational theory already presented in Figure 3.7 to
model physical features of Grenoble protocol. Additionally, each data set of Definition 3.13
is composed by a selection of messages taken from the data generated by the processes,
possibly manipulated by the attacker. For example, Q are all the messages that represent
a question. Qg, subset of Q, are all the messages representing a question that are generated
by the QC. The exam’s relations are also as in Definition 3.13. The set Accepted contains
all the messages (i, (q, a)) (i.e., identity and exam-form) that EA has collected. If the
EA is honest, it accepts only the exam-forms submitted by registered candidates. The
set Marked contains all the messages (i, (q, a),m) (i.e., identity, exam-form, and mark)
that the E has generated after having marked the exam-forms. If E is honest, he marks
only exam-forms authenticated by EA. The set Assigned contains all the messages (i,m)
originating from the EA when it assigns mark m to candidate i. If EA is honest, it
assigns a mark to C only if E notifies that it is the mark delivered on C’s exam-form. The
function Correct is a deterministic function that outputs a mark for a given exam-form.
Note that in ProVerif, we represent the data sets using events inside the process of the
parties. For example, an event accepted(i, q, a) is emitted once the element (i, (q, a)) is
added to the set Accepted. Moreover, the data are sent to the test process on private
channels in case of completeness, and on public channels in case of soundness.
Analysis of Individual Verifiability. We model individual verifiability tests as pro-
cesses in ProVerif. Each test emits two events: the event OK, when the test succeeds, and
the event KO, when the test fails. We use correspondence assertions, i.e., “if an event e is
executed the event e′ has been previously executed” [RSG+00], to prove soundness, and
resort to unreachability of KO to prove completeness. We also use unreachability to prove
soundness for Marking Correctness. A sound test receives its input via public channels.
This allows an attacker to mess with the test’s inputs. Participants can be dishonest too.
Thus, we check that the event OK is always preceded by the event emitted in the part of
the code where the predicate becomes satisfied. Below, we describe how this works for
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Property Sound Complete
Question Validity X(EA) X(all)
Marking Correctness X X(all)
Correct Mark Reception X(EA, E) X(all)
Exam-form Integrity X(EA) X(all)
Exam-form Markedness X(EA, E) X(all)
Mark Integrity X(EA, E) X(all)
Mark Notification Integrity X(EA) X(all)
Table 3.4: Results for I.V. properties of the Grenoble exam.
Question Validity. A complete test receives its input via private channels and by honest
participants. The attacker cannot change the test’s input this time. Then, we check that
the test does not fail, that is, the event KO is unreachable.
Table 3.4 reports the result of the analysis. All properties hold (X) despite the attacker,
but often they hold only assuming some roles to be honest, otherwise attacks exist. All
properties but Marking Correctness have sound tests (Table 3.4, middle column) only if
we assume at least the honesty of the exam authority (EA), or of the examiner (E), or
of both. This in addition to the honesty of candidate, who must be necessarily honest
because he is the verifier. The minimal assumptions for all the properties are reported in
brackets. All properties have complete tests (Table, right columns) but all roles except
the attacker have to be honest for them to hold. In the following we describe the tests
used to verify the individual properties of Grenoble exam.
Question Validity: Figure 3.8 presents the code for the Question Validity’s test. The
QV test inputs the verification value ver_AC, which is used to authenticate the exam
authority. On channel chTest, the test inputs the authenticated question auth_q, which
it checks for origin-authenticity. The test succeeds if the question is authenticated by the
EA, it fails otherwise. The test emits the event OK when it succeeds, otherwise emits the
event KO. In the proof for soundness, we modified the ProVerif code for EA in such way
let test(chTest, ver_AC) =
in(chTest, (auth_q));
let question = openauth(auth_q) in
if authcheck(auth_q, Ver_AC) = question then
event OK
else
event KO.
Figure 3.8: The Question Validity test for the Grenoble exam.
to emit an event valid just after the process receives the question from QC and checks
the authenticity of its origin, and just before EA sends the question to the C. ProVerif
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shows, in case of honest EA, that any OK is preceded by valid: the test outputs true only
if the question is generated by QC. Note that any tampering that QC can perform on the
questions (for example, generating dummy questions or by trashing them after having
generated them) does not violate question validity per se: according to this property the
questions that C received are still those generated, honestly or dishonestly, by the QC:
the origin of the question is not compromised. In the proof for completeness, ProVerif
shows that the event KO is unreachable when all participants are honest.
Marking Correctness: in Grenoble exam when the candidate examine her marked exam-
form in presence of the examiner, she can check with the examiner if the marking was
done correctly. Then, the Marking Correctness test for Grenoble exam simply takes the
exam-form submitted by the candidate and the mark she received, and then compare
if the mark obtained by running the marking algorithm on the submitted exam-form is
equal to the received mark. The Marking Correctness test is presented in Figure 3.9.
Using ProVerif we show that the Marking Correctness test is complete and sound even if
all participants are dishonest.
let test(chCand) =
in(chCand, (ques, ans, mark));
if mark = correction(ques, ans) then
event OK;
if mark <> correction(ques, ans) then event reject
else 0
else
event KO.
Figure 3.9: The Marking Correctness test for Grenoble exam.
Correct Mark Reception: the candidate can examine her exam-form after marking and
check whether it is marked. So, whether the submitted exam-form is equal to the marked
one, and whether the received mark is equal to the one attributed to the exam-form. We
show using ProVerif that Correct Mark Reception is complete and sound in case of honest
examiner for Grenoble exam.
Exam-form Integrity: the candidate can check the integrity of her exam-form by comparing
the the exam-form she submitted to the one marked by the examiner, as she can consult
the later after marking. If the exam-form is unmodified after marking, then it is supposed
that it is accepted correctly by the exam authority and not modified before marking. The
Exam-form Integrity test is presented in Figure 3.11. The test takes from the candidate,
on the channel chCand (private for completeness and public for soundness), the form she
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let test(chCand, chA, chM, ver_t) =
in(chCand, (hC, pseuC, ques, ans, hS, m));
in(chM, auth_fM);
let (=hC, =pseuC, quesX, ansX, hSX, mX) = openauth(auth_fM) in
if (hC, pseuC, quesX, ansX, hSX, mX) = authcheck(auth_fM, ver_t)
then
if ques = quesX && ans = ansX && m = mX then
event OK
else
event KO.
Figure 3.10: The Correct Mark Reception test for Grenoble exam.
submitted (hidden identity, pseudonym, question, answer and hidden signature). Then
it takes the form accepted by the exam authority auth_fA from that candidate, and
verifies that it is equal to the form submitted by the candidate i.e., the exam authority
recorded the submitted form without any modification. If its the case the test outputs
true (OK), and false (KO) otherwise. Note that, the test checks the authenticity of the
forms received from the exam authority with the verification value ver_t since in practice
the candidate takes the forms from them by hand. Also, in case of completeness the
channel chA which used to take the forms from the exam authority is a private channel,
while it is public (controlled by the attacker) in case of soundness. ProVerif proves that
the Exam-form Integrity test is complete and sound in case of honest examiner and
honest exam authority for Grenoble exam.
let test(chCand, chA, chM, ver_t) =
in(chCand, (hC, pseuC, ques, ans, hS));
in(chA, auth_fA);
let (=hC, =pseuC, quesX, ansX, hSX) = openauth( auth_fA) in
if (hC, pseuC, quesX, ansX, hSX) = authcheck( auth_fA, ver_t) then
if quesX = ques && ansX = ans then
event OK
else
event KO.
Figure 3.11: The Exam-form Integrity test for Grenoble exam.
Exam-form Markedness: similar to Exam-form Integrity, the candidate can examine her
exam-form after marking and check whether it is marked. So, the exam-form markedness
test for Grenoble exam is exactly similar to the exam-form integrity test except that for
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exam-form markedness the test additionally takes the form marked by the examiner on
channel chM. Thus, the test checks that if the accepted exam-form is equal to the marked
one. We show using ProVerif that Exam-form Markedness is complete and sound in case
of honest examiner for Grenoble exam.
let test(chCand, chA, chM, ver_t) =
in(chCand, (hC, pseuC, ques, ans, hS));
in(chA, auth_fA);
let (=hC, =pseuC, quesX, ansX, hSX) = openauth( auth_fA) in
if (hC, pseuC, quesX, ansX, hSX) = authcheck( auth_fA, ver_t) then
in(chM, auth_fM);
let (=hC, =pseuC, quesX’, ansX’, hSX’, m) = openauth(auth_fM) in
if (hC, pseuC, quesX’, ansX’, hSX’, m) = authcheck(auth_fM, ver_t)
then
if quesX’ = quesX && ansX’ = ansX then
event OK
else
event KO.
Figure 3.12: The Exam-form Markedness test for Grenoble exam.
Mark Integrity: as the candidate can examine her exam-form after marking, so she can
learn the mark attributed by the examiner for her. The candidate also can asks the exam
authority about the mark assigned for her. Thus, a simple test exists for Mark Integrity
that is comparing the two marks. The test is presented in Figure 3.13. ProVerif shows
that Grenoble exam ensures the completeness and soundness, in case of honest exam
authority and examiner, of the Mark Integrity test.
Mark Notification Integrity: the candidate can ask the exam authority about the mark
assigned to her and check if it is the same one she received. The Mark Notification
Integrity test is presented in Figure 3.14. ProVerif shows that the test is complete and
sound in case of honest exam authority.
Analysis of Universal Verifiability. Universal verifiable tests should use some public
data. However, since the Grenoble exam is a paper-and-pencil based exam, in general,
there is no publicly available data. Thus, originally Grenoble exam does not satisfy any
of the universal verifiability properties. To be universally testable, an auditor has to
be given access to the following data: (1) for Registration verifiability, he can read the
list of registered candidates and the set of accepted exam-forms. Thus, he can check
whether all accepted exam-forms are submitted by registered candidates; (2) for Exam-
form Markedness, in addition to the accepted exam-forms, he knows the set of marked
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let test(chCand, chA, chM, ver_t) =
in(chCand, (hC, pseuC, ques, ans, hS));
in(chM, auth_fM);
let (=hC, =pseuC, quesX, ansX, hSX, m) = openauth(auth_fM) in
if (hC, pseuC, ques, ans, hS, m) = authcheck(auth_fM, ver_t) then
in(chA, auth_mA);
let (=hC, =pseuC, mX) = openauth(auth_mA) in
if (hC, pseuC, mX) = authcheck(auth_mA, ver_t) then
if mX = m then
event OK
else
event KO.
Figure 3.13: The Mark Integrity test for Grenoble exam.
let test(chCand:channel, chA:channel, ver_t:public) =
in(chCand, (hC, pseuC, m));
in(chA, auth_mA);
let (=hC, =pseuC, mX) = openauth(auth_mA) in
if (hC, pseuC, mX) = authcheck(auth_mA, ver_t) then
if mX = m then
event OK
else
event KO.
Figure 3.14: The Mark Notification Integrity test for Grenoble exam.
exam-forms. Then, he can check whether all the accepted exam-forms are marked; (3) for
Exam-form Integrity, he knows the same data as in Exam-form Markedness. The auditor
has to check that all and only the accepted exam-forms are marked; (4) for Marking
Correctness, he knows the correction algorithm and the marked exam-forms together
with the delivered marks. The test is to run the correction algorithm again on each
exam-form and check if the obtained mark is the same as the delivered one; finally, for
(5) Mark Integrity, in addition to the delivered marks, he can access the assigned marks.
The auditor can check whether the assigned marks are exactly the ones delivered and
whether they are assigned to the correct candidates. Having access to such significant
data mentioned above could break candidate’s privacy (for instance identities, answers,
and marks can be disclosed to the auditor); that noticed, discussing the compatibility
between the universal verifiability and privacy is not in the scope of this thesis. Similar
74
Chapter 3. Exam Protocols
Property Sound Complete
Registration X(EA) X(all)
Exam-form Integrity X(EA, E) X(all)
Exam-form Markedness X(EA, E) X(all)
Marking Correctness X(E) X(all)
Mark Integrity X(EA, E) X(all)
Table 3.5: Results for U.V. properties of the Grenoble exam.
to what we did for the individual verifiability tests, we use correspondence assertions to
prove soundness and unreachability of a KO event to prove completeness.
Table 3.5 depicts the result of the analysis. We must note that in our testing universal
verifiability, we were not able to run for all tests a fully automatically analysis in the
general case requiring any number of participants. This is because ProVerif does not
support loops and to prove the general case we would have needed to iterate over e.g.,
all candidates. For these tests we ran ProVerif only for the base case, that where we
have only one accepted exam-form or one assigned mark; then we completed a manual
induction proof that generalizes this result to the general case with an arbitrary number
of candidates. In the following, we present the universal tests used for Grenoble exam,
together with the corresponding manual proofs.
Registration: the Registration test for Grenoble exam is presented in Figure 3.15. We
show, with ProVerif, that Registration test is complete and sound, with honest exam
authority, for the case where we have one accepted exam-form and any number of
registered candidates. Then, we generalize it to the case of any number of accepted
exam-forms, more precisely, we show that
RV(E) = true⇔ i : (i, (q, a)) ∈ Accepted ⊆ Ir
holds for any size n of the set Accepted and any number m of registered candidates.
Let RVk(·) denotes the Registration test that can be applied to an exam execution that
has k accepted exam-forms, and RVk(·) →∗ OK denotes that the test outputs OK (true)
after some steps given certain exam execution with k accepted exam-forms. Let E be an
exam execution that has m registered candidates and n accepted exam-forms, and let Ej
denotes a version of E where only the jth accepted exam-form is counted, and assume
that it is submitted by the candidate ij . We show with ProVerif that the test is complete
and sound for one accepted exam-form and any number of registered candidates, thus we
have for soundness
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : RV1(Ej)→∗ OK⇒ ij ∈ Ir
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and for completeness
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : ij ∈ Ir ⇒ RV1(Ej)→∗ OK.
The test RVn(E) checks if each of the accepted exam-forms received on the channels chA1,
. . . , chAn is submitted by one of the registered candidates given on the channels chR1,
. . . , chRn, and ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : RV1(Ej) checks if the jth accepted exam-form received on the
channel chAj is submitted by the one of the registered candidates given on the channels
chR1, . . . , chRn. Thus, for soundness, we have
RVn(E)→∗ OK
⇓
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : RV1(Ej)→∗ OK
⇓(using ProV erif)
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : ij ∈ Ir
⇓
i : (i, (q, a)) ∈ Accepted ⊆ Ir
We can make a similar argument for completeness:
i : (i, (q, a)) ∈ Accepted ⊆ Ir
⇓
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : ij ∈ Ir
⇓(using ProV erif)
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : RV1(Ej)→∗ OK
⇓
RVn(E)→∗ OK
Exam-form Integrity: the Exam-form Integrity test checks whether all and only the
accepted exam-forms are marked. The Exam-form Integrity test for Grenoble exam
is presented in Figure 3.16. We show, with ProVerif, that Exam-form Integrity test
is complete and sound, with honest exam authority and examiner, for the case of one
accepted exam-form and one marked exam-form. Then, we generalize it to the case of
any number of accepted exam-forms, more precisely, we show that
ETI(E) = true⇔ Accepted = (i, (q, a)) : (i, (q, a), m) ∈ Marked
holds for any size of the sets Accepted and Marked. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the size of the set Accepted is equal to that of Marked, as the test can be
preceded by a simple check on the sizes of the two sets to see if they are equal or not.
If they have different sizes then this means that one of the accepted exam-form is not
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let testRV_n(chR1, ..., chRm, chA1, ..., chAn, ver_t) =
in(chR1, auth_c1); ... in(chRm, auth_cn);
let (pkC1, pseuC1) = openauth(auth_c1) in
...
let (pkCn, pseuCm) = openauth(auth_cm) in
if (pkC1, pseuC1) = authcheck(auth_c1, ver_t)
&& ... &&
(pkCn, pseuCm) = authcheck(auth_cm, ver_t)
then
in(chA1, auth_x1); ... in(chAn, auth_xn);
let (pkX1, pseuX1, ques1, ans1, hS1) = openauth(auth_x1) in
...
let (pkXn, pseuXn, quesn, ansn, hSn) = openauth(auth_xn) in
if (pkX1, pseuX1, ques1, ans1, hS1) = authcheck(auth_x1, ver_t)
&& ... &&
(pkXn, pseuXn, quesn, ansn, hSn) = authcheck(auth_xn, ver_t)
then
if (pkX1 = pkC1 && pseuX1 = pseuC1)
|| ... ||
(pkX1 = pkCm && pseuX1 = pseuCm)
&& ... &&
(pkXn = pkC1 && pseuXn = pseuC1)
|| ... ||
(pkXn = pkCm && pseuXn = pseuCm)
then
event OK
else
event KO.
Figure 3.15: The universal Registration test for Grenoble exam.
marked or the reverse, and in such a case the test can outputs false directly. Let ETIk(·)
denotes the Exam-form Integrity test that can be applied to an exam execution that has
k accepted exam-forms and k marked exam-form, and let ETIk(·) →∗ OK denotes that
the test outputs OK after some steps for a given exam execution with k accepted and k
marked exam-forms. Let E be an exam execution that has n accepted exam-forms and
n marked exam-forms, and let Ej denotes a version of E where only the jth accepted
exam-form (qj , aj), which is submitted by the candidate ij , and jth marked exam-form
(q′j , a
′
j), which is related to the candidate i
′
j , are counted. Note that we assume that the
exam-forms are marked in the same order as they were accepted. We show with ProVerif
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that the test is complete and sound for one exam-form, we have for soundness
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : ETI1(Ej)→∗ OK⇒ (ij , (qj , aj)) = (i′j , (q′j , a′j))
and for completeness
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : (ij , (qj , aj)) = (i′j , (q′j , a′j))⇒ ETI1(Ej)→∗ OK.
The ETIn(E) checks if all the accepted exam-forms received on the channels chA1, . . . ,
chAn are exactly the marked exam-forms received on channels chM1, . . . , chMn, and
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : ETI1(Ej) checks if the jth accepted exam-form on the channel chAj is
exactly the exam-form marked on channel chMj. Thus, for soundness, we have
ETIn(E)→∗ OK
⇓
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : ETI1(Ej)→∗ OK
⇓(using ProV erif)
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : (ij , (qj , aj)) = (i′j , (q′j , a′j))
⇓
Accepted = (i, (q, a)) : (i, (q, a), m) ∈ Marked
We can make a similar argument for completeness:
Accepted = (i, (q, a)) : (i, (q, a), m) ∈ Marked
⇓
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : (ij , (qj , aj)) = (i′j , (q′j , a′j))
⇓
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : ETI1(Ej)→∗ OK
⇓
ETIn(E)→∗ OK
Exam-form Markedness: we assume that a third party can takes the marked exam-forms
from the examiner, so that he can checks whether all the accepted exam-forms (which
he can takes from exam authority) are marked. The Exam-form Markedness test for
Grenoble exam is presented in Figure 3.17. We show, with ProVerif, that Exam-form
Markedness test is complete and sound, with honest exam authority and examiner, for
the case where we have one accepted exam-form and any number of marked exam-forms.
Then, we generalize it to the case of any number of accepted exam-forms, more precisely,
we show that
ETM(E) = true⇔ Accepted ⊆ (i, (q, a)) : (i, (q, a), m) ∈ Marked
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let testETI_n(chM1, ... , chMn, chA1, ... , chAn, ver_t) =
in(chA1, auth_fA1); ... in(chAn, auth_fAn);
let (hC1, pseuC1, ques1, ans1, hS1) = openauth(auth_fA1) in
...
let (hCn, pseuCn, quesn, ansn, hSn) = openauth(auth_fAn) in
if (hC1, pseuC1, ques1, ans1, hS1) = authcheck(auth_fA1, ver_t)
&& ... &&
(hCn, pseuCn, quesn, ansn, hSn) = authcheck(auth_fAn, ver_t)
then
in(chM1, auth_fM1); ... in(chMn, auth_fMn);
let (hX1, pseuX1, quesX1, ansX1, hSX1, m1) = openauth(auth_fM1) in
...
let (hXn, pseuXn, quesXn, ansXn, hSXn, mn) = openauth(auth_fMn) in
if (hX1, pseuX1, quesX1, ansX1, hSX1, m1) = authcheck(auth_fM1, ver_t)
&& ... &&
(hXn, pseuXn, quesXn, ansXn, hSXn, mn) = authcheck(auth_fMn, ver_t)
then
if (hX1=hC1 && pseuX1=pseuC1 && quesX1=ques1 && ansX1=ans1 && hSX1=hS1)
&& ... &&
(hXn=hCn && pseuXn=pseuCn && quesXn=quesn && ansXn=ansn && hSXn=hSn)
then
event OK
else
event KO.
Figure 3.16: The universal Exam-form Integrity test for Grenoble exam.
holds for any size n of the set Accepted and any number m of marked exam-forms. Let
ETMk(·) denotes the Exam-form Markedness test that can be applied to an exam execution
that has k accepted exam-forms, and ETMk(·) →∗ OK denotes that the test outputs OK
after some steps given certain exam execution with k accepted exam-forms. Let E be
an exam execution that has n accepted exam-forms and m marked exam-forms, and let
Ej denotes a version of E where only the jth accepted exam-form (qj , aj) is counted,
and assume that it is submitted by the candidate ij . As we show with ProVerif that
the test is complete and sound for one accepted exam-form and any number of marked
exam-forms, thus we have for soundness
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : ETM1(Ej)→∗ OK⇒ (ij , (qj , aj)) ⊆ (i, (q, a)) : (i, (q, a), m) ∈ Marked
and for completeness
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : (ij , (qj , aj)) ⊆ (i, (q, a)) : (i, (q, a), m) ∈ Marked⇒ ETM1(Ej)→∗ OK.
The test ETMn(E) checks if each of the accepted exam-forms received on the channels
chA1, . . . , chAn is one of the marked exam-forms received on the channels chM1, . . . ,
chMm, and ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : ETM1(Ej) checks if the jth accepted exam-form received on the
channel chAj is one of the marked exam-forms received on the channels chM1, . . . , chMm.
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Thus, for soundness, we have
ETMn(E)→∗ OK
⇓
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : ETM1(Ej)→∗ OK
⇓(using ProV erif)
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : (ij , (qj , aj)) ⊆ (i, (q, a)) : (i, (q, a), m) ∈ Marked
⇓
Accepted ⊆ (i, (q, a)) : (i, (q, a), m) ∈ Marked
We can make a similar argument for completeness:
Accepted ⊆ (i, (q, a)) : (i, (q, a), m) ∈ Marked
⇓
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : (ij , (qj , aj)) ⊆ (i, (q, a)) : (i, (q, a), m) ∈ Marked
⇓(using ProV erif)
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : ETM1(Ej)→∗ OK
⇓
ETMn(E)→∗ OK
Marking Correctness: we assume that anyone can access the correction algorithm, so
a third party can check whether the delivered marks are computed correctly provided
he given an access to the marked exam-forms also. The Marking Correctness test is
presented in Figure 3.18. Using ProVerif, we show that the Marking Correctness test
complete and sound, with honest examiner, in the case where we have only one marked
exam-form, i.e., size of Marked is 1. Then, we generalize it to the case of any number of
marked exam-forms, more precisely, we show that
MC(E) = true⇔∀(i, (q, a),m) ∈ Marked, Correct(q, a) = m
holds for any size n of the set Marked. Let MCk(·) denotes the Marking Correctness
test that can be applied to an exam execution that has k marked exam-forms, and
MCk(·)→∗ OK denotes that the test outputs OK after some steps for a given exam execution
with k marked exam-forms. Let E be an exam execution that has n marked exam-
forms, and let Ej denotes a version of E where only the jth marked exam-form (qj , aj)
is counted, which is submitted by the candidate ij and attributed the mark mj i.e.,
(ij , (qj , aj),mj) ∈ Marked. As we show with ProVerif that the test is complete and sound
for one marked exam-form, we have for soundness
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : MC1(Ej)→∗ OK⇒ Correct(qj , aj) = mj
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let testETM_n(chM1, ..., chMm, chA1, ..., chAn, ver_t) =
in(chA1, auth_fA1); ... in(chAn, auth_fAn);
let (hC1, pseuC1, ques1, ans1, hS1) = openauth(auth_fA1) in
...
let (hCn, pseuCn, quesn, ansn, hSn) = openauth(auth_fAn) in
if (hC1, pseuC1, ques1, ans1, hS1) = authcheck(auth_fA1, ver_t)
&& ... &&
(hCn, pseuCn, quesn, ansn, hSn) = authcheck(auth_fAn, ver_t)
then
in(chM1, auth_fM1); ... in(chMm, auth_fMn);
let (pkX1, pseuX1, quesX1, ansX1, hSX1, mark1) = openauth(auth_fM1) in
...
let (pkXn, pseuXn, quesXn, ansXn, hSXm, markm) = openauth(auth_fMm) in
if (pkX1, pseuX1, quesX1, ansX1, hSX1, mark1) = authcheck(auth_x1, ver_t)
&& ... &&
(pkXn, pseuXn, quesXn, ansXn, hSXm, markm)= authcheck(auth_xn, ver_t)
then
if (pkC1 = pkX1 && pseuC1 = pseuX1 && ques1 = quesX1 && ans1 = ansX1)
|| ... ||
(pkC1 = pkXm && pseuC1 = pseuXm && ques1 = quesXm && ans1 = ansXm)
&& ... &&
(pkCn = pkX1 && pseuCn = pseuX1 && quesn = quesX1 && ansn = ansX1)
|| ... ||
(pkCn = pkXm && pseuCn = pseuXm && quesn = quesXm && ansn = ansXm)
then
event OK
else
event KO.
Figure 3.17: The universal Exam-form Markedness for Grenoble exam.
and for completeness
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : Correct(qj , aj) = mj ⇒ MC1(Ej)→∗ OK.
The MCn(E) checks if all the marked exam-forms received on the channels chM1, . . . , chMn
are marked correctly, and ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : MC1(Ej) checks if the jth marked exam-form
received on the channel chMj is marked correctly. Thus, we have for soundness,
MCn(E)→∗ OK
⇓
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : MC1(Ej)→∗ OK
⇓(using ProV erif)
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : Correct(qj , aj) = mj
⇓
∀(i, (q, a),m) ∈ Marked, Correct(q, a) = m
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let testMC_n(chM1, ..., chMn, ver_t) =
in(chM1, auth_fM1); ... in(chMn, auth_fMn);
let (hC1, pseuC1, ques1, ans1, hS1, m1) = openauth(auth_fM1) in
...
let (hCn, pseuCn, quesn, ansn, hSn, mn) = openauth(auth_fMn) in
if (hC1, pseuC1, ques1, ans1, hS1, m1) = authcheck(auth_fM1, ver_t)
&& ... &&
(hCn, pseuCn, quesn, ansn, hSn, mn) = authcheck(auth_fMn, ver_t)
then
if m1 = correction(ques1, ans1)
&&
...
&&
mn = correction(quesn, ansn)
then
event OK
else
event KO.
Figure 3.18: The universal Marking Correctness test for Grenoble exam.
We can make a similar argument for completeness:
∀(i, (q, a),m) ∈ Marked, Correct(q, a) = m
⇓
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : Correct(qj , aj) = mj
⇓(using ProV erif)
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : MC1(Ej)→∗ OK
⇓
MCn(E)→∗ OK
Mark Integrity: we assume that a third party can take the list of assigned mark with the
corresponding candidates from the exam authority. Thus, simply he can check whether
the assigned marks are exactly the delivered ones and that they assigned to the correct
candidates. The Mark Integrity test is presented in Figure 3.19. We show, with ProVerif,
that Mark Integrity test is complete and sound, with honest exam authority and examiner,
in the case where we have only one delivered mark and only one assigned mark. Then, we
generalize it to the case of any number of delivered and assigned marks, more precisely,
we show that
MI(E) = true⇔ Assigned = (i, m) : (i, (q, a), m) ∈ Marked
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let testMI_n(chM1, .. , chMn, chA1, ... , chAn, ver_t) =
in(chM1, auth_fM1); ... in(chMn, auth_fMn);
let (hC1, pseuC1, ques1, ans1, hS1, m1) = openauth(auth_fM1) in
...
let (hCn, pseuCn, quesn, ansn, hSn, mn) = openauth(auth_fMn) in
if (hC1, pseuC1, ques1, ans1, hS1, m1) = authcheck(auth_fM1, ver_t)
&& ... &&
(hCn, pseuCn, quesn, ansn, hSn, mn) = authcheck(auth_fMn, ver_t)
then
in(chA1, auth_A1); ... in(chAn, auth_An);
let (hX1, pseuX1, mX1) = openauth(auth_A1) in
...
let (hXn, pseuXn, mXn) = openauth(auth_An) in
if (hX1, pseuX1, mX1) = authcheck(auth_A1, ver_t)
&& ... &&
(hXn, pseuXn, mXn) = authcheck(auth_An, ver_t)
then
if (hX1 = hC1 && pseuX1 = pseuC1 && mX1 = m1)
&& ... &&
(hXn = hCn && pseuXn = pseuCn && mXn = mn)
then
event OK
else
event KO.
Figure 3.19: The universal Mark Integrity test for Grenoble exam.
holds for any size of the sets Marked and Assigned. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the size of the set Assigned is equal to that of Marked, as the test can be preceded
by a simple check to see whether the sizes of the two sets are equal or not. If they have
different sizes then this means that one of the delivered marks is not assigned to any of
the candidates or a candidate is assigned a mark which is not delivered, and in such a
case the test can output false directly. Let MIk(·) denotes the Mark Integrity test that
can be applied to an exam execution that has k delivered marks and k assigned marks,
and let MIk(·)→∗ OK denotes that the test outputs OK after some steps for a given exam
execution with k delivered and k assigned marks. Let E be an exam execution that has
n delivered marks and n assigned marks, and let Ej denotes a version of E where only
the jth mark mj delivered for ij , and the jth mark m′j assigned to j
′
j are counted. Note
that, we assume that the assigned marks are ordered in a table as they were delivered.
As we show with ProVerif that the test is complete and sound for one exam-form, we
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have for soundness
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : MI1(Ej)→∗ OK⇒ (ij ,mj) = (i′j ,m′j)
and for completeness
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : (ij ,mj) = (i′j ,m′j)⇒ MI1(Ej)→∗ OK.
The MIn(E) checks if all the delivered marks received on the channels chM1, . . . , chMn are
equal to the assigned marks received on the channels chA1, . . . , chAn and that they are
assigned to the correct candidates i.e., they are assigned correctly without modification,
and ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : MI1(Ej) checks if the jth delivered mark received on the channel chMj
is equal to the assigned mark received on the channel chAj and that it is assigned to the
correct candidate. Thus, for soundness, we have
MIn(E)→∗ OK
⇓
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : MI1(Ej)→∗ OK
⇓(using ProV erif)
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : (ij ,mj) = (i′j ,m′j)
⇓
(i, m) : (i, (q, a), m) ∈ Marked = Assigned
We can make a similar argument for completeness:
(i, m) : (i, (q, a), m) ∈ Marked = Assigned
⇓
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : (ij ,mj) = (i′j ,m′j)
⇓(using ProV erif)
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : MI1(Ej)→∗ OK
⇓
MIn(E)→∗ OK
3.4.3.2 Protocol by Giustolisi et al.
The second exam protocol is Remark! [GLR14], we described in Section 3.3.3.2.
Formal Model We use the same equational theory presented in Figure 3.5. Data sets
I, Q, A and M are as in Definition 3.13. Set I contains the C’s pseudonyms rather than
their identities. This replacement is sound because any candidate is uniquely identified
by her pseudonym and the equational theory preserves this bijection. The sets Q, A,
and M are the messages that correspond to questions, answers, and marks generated
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during the protocol’s run. The relations are built from the posts that appear on the BB.
Precisely, the tuple (i, (q, a)) of Accepted is built from the receipts that EA publishes at
Examination. The tuples (i, (q, a),m) and (i,m) of Marked and Assigned consist of the
posts that EA publishes at Marking. Precisely, the tuple (i, (q, a),m) is built from the
marked exam-form signed by E, while the tuple (i,m) is built from the encryption of the
marked exam-form that EA generates. In fact, the encryption requires a pseudonym, and
officially links C with their identities. This replacement is sound because C is uniquely
identified by her key and the marked exam-form. Correct is the algorithm used to mark
the exam-forms and is modeled using a table.
Analysis of Individual Verifiability. Similarly to what we did in the analysis of
the Grenoble case, we modeled our individual verifiability tests in ProVerif. We used
assertions to prove soundness, and unreachability of an event KO to prove completeness.
In checking the soundness of a test we assumed, in addition to the honest NET, a honest
C (the verifier). The roles of E and co-candidate are dishonest for all tests. The input
of a test consists of the data sent via private channel from C, the data sent via public
channel from EA, and the evidences posted on BB. To check the completeness of a test,
we model all roles as honest. They all send their data via private channel to the test,
whose input also includes the evidences posted on BB.
Remark! protocol originally mandates only two individual verifiability properties:
Mark Notification Integrity and a weaker version of Exam-form Integrity. However, we
checked which assumptions Remark! protocol needs in order to ensure all our properties.
For each property, we describe how to build the corresponding test. Table 3.6 summarizes
the ProVerif results of our analysis.
Question Validity : the test (Figure 3.20) checks if the question given to the candidate is
correctly signed by the exam authority. Since the questions are generated by the Exam
Authority, it is modelled as an honest role. To check soundness in ProVerif, we check if
the test emits the event OK only if the Exam Authority actually generated the question,
i.e., any event OK is preceded by the event generated. ProVerif shows that Remark! is
question validity verifiable.
Marking Correctness: Remark! does not originally provide the marking algorithm used
to evaluate the answer. Consequently, there exists no test that candidate can run to
verify Marking Correctness. However, we prove in ProVerif that if the (honest) exam
authority publishes the table of evaluations after the exam concludes, the property holds
(both soundness and completeness). Given the exam-form submitted by the candidate
and the table of evaluations, the test (Figure 3.21) checks if the mark reported on table
that corresponds to the exam-form coincides with the mark notified to the candidate.
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let testQV(pkA, pch, bba)=
in(bba, eques);
in(pch, (ques, priv_C));
let (ques’, sques) = decrypt(eques, priv_C) in
let (ques’’, pseudoC) =checksign(sques, pkA) in
if ques’=ques && ques’’=ques’
then
event OK
else
event KO.
Figure 3.20: The Question Validity test for Remark! protocol.
let testMC (pkA, pch) =
in(pch, (ques: bitstring,ans: bitstring, mark: bitstring));
get correct_ans(=ques,=ans,mark’) in
if mark’=mark
then
event OK
else
event KO.
Figure 3.21: The Marking Correctness for Remark!.
Correct Mark Reception: the Correct Mark Reception test (Figure 3.24) checks if the exam-
form submitted and the mark received by the candidate (ques,ans), and the notification
(ema’) published on the bulletin board by the exam authority, contain the same questions,
answers, pseudonym, and mark. For soundness, we label the corresponding ProVerif test
code with two events (accepted and marked), which map the corresponding relations. In
particular, we consider a receipt part of the relation Accepted if it is signed by the exam
authority and encrypted under the pseudonym of the candidate. Similarly, we consider
a notification part of the relation Marked if it is signed by the examiner and encrypted
under the pseudonym of the candidate. ProVerif shows that the test for Correct Mark
Reception is sound and complete.
Exam-form Integrity : for Remark! protocol the Exam-form Integrity test (Figure 3.24)
checks if the exam-form submitted by the candidate (ques,ans), the corresponding
receipt (eca’), and the notification (ema’) published on the bulletin board by the exam
authority, contain the same questions, answers, and pseudonym. For soundness, we
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let testCMR (pkN, pkA, pch, bbn, bba)=
in(pch, (pseudo_C, ques,ans, mark, priv_C));
in(bbn, (pseudo_E, he, rolet: role, spseE));
in(bba, ema’);
let (((ques’, ans’, pseudo_C’),sca1, mark’), sma)
= decrypt(ema’, priv_C) in
let ((ques’’, ans’’, pseudo_C’’),sca1’, mark’’)
= checksign(sma, pseudo_E) in
if ques’=ques && ans’=ans && pseudo_C’=pseudo_C && mark’=mark &&
(ques’, ans’, pseudo_C’)=checksign(sca1,pkA) && ques’’=ques &&
ans’’=ans && pseudo_C’’=pseudo_C && mark’’=mark’ && sca1’=sca1
then
event OK
else
event KO.
Figure 3.22: The Correct Mark Reception test for Remark! protocol.
label the corresponding ProVerif test code with the event (accepted), which map the
corresponding relation. In particular, we consider a receipt part of the relation Accepted
if it is signed by the exam authority and encrypted under the pseudonym of the candidate.
Note that a corrupted exam authority can publish two different receipts for the same
exam-form on the bulletin board. However, since the bulletin board is append-only, the
candidate notices if the exam authority appends two different receipts for her submission
because only the candidate knows the private key. ProVerif shows that the test for
Exam-form Integrity is sound and complete.
Exam-form Markedness: the Exam-form Markedness test (Figure 3.24) checks if the
exam-form submitted by the candidate (ques,ans), the corresponding receipt (eca’), and
the notification (ema’) published on the bulletin board by the exam authority, contain
the same questions, answers, and pseudonym. For soundness, we label the corresponding
ProVerif test code with two events (accepted and marked), which map the corresponding
relations. In particular, we consider a receipt part of the relation Accepted if it is signed
by the exam authority and encrypted under the pseudonym of the candidate. Similarly,
we consider a notification part of the relation Marked it is signed by the examiner and
encrypted under the pseudonym of the candidate. ProVerif shows that the test for
Exam-form Markedness is sound and complete.
Mark Integrity : similarly to Exam-form Integrity, we can show that Remark! is mark
integrity verifiable. Given the exam-form submitted by the candidate (ques,ans) and
the corresponding notification (ema’) published by the exam authority, the test (Figure
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let testETI (pkN, pkA, pch, bbn, bba)=
in(pch, (pseudo_C, ques,ans, priv_C));
in(bbn, (pseudo_E, he, rolet: role, spseE));
in(bba, eca’);
in(bba, ema’);
let (ca, sca’)=decrypt(eca’, priv_C) in
let (ques’, ans’, pseudo_C’)= checksign(sca’, pkA) in
if ques’=ques && ans’=ans && pseudo_C’=pseudo_C
then
event OK
else
event KO.
Figure 3.23: The Exam-form Integrity test for Remark! protocol.
Property Sound Complete
Question Validity X (EA) X(all)
Marking Correctness X (EA) X(all)
Correct Mark Reception X X(all)
Exam-form Integrity X X(all)
Exam-form Markedness X X(all)
Mark Integrity X X(all)
Mark Notification Integrity X X(all)
Table 3.6: Results for I.V. properties of the Remark! protocol.
3.25) checks if they contain the same questions, answers, and pseudonym and that the
examiner’s signature on the mark is correct. To check soundness in ProVerif, we label
the corresponding test code with two events (assigned and marked), which map the
corresponding relations with respect to the notification published on the bulletin board.
We consider the notification part of Assigned if it is signed by the exam authority and
encrypted under the pseudonym of the candidate. Similarly, we consider the notification
part of the relation Marked if it also includes the signature of the examiner.
Mark Notification Integrity : given the mark notified to the candidate and the corresponding
notification (ema’) published by the exam authority, the test (Figure 3.26) simply checks
if the marks coincide. Similarly to Mark Integrity, we consider the notification part of
Assigned if it is signed by the exam authority and encrypted under the pseudonym of the
candidate. ProVerif shows that the test for Exam-form Integrity is sound and complete.
Analysis of Universal verifiability. We check most of the universal verifiability tests
using a different approach compared to the individual ones. This is needed because C can
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let testETI (pkN, pkA, pch, bbn, bba)=
in(pch, (pseudo_C, ques,ans, priv_C));
in(bbn, (pseudo_E, he, rolet: role, spseE));
in(bba, eca’);
in(bba, ema’);
let (ca, sca’)=decrypt(eca’, priv_C) in
let (ques’, ans’, pseudo_C’)=checksign(sca’, pkA) in
let (((ques’’, ans’’, pseudo_C’’),sca1, mark), sma)
=decrypt(ema’, priv_C) in
let ((ques’’’, ans’’’, pseudo_C’’’),sca1’, mark’)
=checksign(sma, pseudo_E) in
if (ques’, ans’, pseudo_C’)=checksign(sca1,pkA) &&
pseudo_C’=pseudo_C && ques’’=ques’ && ans’’=ans’ &&
pseudo_C’’=pseudo_C && ques’’’=ques’ && ans’’’=ans’ &&
pseudo_C’’’=pseudo_C’ && sca1’=sca1
then
event OK
else
event KO.
Figure 3.24: The Exam-form Markedness test for Remark! protocol.
be dishonest, in contrast to the case of individual verifiability, thus no sufficient events
can be insert in any process to model correspondence assertions. In general, the idea of
this approach is that every time the test succeeds, which means that it emits the event
OK, we check if the decryption of the concerned ciphertext gives the expected plaintext. If
not, the event bad is emitted, and we check soundness of the tests using unreachability of
the event bad. However, we can still model soundness using correspondence assertions for
Registration, because the NET is honest and emits an event when registration concludes.
Since all the bulletin board posts are encrypted with C’s or E’s pseudonyms, no public
data can be used as it is. Moreover, the encryption algorithm has the probabilistic feature
of ElGamal encryption, thus the random value used to encrypt a message is usually
needed. However, an auditor can access some data posted by EA after the exam concludes.
Precisely, we assume that the auditor is given the following data:
1. For Registration, the EA reveals the signatures inside the receipts posted on BB
and the random values used to encrypt the receipts. By looking at the bulletin
board, the auditor can check that EA only accepted tests signed with pseudonyms
posted by the NET during registration.
2. For Exam-form Integrity, the EA reveals the marked exam-form and the random
values used to encrypt them, in addition to the data given for Registration. In so
89
Chapter 3. Exam Protocols
let testMI (pkN: pkey, pkA: pkey, pch, bbn, bba)=
in(pch, (pseudo_C, ques, ans, priv_C));
in(bbn, (pseudo_E, he, rolet:role, spseE));
in(bba, ema’);
let (((ques’, ans’, pseudo_C’),sca’, mark), sma)
= decrypt(ema’, priv_C) in
let ((ques’’, ans’’, pseudo_C’’: pkey),sca’’, mark’)
=checksign(sma, pseudo_E) in
if pseudo_C’=pseudo_C && pseudo_C’’=pseudo_C && mark=mark’ &&
(ques’, ans’, pseudo_C’)=checksign(sca’,pkA)
then
event OK
else
event KO.
Figure 3.25: The Mark Integrity test for Remark! protocol.
let testMNI (pkA, priv_ch, bba)=
in(priv_ch, (priv_C, mark, pseudo_C));
in(bba, ema’);
let (((ques, ans, pseudo_C’), sca, mark’), sma)
=decrypt(ema, priv_C) in
if (ques,ans,pseudo_C’)=checksign(sca, pkA)
&& pseudo_C’=pseudo_C && mark’=mark
then
event OK
else
event KO.
Figure 3.26: The Mark Notification Integrity test for Remark! protocol.
doing, the auditor can check if the pseudonyms, questions, and answers did not
change and got marked.
3. For Exam-form Markedness, the auditor accesses the same data outlined above for
Exam-form Integrity. However, since Remark! is exam-form integrity universally
verifiable, it is easy to show that the protocol is exam-form markedness universally
verifiable, too.
4. For Marking Correctness, the EA reveals the marked exam-form, the random values
used to encrypt the marked exam-form, and a table that maps a mark to each
answer, after the exam concludes.
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According our test codes outlined in Figures 3.27-3.28, the data needed to make Remark!
testable is received from channel ch. As already mentioned for the Grenoble exam,
ProVerif is unable to handle the general case for the universal verifiability properties.
We thus prove in ProVerif the case with one candidate and rely on the general manual
proofs seen in section 3.4.3.1 for the case with more candidates. Table 3.7 summarizes
the results of our analysis.
Registration: Remark! ensures Registration if the exam authority reveals to the third
party the signatures inside the receipts (posted on the bulletin board) and the random
values used to encrypt the receipts after the exam concludes. In doing so, the third party,
who run the test in Figure 3.27, can check by looking at the bulletin board that the
exam authority only accepted tests signed with pseudonyms posted by the NET during
registration.
Exam-form Integrity : we prove that Remark! is exam-form integrity universally verifiable if
the exam authority reveals the signatures inside the receipts and on the notification
posted on the bulletin board, and the random values used for the encryption under the
candidate pseudonyms. Then, the third party, can run the test in Figure 3.28 to check if
the pseudonyms, questions, and answers did not change and get marked. For simplicity,
we assume that only one examiner marks the exam-forms.
Exam-form Markedness : since Remark! is exam-form integrity universally verifiable, it is
easy to show that it is also exam-form markedness universally verifiable.
Marking Correctness : Remark! does not originally provide the marking algorithm used to
evaluate the answer. However, ProVerif shows that Remark! can be marking correctness
universally verifiable by a third party by running the test in Figure 3.29, provided that the
honest exam authority reveals 1) the tests and the marks encrypted on the notifications
(posted on the bulletin board), 2) the random values used for the encryption under the
candidate pseudonyms, and 3) the marking algorithm after the exam concludes. Similarly
to Exam-form Integrity, we assume that one examiner marks all the exam-forms for
simplicity.
Mark Integrity : regarding this property, we note that the input needed for this test (Figure
3.30) is the notification posted on the bulletin board by the exam authority. In fact, the
examiner should reveal the signature of the examiners on the notification posted on the
bulletin board, and the random values used to encrypt under the candidate pseudonyms.
In so doing the third party can verify that each mark notified to the candidate has a
correct signature.
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Property Sound Complete
Registration X X(all)
Exam-form Integrity X X(all)
Exam-form Markedness X X(all)
Marking Correctness X (EA) X(all)
Mark Integrity X X(all)
Table 3.7: Results for U.V. properties of the Remark! protocol.
let testR(pkN, pkA, ch1,...,chn, bbn1,...,bbnm, bba1,...,bban)=
in(bbn1, (pseudo_C1, hc, r, NET_sign1));
...
in(bbnm, (pseudo_Cm, hc, r, NET_signm));
in(bba1, receipt1);
...
in(bban, receiptn);
in(ch1, (rcoin1, EA_sign_rcpt1));
...
in(chn, (rcoinn, EA_sign_rcptn));
let (quest1, answ1, pseudo_C’1) = checksign(EA_sign_rcpt1, pkA) in
...
let (questn, answn, pseudo_C’n) = checksign(EA_sign_rcptn, pkA) in
if (pseudo_C1, hc, r)=checksign(NET_sign1, pkN) &&
r=C && pseudo_C1=pseudo_C’1
||...||
(pseudo_C1, hc, r)=checksign(NET_sign1, pkN) &&
r=C && pseudo_C1=pseudo_C’n
&&...&&
(pseudo_Cm, hc, r)=checksign(NET_signm, pkN) &&
r=C && pseudo_Cm=pseudo_C’1
||...||
(pseudo_Cm, hc, r)=checksign(NET_signm, pkN) &&
r=C && pseudo_Cm=pseudo_C’n
then
if receipt1=int_encrypt(((quest1, answ1, pseudo_C’1),
EA_sign_rcpt1), pseudo_C1, rcoin1)
&&...&&
receiptn=int_encrypt(((questn, answn, pseudo_C’n),
EA_sign_rcptn), pseudo_Cm, rcoinn)
then event OK
else event KO
else KO.
Figure 3.27: The universal Registration test for Remark! protocol.
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let testETI(pkN, pkA, bba1,..., bban, bbn, ch1,...,chn)=
in(bbn, (pseudo_E, he, re, spseE));
in(ch1,( (rcoin1, sca1, pseudo_C1), (rcoinA1, smaA1, pseudo_CA1)));
...
in(chn,( (rcoinn, scan, pseudo_Cn), (rcoinAn, smaAn, pseudo_CAn)));
in(bba1, (receipt1, notif1));
...
in(bban, (receiptn, notifn));
let (quest1, answ1, pseudo_C’1)=checksign(sca1, pkA) in
...
let (questn, answn, pseudo_C’n)=checksign(scan, pkA) in
let ((quest’1, answ’1, pseudo_C’’1),sca’1, mark1)
= checksign(smaA1, pseudo_E) in
...
let ((quest’n, answ’n, pseudo_C’’n),sca’n, markn)
= checksign(smaAn, pseudo_E) in
if (receipt1=int_encrypt(((quest1, answ1, pseudo_C’1), sca1),
pseudo_C1, rcoin1)&&
notif1=int_encrypt((((quest’1, answ’1, pseudo_C’’1), sca’1,
mark1), smaA1),pseudo_CA1, rcoinA1) && sca’1=sca1)
&&...&&
(receiptn=int_encrypt(((questn, answn, pseudo_C’n), scan),
pseudo_Cn, rcoinn)&&
notifn=int_encrypt((((quest’n, answ’n, pseudo_C’’n), sca’n,
markn), smaAn),pseudo_CAn, rcoinAn) && sca’n=scan)
then
if (pseudo_C1=pseudo_CA1 && pseudo_CA1=pseudo_C’1 &&
pseudo_C’1=pseudo_C’’1&& quest1=quest’1 && answ1=answ’1)
&&...&&
(pseudo_Cn=pseudo_CAn && pseudo_CAn=pseudo_C’n &&
pseudo_C’n=pseudo_C’’n&&questn=quest’n && answn=answ’n)
then
event OK
else KO
else KO.
Figure 3.28: The universal Exam-form Integrity test for Remark! protocol.
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let testMC (pkN, bbn, ch1,...,chn) =
in(bbn, (pseudo_E, he, r, spseE));
in(ch1, sma1);
...
in(chn, sman);
let ((ques1, ans1, pseudo_C1),sca1, mark1)
=checksign(sma1, pseudo_E) in
...
let ((quesn, ansn, pseudo_Cn),scan, markn)
=checksign(sman, pseudo_E) in
get correct_ans(ques’1,ans’1,=mark1) in
...
get correct_ans(ques’n,ans’n,=markn) in
if (pseudo_E, he, r) = checksign(spseE, pkN) && r = E
then
if (ques1=ques’1 && ans’1=ans1)
&&...&&
(quesn=ques’n && ans’n=ansn)
then event OK
else event KO
else KO.
Figure 3.29: The universal Marking Correctness test for Remark! protocol.
3.5 Monitoring Exams
In the previous section, we provided an abstract definition of exam verifiability. Although
it is useful to analyze exams as we have shown with our case studies, such approach is
limited to exam specifications and does not allow us to analyze real exam implementations.
Thus, it cannot deal with some flaws such that those results from the errors that may
have been introduced at implementation stage or during execution. Moreover, scalability
limitations may be faced when considering complex large systems and large number
of parties. In this section, propose several monitors that allow us to verify real exam
execution at runtime. Although, results of runtime monitoring are limited to the analyzed
exam runs, it has an advantage that the actual behavior is analyzed. We first formalize
several exam requirements as Quantified Event Automata (QEAs). Then, we perform
an oﬄine monitoring, using MarQ tool [RCR15], of real e-exam executions organized
by Université Joseph Fourier (UJF). Namely, for each exam execution, we extract a
sequence of events (a trace). Then we feed the extracted trace to a monitor constructed
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let testMI (bbn, bba1,...,bban, ch1,...,chn) =
in(bbn, (pseudo_E, he, re, spseE));
in(bba1, notif1);
...
in(bban, notifn);
in(ch1, (rcoin1, sma1));
...
in(chn, (rcoinn, sman));
let ((quest1, answ1, pseudo_C1),sca’1, mark1)
=checksign(sma1, pseudo_E) in
...
let ((questn, answn, pseudo_Cn),sca’n, markn)
=checksign(sman, pseudo_E) in
if notif1=int_encrypt((((quest1, answ1, pseudo_C1), sca’1,
mark1), sma1),pseudo_C1, rcoin1)
&&...&&
notifn=int_encrypt((((questn, answn, pseudo_Cn), sca’n,
markn), sman),pseudo_Cn, rcoinn)
then
event OK
else
event KO.
Figure 3.30: The universal Mark Integrity test for Remark! protocol.
using MarQ tool, which processes the trace and produces a verdict based on the defined
requirements.
3.5.1 Exam Run and Events
We define an e-exam run (or e-exam execution) by a finite sequence of events, called
trace. Such event-based modelling of e-exam runs is appropriate for monitoring actual
events of the system. An exam run satisfies a property if the resulting trace is accepted
by the corresponding monitor. A correct exam run satisfies all the properties. In order
to formalize exam requirements, we consider the events register(i): i registered to
the exam; submit(i, q, a): i submitted (q, a); and accept(i, q, a): (q, a) accepted by the
authority from i, that are already defined in Section 3.3.1. However, from now on we
assume that the question q and the answer a respectively refer only to one question and
one answer. We also consider the following events:
− Event get(i, q) is emitted when candidate i gets question q.
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− Event change(i, q, a) is emitted when candidate i changes the answer field of question
q to a.
− Event corrAns(q, a) is emitted when the authority specifies a as a correct answer
to question q. Note that more than one answer can be correct for a given question.
− Event marked(i, q, a, b) is emitted when the answer a from candidate i to question q
is scored with b. We assume that the score b ranges over {0, 1} (1 for correct answer
and 0 for wrong answer). However, other ranges of scores can be considered. Note
that, event marked(i, q, a, b) is similar to event attribut(ques, ans,m, idform, ide)
already defined in Section 3.3.1. However, event attribut means that an (overall)
mark is attributed to an exam-form instead of one question/answer pair in case
of marked event. Moreover, marked specifies the identity of the candidate i while
attribut specifies the identity of the examiner.
− Event assign(i,m) is emitted when the mark m is assigned to the candidate
i. Note that, event assign(i,m) is different from event notify(i,m) defined in
Section 3.3.1. Instead it corresponds to the set Assigned defined in Section 3.4
as event assign signifies that an authority associates a mark m with candidate i,
while the notify signifies that the candidate i received the mark m.
− Event begin(i) is emitted when candidate i begins the examination phase.
− Event end(i) is emitted when candidate i ends the examination phase. The candidate
terminates the exam himself, e.g., after answering all questions before the end of
the exam duration.
In general, all events are time stamped, however we parameterize them with time only
when it is relevant for the considered property. Moreover, we may omit some parameters
from the events when they are not relevant to the property. For instance, we may use
submit(i) when candidate i submits an answer regardless of his answer. Note that, the
events here are assumed to be recorded during the exam or built from data logs.
3.5.2 E-exams Requirements
In this section, we define the following eight properties that aim at ensuring e-exams
correctness:
− Candidate Registration: no unregistered candidate tries to participate in the exam
by submitting an answer.
− Candidate Eligibility : answers are accepted only from registered candidates.
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− Answer Authentication: all accepted answers are actually submitted by candidates,
and for each question at most one answer is accepted per candidate.
− Questions Ordering : all candidates answer the questions in the required order.
− Exam Availability : answers are accepted only during the examination time.
− Exam Availability with Flexibility : a variant of Exam Availability that supports
both flexible starting time and duration of the exam.
− Marking Correctness: all answers are marked correctly.
− Mark Integrity : each candidate assigned his mark.
Each property is defined as a QEA according to the formalism introduced in Section 2.3.
Note that, we extend the initial definition of QEAs in [BFH+12] by i) allowing variable
declaration and initialization before reading the trace, and ii) introducing the notion of
global variable shared among all event automaton instances. Global variables are mainly
needed in QEAs to keep track and report data at the end of monitoring.
Note that, each property represents a different e-exam requirement and can be mon-
itored independently. An exam run may satisfy one property and fail on another one,
which narrows the possible source of potential failures and allows to deliver a detailed
report about the satisfied and unsatisfied properties. Note also that we assume that an
input trace contains events related to a single exam run. To reason about traces with
events from more than one exam run, the events have to be parameterized with an exam
run identifier, which has to be added to the set of quantified variables.
3.5.2.1 Properties for Error Detection:
Candidate Registration: states that only already registered candidates can submit answers
to the exam. An exam run satisfies Candidate Registration if, for every candidate i,
event submit(i) is preceded by event register(i). A violation of Candidate Registration
does not reveal a weakness in the exam system (as long as the answers submitted from
unregistered candidates are not accepted by the authority). However, it allows us to
detect if a candidate tries to fake the system, which is helpful to be aware of spoofing
attacks.
Definition 3.27. (Candidate Registration). Candidate Registration is defined by
the QEA depicted in Figure 3.31 with alphabet ΣCR = {register(i), submit(i)}.
The input alphabet ΣCR for Candidate Registration contains only events register(i)
and submit(i), so any other events in the trace are ignored for this property. The QEA
for Candidate Registration has two accepting states, and one quantified variable i. As the
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∀i
1 2
register(i)
Figure 3.31: A QEA for Candidate Registration.
initial state is an accepting state, then the empty trace is accepted by the QEA. State
(1) is a square state, so an event submit(i) that is not preceded by event register(i)
leads to a failure. An event register(i) in state (1) leads to state (2) which is a skipping
(circular) state. Henceforth, given a candidate i any trace starting with event register(i)
is accepted.
The quantification ∀i means that the property must hold for all values that i takes
in the trace, i.e., the values obtained when matching the symbolic events in the spec-
ification with concrete events in the trace. For instance, consider the following trace:
register(i1).submit(i2).submit(i1) .register(i2). To decide whether it is accepted or
not, the trace is sliced based on the values that can match i, resulting in two slices:
i 7→ i1: register(i1).submit(i1), and i 7→ i2: submit(i2).register(i2). Then, each slice
is checked against the event automaton instantiated with the appropriate value for i.
The slice associated to i1 is accepted as it reaches the final state (2), while the slice
associated to i2 does not reach a final state since event submit(i2) leads from state (1)
to an implicit failure state. Therefore, the whole trace is not accepted by the QEA. Note
that, we omit parameters q and a from event submit(i, q, a) since only the fact that a
candidate i submits an answer is significant for the property, regardless of the question
he is answering, and the answer he submitted.
∀i
1 2
register(i)
Figure 3.32: A QEA for Candidate Eligibility.
Candidate Eligibility : states that no answer is accepted from an unregistered candidate.
It is modeled by a QEA similar to that of Candidate Registration depicted in Figure 3.31,
except that event submit(i, q, a) has to be replaced by accept(i, q, a) in the related
alphabet.
Definition 3.28. (Candidate Eligibility). Candidate Eligibility is defined by the QEA
depicted in Figure 3.32 with alphabet ΣCE = {register(i), accept(i, q, a)}.
Trace register(i1).accept(i2, q0, a2).accept(i1, q0, a1).register(i2) is not accepted by
Candidate Eligibility as an answer is accepted from the candidate i2 before he registered.
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Answer Authentication: states that all accepted answers are submitted by candidates.
Moreover, for every question, exactly one answer is accepted from each candidate that
submitted at least one answer to that question.
Definition 3.29. (Answer Authentication). Answer Authentication is defined by the
QEA depicted in Figure 3.33 with alphabet ΣAA = {submit(i, q, a), accept(i, q, a)}.
The QEA of Answer Authentication fails if an unsubmitted answer is accepted. A
candidate can submit more than one answer to the same question, however exactly one
answer has to be accepted. Note that, any answer among the submitted answers can
be accepted. However, the QEA can be updated to allow only the acceptance of the
last submitted answer by replacing set A with a variable, which acts as a placeholder
for the last submitted answer. If no answer is accepted after at least one answer has
been submitted, the QEA ends in the failure state (2), while acceptance of an answer
leads to the accepting state (3). A candidate can submit after having accepted an answer
from him to that question. However, if more than one answer is accepted, an implicit
transition from state (3) to a failure state is fired. The QEA of Answer Authentication
accepts the trace submit(i1, q0, a1).submit(i1, q0, a2).accept(i1, q0, a2), where candidate
i1 submits two answers a1 and a2 to question q0, then only a2 is accepted. While it
rejects the traces accept(i1, q, a), where an unsubmitted answer is accepted from i1, and
submit(i1, q, a1). submit(i1, q, a2). accept(i1, q, a1).accept(i1, q, a2), where two answers
to the same question are accepted from same candidate. Answer Authentication can be
∀i,∀q
1 2 3
submit(i, q, a)
A:=ˆ{a}
submit(i, q, a)
A:=A∪{a}
accept(i, q, a) [a∈A]
submit(i, q, a)
Figure 3.33: A QEA for Answer Authentication.
further split into three different properties which allow us to precisely know whether, only
submitted answers are accepted (Answer Submission Authentication), for every question
an answer is accepted from a candidate that submitted at least one answer (Acceptance
Ensurance), and only one answer is accepted from the same candidate for the same
question (Answer Singularity).
Definition 3.30. (Answer Submission Authentication). Answer Submission Au-
thentication is defined by the QEA depicted in Figure 3.33 with alphabet ΣASA =
{submit(i, q, a), accept(i, q, a)}.
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∀i,∀q
1 2
submit(i, q, a)
A:=ˆ{a}
submit(i, q, a)
A:=A∪{a}
accept(i, q, a) [a∈A]
Figure 3.34: A QEA for Answer Submission Authentication.
The QEA presented in Figure 3.34 fails when an unsubmitted answer is accepted from a
certain candidate regardless of whether that candidate submitted a different answer or not.
Traces accept(i1, q1, a1) and submit(i1, q1, a1).accept(i1, q1, a2) are both unaccepted
traces by QEA of Figure 3.34. In the former an answer for the question q1 is accepted
from candidate i1, which did not submit any answer to question q1. In the latter the
candidate i1 submitted an answer a1 while a different answer a2 is accepted from him.
Note that, it is allowed that no answer is accepted from a candidate, or multiple answers
are accepted from the same candidate as long as they are all submitted by that candidate.
Definition 3.31. (Acceptance Ensurance). Acceptance Ensurance is defined by the
QEA depicted in Figure 3.35 with alphabet ΣAE = {submit(i, q, a), accept(i, q, a)}.
∀i,∀q
1 2 3
submit(i, q, a)
accept(i, q, a)
submit(i, q, a)
accept(i, q, a)
Figure 3.35: A QEA for Acceptance Ensurance.
The QEA presented in Figure 3.35 fails when no answer is accepted from a candidate that
submitted at least one answer. Note that, the QEA succeeds even if the accepted answer
is not one of the submitted answers. The latter case leads to failure of QEA presented in
Figure 3.34.
Definition 3.32. (Answer Singularity). Answer Singularity is defined by the QEA
depicted in Figure 3.35 with alphabet ΣAS = {submit(i, q, a), accept(i, q, a)}.
The QEA presented in Figure 3.36 fails if more than one answer is accepted from the same
candidate to the same question, even if all the accepted answers are submitted ones. Traces
accept(i1, q1, a1) and submit(i1, q1, a1).accept(i1, q1, a1) are accepted traces. While
trace submit(i1, q1, a1).accept (i1, q1, a1).submit(i1, q1, a2).accept(i1, q1, a2) is an unac-
cepted trace as two answers are accepted from the same candidate to the same question.
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∀i,∀q
1 2
accept(i, q, a)
submit(i, q, a)
Figure 3.36: A QEA for Answer Singularity.
Questions Ordering : states that a candidate should not get a question before validating
his answer to the previous question. Note that, the previous properties formalize the
main requirements that are usually needed concerning answer submission and acceptance.
However, Questions Ordering might be required as an additional requirement.
Definition 3.33. (Question Ordering). Let q1, . . . , qn be n questions such that the
order ord(qk) of qk is k. Questions Ordering is defined by the QEA depicted in Figure 3.37
with alphabet ΣQO = {get(i, q), accept(i, q)}.
∀i, Initially c : =ˆ1
1 2
get(i, q) [ord(q)<c]
get(i, q) [ord(q)=c]
get(i, q) [ord(q)≤c]
accept(i, q) [ord(q)=c]c++
Figure 3.37: A QEA for Questions Ordering.
The QEA of Questions Ordering fails if a candidate gets or an answer is accepted from
him for a higher order question before his answer to the current question is accepted.
This is ensured by the guard [ord(q) = c] on the self loop transition on state (2). Note
that, Questions Ordering also allows only one accepted answer per question. Otherwise,
there is no meaning for the order as the candidate can re-submit answers latter when he
gets all the questions.
Exam Availability : states that questions are obtained, and answers are submitted and
accepted only during the examination time. Exam Availability is necessary to ensure that
all candidates have took the exam during the examination phase.
Definition 3.34. (Exam Availability). Let t0 and tf be the starting and ending time
instants of the exam, respectively. Exam Availability is defined by the QEA depicted in
Figure 3.38 with alphabet ΣEA = {get(i, t), change(i, t), submit(i, t), accept(i, t)}.
The QEA of Exam Availability checks that all the events in ΣEA are emitted between t0
and tf . Note that, any other event can be added to ΣEA if required.
Exam Availability with Flexibility : is a variant of Exam Availability that supports exams
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1
ΣEA(i, t)
[t0≤t≤tf ]
Figure 3.38: A QEA for Exam Availability.
∀i
1 2 3
begin(i, t) [t1≤t≤t2]tb:=ˆt
accept(i, t) [tb≤t≤t2∧t−tb≤duration(i)]
end(i)
Figure 3.39: A QEA for Exam Availability with Flexibility.
with flexible starting and duration time. Some exams offer flexibility to the candidates,
so that a candidate is free to choose the beginning time within a certain specified period.
To capture that, we define Exam Availability with Flexibility which states that no answer
can be accepted from a candidate before he begins the exam, after he terminates the
exam, after the end of his exam duration, or after the end of the specified period. The
beginning time of the exam may differ from one candidate to another, but in any case it
has to be within a certain specified period. The exam duration may also differ between
candidates. For example, an extended duration may be offered to certain candidates with
disabilities.
Definition 3.35. (Exam Availability With Flexibility). Let t1 and t2 respectively
be the starting and the ending time instants of the allowed period, and let duration(i) be
the exam duration for candidate i. Exam Availability with Flexibility is defined by the
QEA depicted in Figure 3.39 with alphabet ΣEAF = {begin(i, t), end(i), accept(i, t)}.
Exam Availability with Flexibility also requires that, for each candidate i, there is only one
event begin(i, t) per exam. Hence, it fails if event begin(i) is emitted more than once. A
candidate can begin his exam at any time tb such that t1 ≤ tb ≤ t2. Note that, no answer
can be accepted from a candidate after then ending time t2 of the period, if the duration
of the candidate is not finished yet. Assume that t1 = 0, t2 = 1, 000, and that the exam
duration of i1 and i2 respectively are duration(i1) = 90 and duration(i2) = 60. Then,
trace begin(i1, 0).accept(i1, 24).begin(i2, 26).accept (i2, 62).accept(i1, 90) is accepted.
While, trace accept(i1, 5).begin (i1, 20) and trace begin(i1, 0).accept(i1, 91) are not
accepted since in the first one an answer is accepted from candidate i1 before he begins
the exam, and in the second one an answer is accepted after the exam duration expires.
Event submit is not included in ΣEAF, thus an answer submission outside the exam
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time is not considered as an irregularity if the answer is not accepted by the authority.
However, again other events (e.g., get and submit) can be considered. In such a case,
the QEA in Figure 3.39 has to be edited by looping over state (2) with any added event.
∀q, A : =ˆ∅
1 2
corrAns(q, a)
A:=ˆA∪{a}
marked(q, a, b) [(b=1⇔a∈A)]
marked(q, a, b) [b=1⇔a∈A]
Figure 3.40: A QEA for Marking Correctness.
Marking Correctness : states that all answers are marked correctly. In the QEA of Marking
Correctness, the correct answers for the considered question are collected in a set A (self
loop over state (1)).
Definition 3.36. (Marking Correctness). Property Marking Correctness is defined
by the QEA depicted in Figure 3.40 with alphabet ΣMC = {corrAns(q, a), marked(q, a, b)}.
Instate (1), once an answer to the considered question is marked correctly, a transition
to state (3) is fired, otherwise if an answer is marked in a wrong way a transition to an
implicit failure state occurs. In state (3), the property fails either if an answer is marked
in a wrong way, or if an event corrAns(q, a) is encountered as this means that certain
answers are marked before all the correct answers are set.
Mark Integrity : states that all the accepted answers are marked, and that exactly one
mark is assigned to each candidate, the one attributed to his answers. Mark Integrity
together with Marking Correctness, guarantees that each candidate participating in the
exam gets the correct mark corresponding to his answers.
Definition 3.37. (Mark Integrity). Property Mark Integrity is defined by the QEA de-
picted in Figure 3.41 with alphabet ΣMI = {accept(i, q, a), marked(q, a, b), assign(i,m)}.
The QEA of Mark Integrity collects, for each candidate, the answers that he submitted in
set A. For each accepted answer, the QEA accumulates the corresponding score b in the
sum s. If the accepted answers are not marked, the property fails (failure state (2)). If
the candidate is not assigned a mark or assigned a wrong mark the property fails (failure
state (3)). Once the correct mark is assigned to the candidate, if another mark is assigned
or any other answer is accepted from him, the property fails (square state (4)).
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∀i
1 2
34
marked(q, a, b)
accept(i, q, a)
A:=ˆ{(q,a)}
accept(i, q, a)
A:=A∪{(q,a)}
marked(q, a, b) [(q,a)/∈A]
marked(q, a, b) [(q,a)∈A]
A:=A\{(q,a)}; s:=ˆb
marked(q, a, b) [(q,a)/∈A]
accept(i, q, a)
A:=A∪{(q,a)}
marked(q, a, b) [(q,a)∈A]
A:=A\{(q,a)}; s:=s+b
assign(i,m) [m=s∧A=∅]
marked(q, a, b)
Figure 3.41: A QEA for Mark Integrity.
3.5.2.2 Properties for Error Reporting
In the previous formalization, a property fails when its requirement is violated. However, it
does not identify the entities that violate the requirement. In the following, we propose for
each property an alternative that reports at the end all entities that violate the requirement
of the property. In general, an alternative property ensures the same requirement(s) of
the original regular property and has same input alphabet, but additionally reports some
data at the end. Whenever the requirements formalized by the following QEAs differ
from their counterparts in the previous subsection, we mention it.
Candidate Registration with Auditing : fails if an unregistered candidate submitted an
answer, and at the same time collects all such candidates in a set F.
Definition 3.38. (Candidate Registration with Auditing). Candidate Registration
with Auditing is defined by the QEA depicted in Figure 3.42 with alphabet ΣCRA =
{register(i), submit(i)}.
The QEA of Candidate Registration with Auditing has three free variables I, F, and i,
and no quantified variable. Instead of being instantiated for each candidate i, the QEA
of Candidate Registration with Auditing collects all the registered candidates in set I,
so that any occurrence of event submit(i) at state (1) with i /∈ I fires a transition to
the failure state (2). Such a transition results in the failure of the property since all
transitions from state (2) are self-looping transitions. Set F is used to collect all the
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Initially: I : =ˆ ∅
1 2
register(i)
I:=I∪{i}
submit(i, q, a) [i/∈I]
F:=ˆ{(i,q,a)}
register(i)
I:=I∪{i}
submit(i, q, a) [i/∈I]
F:=F∪{(i,q,a)}
Figure 3.42: A QEA for Candidate Registration with Auditing.
unregistered candidates that submitted an answer, i.e., those that violate the requirement.
For example, trace register(i1).submit(i2, q, a2).submit(i1, q, a1) .register(i2) is not
accepted by Candidate Registration with Auditing , and results in the set F = {(i2, q, a2)}.
Candidate Eligibility with Auditing : fails when an answer is accepted from an unregistered
candidate, and reports all such candidates in a set F.
Definition 3.39. (Candidate Eligibility with Auditing). Candidate Eligibility
with Auditing is defined by the QEA depicted in Figure 3.43 with alphabet ΣCEA =
{register(i), accept(i, q, a)}.
Initially: I : =ˆ ∅
1 2
register(i)
I:=I∪{i}
accept(i, q, a) [i/∈I]
F:=ˆ{(i,q,a)}
register(i)
I:=I∪{i}
accept(i, q, a) [i/∈I]
F:=F∪{(i,q,a)}
Figure 3.43: A QEA for Candidate Eligibility with Auditing.
Note that, the QEA of Candidate Eligibility with Auditing is similar to the QEA of
Candidate Registration with Auditing , except that the event submit(i, q, a) is replaced by
the event accept(i, q, a).
Answer Authentication with Auditing : fails when an unsubmitted answer is accepted, no
answer to a certain question is accepted from a candidate that submitted an answer for
that question, or more than one answer is accepted from the same candidate to the same
question. The QEA of Answer Authentication with Auditing collects in a set F1 all the
unsubmitted answers that are accepted together with the corresponding candidates and
questions. It also collects in a set F2 the further accepted answers to the same question
from the same candidate. Note that, when the first answer is accepted the free variable c
is set to 1. The sets F1 and F2 are globally defined, and thus they are shared between all
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the instances of the QEA which result from the instantiation of the QEA for different i
and q.
Definition 3.40. (Answer Authentication with Auditing). Answer Authentication
is defined by the QEA depicted in Figure 3.33 with alphabet ΣAAA = {submit(i, q, a),
accept(i, q, a)}.
Global: F1 : =ˆ∅ F2 : =ˆ∅, ∀i,∀q, A : =ˆ∅
1 2
34
a
c
c
e
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t
(i,q,a
)
F
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F
1 ∪{
(i,q
,a
)}
c
:
=ˆ
0
submit(i, q, a)
A:=A∪{a}
submit(i, q, a) A:=A∪{a}
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ce
pt
(i,
q,
a)
[a
/∈A
]
F1
:=
F1
∪{(
i,q
,a
)};
c:=ˆ
0
a
c
c
e
p
t
(i,q,a
)
[a∈
A
]
c:=ˆ
1
submit(i, q, a) A:=A∪{a}
accept(i, q, a) [a/∈A]
F1:=F1∪{(i,q,a)}
accept(i, q, a) [a∈A]
F2:=F2∪{(i,q,a)}
submit(i, q, a) A:=A∪{a}
accept(i, q, a) [a∈A∧c=0]c:=1
accept(i, q, a) [a/∈A]
F1:=F1∪{(i,q,a)}
accept(i, q, a) [a∈A∧c=1]
F2:=F2∪{(i,q,a)}
Figure 3.44: A QEA for Answer Authentication with Auditing.
Questions Ordering with Auditing : states that all the candidates have to answer the
questions in the required order. Additionally, it collects in a set F all candidates that get
a higher order question before their answer to the current question is accepted. Also, a
candidate which an answer is accepted from him for a question different from the current
question is added to F. Note that, the set F is a global set.
Definition 3.41. (Questions Ordering with Auditing). Let q1, . . . , qn be n questions
such that the order ord(qk) of qk is k. Questions Ordering with Auditing is defined by
the QEA depicted in Figure 3.45 with alphabet ΣQOA = {get(i, q), accept(i, q)}.
Exam Availability with Auditing : checks that all the events in ΣEA are emitted between
t0 and tf . It also collects all the candidates that violate the requirements in a set F.
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Global: F : =ˆ∅, ∀i, c : =ˆ1
1 2 3
get(i, q) [ord(q)<c]
get(i, q) [ord(q)>c]
F:=F∪{i}
accept(i, q)
F:=F∪{i}
get(i, q) [ord(q)=c]
get(i, q) [ord(q)≤c]
accept(i, q) [ord(q)=c]c++
accept(i, q) [ord(q) 6=c]
F:=F∪{i}
get(i, q) [ord(q)>c]
F:=F∪{i}
Figure 3.45: A QEA for Questions Ordering with Auditing.
1 2
ΣEA(i, t)
[t0>t∨t>tf ]
F:=ˆ{i}
ΣEA(i, t)
[t0>t∨t>tf ]
F:=F∪{i}
Figure 3.46: A QEA for Exam Availability with Auditing.
Definition 3.42. (Exam Availability with Auditing). Let t0 and tf resp. be the
starting and finishing time of the exam. Exam Availability with Auditing is defined by the
QEA depicted in Figure 3.46 with alphabet ΣEAA = {get(i, t), submit(i, t), accept(i, t)}.
Exam Availability with Flexibility Auditing : collects all the candidates that violate the
requirements of Exam Availability with Flexibility in a global set F.
Definition 3.43. (Exam Availability With Flexibility Auditing). Let t1 and t2
respectively be the starting and the finishing of the allowed period, and let duration(i) be
the exam duration of candidate i. Exam Availability with Flexibility Auditing is defined by
the QEA depicted in Figure 3.47 with alphabet ΣEAF = {begin(i, t), end(i), accept(i, t)}.
Marking Correctness with Auditing : collects all the answers that are marked in a wrong
way in a global set F. Note that, the fact that, for a question q, no event corrAns(q, a)
can be emitted after the marking of the first answer is marked is relaxed. Simply, an
answer that is not declared as an correct answer yet is considered a wrong answer.
Definition 3.44. (Marking Correctness with Auditing). Property Marking Cor-
rectness with Auditing is defined by the QEA depicted in Figure 3.48 with alphabet
ΣMC = {corrAns(q, a), marked(q, a, b)}.
Mark Integrity with Auditing : states that all the accepted answers are marked, and that
exactly one mark is assigned to each candidate, the one attributed to his answers. Note
that, a candidate that does not participated in the exam, i.e., no answer is accepted
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Global F : =ˆ∅, ∀i
1 2 3
4
begin(i, t) [t1≤t≤t2]tb:=ˆt
accept(i, t) [t≤t2∧t−tb≤duration(i)]
end(i, t)
begin(i, t) [t≤t1]
F:=F∪{i}
accept(i, t)
F:=F∪{i}
end(i, t)
F:=F∪{i}
ΣEAF F:=F∪{i}
begin(i, t)
F:=F∪{i}
accept(i, t) [t>t2∨t−tb>duration(i)]
F:=F∪{i}
Figure 3.47: A QEA for Exam Availability With Flexibility Auditing.
from him, is assigned no mark. While, a candidate that participated in the exam but
none of his answers is a correct answer is assigned the mark 0. Set F1 collects all the
candidates that their first assigned mark is wrong. While, set F2 collects all the further
marks assigned for the candidates regardless if they are correct or not.
Definition 3.45. (Mark Integrity with Auditing). Mark Integrity with Auditing
is defined by the QEA depicted in Figure 3.49 with alphabet ΣMI = {accept(i, q, a),
marked(q, a, b), assign(i,m)}.
3.5.3 Case Study: UJF E-exam
In June 2014, the pharmacy faculty at UJF organized a first e-exam, as a part of Epreuves
Classantes Nationales informatisées project which aims to realize all medicine exams
electronically by 2016. The project is lead by UJF and the e-exam software is developed
by the company THEIA specialized in e-formation platforms. This software is currently
used by 39 French universities.
A : =ˆ∅
1 2
corrAns(q, a)
A:=ˆA∪{(q,a)}
marked(q, a, b) [(b=1<a∈A)]
F:=ˆ{(q,a)}
corrAns(q, a)
A:=ˆA∪{(q,a)}
marked(q, a, b) [(b=1<a∈A)]
F:=F∪{(q,a)}
Figure 3.48: A QEA for Marking Correctness with Auditing.
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Global: F1 : =ˆ∅, F2 : =ˆ∅, ∀i
1 2
34
5
marked(q, a, b)
accept(i, q, a)
A:=ˆ{(q,a)}
accept(i, q, a)
A:=A∪{(q,a)}
marked(q, a, b) [(q,a)/∈A]
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d
(q,a
,b)
[(q
,a
)∈
A
]
A
:=
A\{
(q
,a
)}
;
s:=ˆ
b
marked(q, a, b) [(q,a)/∈A]
accept(i, q, a)
A:=A∪{(q,a)}
marked(q, a, b) [(q,a)∈A]
A:=A\{(q,a)}; s:=s+b
assign(i,m) [mc=s∧A=∅]ic:=ˆi, mc:=ˆm
marked(q, a, b)
assign(i,m)
F1:=ˆ{(i,m)}
as
si
gn
(i,
m) F
1:=ˆ
{(i,m
)}
assign(i,m) [m 6=s∨A6=∅]accept(i, q, a)
F1:=ˆ{(ic,mc)}
assign(i,m)
F2:=ˆ{(i,m)}
assign(i,m)
F2:=ˆ{(i,m)}
Figure 3.49: A QEA for Mark Integrity with Auditing.
We validate our framework by verifying two real e-exam executions passed with this
system. All the logs received from the e-exam organizer are anonymized; nevertheless we
were not authorized to disclose them. We use MarQ16 [RCR15] (Monitoring At Runtime
with QEA) to model the QEAs and perform the verification. We provide a description
for this system that we call UJF e-exam, before presenting the results of our analysis.
Exam Description. The UJF exam consist of the following four phases.
Registration: the candidates have to register two weeks before the examination time.
Each candidate receives a username/password to authenticate at the examination.
Examination: the exam takes place in a supervised room. Each student handled a
previously-calibrated tablet to pass the exam. The internet access is controlled: only IP
addresses within an certain range are allowed to access the exam server. A candidate
starts by logging in using his username/password. Then, he chooses one of the available
exams by entering the exam code, which is provided at the examination time by the
invigilator supervising the room. Once the correct code is entered, the exam starts and the
first question is displayed. The pedagogical exam conditions mention that the candidates
have to answer the questions in a fixed order and cannot get to the next question before
16 https://github.com/selig/qea
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answering the current one. A candidate can change the answer as many times as he
wants before validating, but once he validates, then he cannot go back and change any
of the previously validated answers. Note that, all candidates have to answer the same
questions in the same order. A question might be a one-choice question, multiple-choice
question, open short-text question, or script-concordance question.
Marking : after the end of the examination phase, the grading process starts. For each
question, all the answers provided by the candidates are collected. Then, each answer
is evaluated anonymously by an examiner to a mark of 0 if it is wrong, 0 < s < 1 if
it is partially correct, or 1 if it is correct. An example of a partially-correct answer is
when a candidate provides only one of the two correct answers for a multiple-choice
question. The professor specifies the correct answer(s) and the scores to attribute to
correct and partially-correct answers, as well, as the potential penalty. After evaluating
all the provided answers for all questions, the total mark for each candidate is calculated
as the summation of all the scores attributed to his answers.
Notification: the marks are notified to the candidates. A candidate can consult his
submission, obtain the correct answer and his score for each question.
Analysis. We analyzed two exams: Exam 1 involves 233 candidates and contains 42
questions for a duration of 1h35. Exam 2 involves 90 candidates, contains 36 questions
for a duration of 5h20. The resulting traces for these exams are respectively of size
1.85 MB and 215 KB and contain 40,875 and 4,641 events. The result of our analysis
together with the time required for MarQ to analyze the whole trace on a standard PC
(AMD A10-5745M–Quad-Core 2.1 GHz, 8 GB RAM), are summed up in Table 3.8. (X)
means satisfied, (×) means not satisfied, and (−) indicates the number of candidates
that violate the requirements of the property. Note that, some required data are not
logged by UJF. Thus, we were not able to verify all our eight properties. Only four
of the eight general properties presented in Section 3.5.2.1 were compatible with UJF
E-exam. Concerning error reporting properties, MarQ tool did not support all of them.
In particular, current version of MarQ tool does not support global variables that are
needed of these properties. However, we considered five additional and specific properties
for the UJF exam which help us to identify the source of error for some properties, and
also to detect some candidates that violate the requirements (see below for details).
Property Candidate Registration was satisfied, that is, no unregistered candidate
submits an answer. Candidate Eligibility is also satisfied. We note that, in MarQ tool
the Candidate Eligibility monitor stops monitoring as soon as a transition to state (2)
is made since there is no path to success from state (2). Thus, only the first candidate
that violate the requirements is reported. In order to report all such candidates, we had
to add an artificial transition from state (2) to an accepting state that could never be
taken. Then, monitoring after reaching state (2) remains possible. Moreover, the current
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Global: F : =ˆ∅ ∀q
1 2 3
accept(i, q, a)
A:=ˆ{i}
accept(i, q, a) [i/∈A]
A:=A∪{i}
accept(i, q, a) [i∈A]
F:=ˆ{i}
accept(i, q, a) [i/∈A]
A:=A∪{i}
accept(i, q, a) [i∈A]
F=F∪{i}
Figure 3.50: A QEA for Answer Authentication Reporting.
implementation of MarQ does not support sets of tuples. Consequently, we could only
collect the identities i in a set F instead of the tuples (i, q, a).
Answer Authentication was violated only in Exam 1. We reported the violation to the
e-exam’s developers. The violation actually revealed a discrepancy between the initial
specification and the current features of the e-exam software: a candidate can submit the
same answer several times and this answer remains accepted. Consequently, an event
accept can appear twice but only with the same answer. To confirm that the failure of
Answer Authentication is only due to the acceptance of a same answer twice, we update
the property Answer Authentication and its QEA presented in Figure 3.33 by storing the
accepted answer in a variable av, and adding a self loop transition on state (3) labeled by
accept(i, q, a) [a=av ] . We refer to this new weaker property as Answer Authentication∗,
which differs from Answer Authentication by allowing the acceptance of the same answer
again; but it still forbids the acceptance of a different answer. We found out that Answer
Authentication∗ is satisfied, which confirms the claim about the possibility of accepting
the same answer twice. After diagnosing the source of failure, we defined property Answer
Authentication Reporting presented in Figure 3.50, which fails if more than one answer
(identical or not) is accepted from same candidate to same question. At the same time,
it collects all such candidates in a set F. Answer Authentication Reporting is defined
by the QEA depicted in Figure 3.50 with the input alphabet ΣAAR = {accept(i, q, a)}.
The analysis of Answer Authentication Reporting shows that, for Exam 1, there is only
one candidate such that more than one answer are accepted from him to the same
question. The multiple answers that are accepted for the same question are supposed to
be equal since Answer Authentication∗ is satisfied. Note that MarQ currently does not
support global variables, so for Answer Authentication Reporting , a set is required for
each question. Note that for Exam 1, Answer Authentication required less monitoring
time than Answer Authentication∗ and Answer Authentication Reporting as the monitor
for Answer Authentication stops monitoring as soon as it finds a violation.
Furthermore, UJF exam has a requirement stating that after acceptance the writing
field is “blocked” and the candidate cannot change it anymore. Actually, in UJF exam
when a candidate write a potential answer in the writing field the server stores it
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∀i, ∀q
1 2
change(i, q)
accept(i, q, av)
accept(i, q, a) [a=av ]
Figure 3.51: A QEA for Answer Integrity.
∀i
1 2 3
change(i, q) [ord(q)=1]
accept(i, q) [ord(q)=1]c:=ˆ2
accept(i, q) [ord(q)=c]c++
accept(i, q) [ord(q)<c]
change(i, q) [ord(q)<c]
change(i, q) [ord(q)=c]
change(i, q) [ord(q)≤c]
accept(i, q) [ord(q)<c]
accept(i, q) [ord(q)=c]c++
Figure 3.52: A QEA for Questions Ordering∗.
directly, and once the candidate validates the question the last stored answer is accepted.
As Answer Authentication shows, several answers can still be accepted after the first
acceptance, then the ability of changing the answer in the writing field could result
in an acceptance of a different answer. For this purpose, we defined the property
Answer Integrity that states that a candidate cannot change the answer after acceptance.
Answer Integrity is defined by the QEA depicted in Figure 3.51 with the input alphabet
ΣAE = {change(i, q), accept(i, q, a)}. Note that, we allowed the acceptance of the same
answer to avoid the bug found by Answer Authentication. Our analysis showed that
Answer Integrity was violated in Exam 2: at least one student was able to change the
content of the writing field after having his answer accepted.
Concerning Questions Ordering the developers did not log anything related to the event
get(i, q). However, we defined Questions Ordering∗ which fails if a candidate changes the
writing field of a future question before an answer for the current question is accepted.
Questions Ordering∗ is defined by the QEA depicted in Figure 3.52 with the input
alphabet ΣQO′ = {change(i, q), accept(i, q)}. The idea is that if a candidate changes the
answer field of a question, he must have received the question previously. Moreover, we
allow submitting the same answer twice, and also changing the previous accepted answers
to avoid the two bugs previously found. Note that, UJF exam requires the candidate
to validate the question even if he left it blank, thus we also allow acceptance for the
current question before changing its field (self loop above state (2)). The analysis showed
that Questions Ordering∗ was violated in both exams. Note that, the manual check
of Questions Ordering∗ showed that the candidates were able to skip certain questions
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∀i, c : =ˆ1
1
accept(i, q) [ord(q)≥c]c:=ord(q)
Figure 3.53: A QEA for Acceptance Order.
Exam 1 Exam 2
Property Result Time (ms) Result Time (ms)
Candidate Registration X 538 X 230
Candidate Eligibility X 517 X 214
Answer Authentication × 310 X 275
Answer Authentication∗ X 742 X 223
Answer Authentication Reporting ×(1) 654 X 265
Answer Integrity X 641 × 218
Questions Ordering∗ × 757 × 389
Acceptance Order X 697 X 294
Exam Availability X 518 ×(1) 237
Table 3.8: Results of the off-line monitoring of two UJF exam runs.
(after writing an answer) without validating them, and then validating the following
questions. As we found a violation for Questions Ordering∗, we defined Acceptance Order
that checks, for each candidate, whether all the accepted answers are accepted in order,
i.e., there should be no answer accepted for a question that is followed by an accepted
answer for a lower order question. Acceptance Order is defined by the QEA depicted in
Figure 3.53 with the input alphabet ΣAO = {accept(i, q, a)}.
Exam Availability is also violated in Exam 2. A candidate was able to change and
submit an answer, which is accepted, after the end of the exam duration. We could
not analyze Exam Availability with Flexibility , since it is not supported by the exam.
We also did not consider Marking Correctness, and Mark Integrity properties since the
developers did not log anything concerning the marking and the notification phase is
done by each universities and we were not able to get the logs related to this phase. This
shows that usually universities only looks for cheating candidates, and do not look for
internal problems or insider attacks. We expect the developers of the e-exam software
to include logging features for every phase. Note that, we implemented all properties in
MarQ and validated them on toy traces as we expect to obtain the actual traces of the
marking phase in the near future.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we studied exam protocols. We identify and define several desirable
authentication, privacy, verifiability, and monitoring properties. We defined authentication
and privacy properties in the Applied pi-Calculus, and automatically analyzed using
ProVerif the protocols due to Huszti & Pethő [HP10], Giustolisi et al. [GLR14], and
Université Grenoble Alpes. Our analysis shows that Huszti & Pethő protocol indeed
satisfies none of the nine authentication and privacy properties. Authentication is
compromised because of inaccuracies in the protocol design, whereas most of attacks
invalidating privacy exploit attacks on the RARC. These attacks compromise secrecy
and anonymity of the messages, and exploit the absence of a proof of knowledge of the
submitted message to the RARC, which allows its use as a decryption oracle. Such a
proof is not explicitly required in the original specification of the RARC, and is certainly
missing in the H&P protocol: the “exam authority” is required to forward questions
and answers without knowing them, and thus cannot prove knowledge of them when
submitting them to the RARC. Even when assuming a perfect RARC ensuring anonymity,
we still have attacks on all properties. Thus, we think that fixing the RARC is not
sufficient – the protocol requires fundamental changes. Remark! protocol presents a
weakness concerning Form Authenticity. We propose a fix and formally verify that the
(fixed) protocol satisfies all the properties herein considered. Université Grenoble Alpes
exam fails to satisfy Anonymous Examiner and Mark Privacy.
In the second part of the chapter, we proposed general abstract definitions of exam
Verifiability properties. For each property, we define the soundness and completeness
conditions for the related verification test. Then, we instantiated our properties and
analyzed with the help of ProVerif the protocols due to Giustolisi et al. [GLR14], and
Université Grenoble Alpes. The analysis of Giustolisi et al. shows that all properties but
three are satisfied without assuming that the exam’s roles are honest. However, Marking
Correctness holds only assuming an honest exam authority. In fact, a student can check
her mark by using the exam table, but this is posted on the bulletin board by the exam
authority who can nullify the verification of correctness by tampering with the table.
Whereas the analysis of Université Grenoble Alpes exam shows that it satisfies all the
verifiability properties under the assumption that authorities and examiner are honest.
This seems to be peculiar to paper-and-pencil exams, where log-books and registers are
managed by the authorities that can tamper with them. Only Marking Correctness holds
even in presence of dishonest authorities and examiner: here, a candidate can consult
her exam-test after marking, thus verifying herself whether her mark has been computed
correctly.
In the final part, we defined monitors that allow us to check the exam requirements
at runtime. Then, we implemented these monitors and analyzed an e-exam organized
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by Université Joseph Fourier using MarQ tool. The analysis reveals both fraudulent
students and discrepancies between the specification and the implementation. Note that,
due to the lack of logs about the marking and notification phases, we were not able
to analyze all properties. The UJF E-exam case study clearly demonstrates that the
developers do not think to log these two phases where there is less interaction with the
candidates. However, we believe that monitoring the marking phase is essential since a
successful attempt from a bribed examiner or a cheating student can be very effective.
As a future work, it would be interesting to model the full Huszti & Pethő protocol
with RARC as we analyzed RARC alone due to ProVerif termination problem. Also,
it would be great to automatize the manual proofs used to prove the general case of
universal verifiability properties. Another line of research is to study novel properties
such as accountability, which allows them to identify which party is responsible when the
verification fails. Few works go in this direction: Küsters et al. [KTV10] have studied
accountability, however, their framework needs to be instantiated for each application
by identifying relevant verifiability goals. As we identified several verifiability properties
relevant for exam protocols, one may study how their accountability framework can be
applied to case of exam protocols. Bella et al. [BGLR15] have proposed an accountability
property, which allows to identify the responsible party when a candidate fails to submit
an answer or to receive the corresponding mark. They have analyzed their protocol
and have shown that it satisfies this property. However, more accountability properties
need to be defined to identify the responsible parties when the verifiability properties
we propose in this thesis fails. With respect to runtime verification, one direction is
to perform the verification of marking related properties, as well as, to perform online
verification with our monitors during live e-exams, and to study to what extent runtime
enforcement can be applied during a live e-exam run. Online verification requires to
deliver events to the monitor at the time they are generated by the system in order to
check them and take a verdict. This introduces additional overheads and may cause
scalability problems depending on the size of the system and number of events generated
per second. Another direction is to study more expressive and quantitative properties
that might detect possible collusions between students through similar answer patterns.
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Chapter4
e-Cash Protocols
Electronic cash (e-cash) aims at achieving client privacy during payment, similar to real
cash. Due to digital nature of electronic coins security against abuse of individuals is also
a main concern to prevent generating fake coins, or spending the same coin twice. In this
chapter, we propose a formal framework to define, and verify security properties of e-cash
protocols. We define two client privacy properties and three properties to prevent forgery.
Then, we apply our definitions and analyze using ProVerif the Chaum protocol [Cha82],
the DigiCash protocol1, and the Chaum et al. protocol [CFN88].
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4.1 Introduction
Although current banking and electronic payment systems such as credit cards or, e.g.,
PayPal allow clients to transfer money around the world in a fraction of a second, they
1 DigiCash Inc. was an electronic money corporation founded by David Chaum in 1990. The protocol
used by DigiCash has been presented by Berry Schoenmakers in [Sch97].
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do not fully ensure the clients’ privacy. In such systems, no transaction can be made in a
completely anonymous way, since the bank or the payment provider knows the details of
the clients’ transactions. By analyzing a client payments for, e.g., transportations, hotels,
restaurants, movies, clothes, and so on, the payment provider can typically deduce the
client’s whereabouts, and much information about his lifestyle.
Physical cash provides better privacy: the payments are difficult to trace as there is no
central authority that monitors all transactions, in contrast to most electronic payment
systems. This property is the inspiration for “untraceable” e-cash systems. The first such
e-cash system preserving the client’s anonymity was presented by David Chaum [Cha82].
A client can withdraw a coin anonymously from his bank and spend it with a seller. The
seller can then deposit the coin at the bank, who will credit his account. In this protocol
coins are non-transferable, i.e., the seller cannot spend a received coin again, but has to
deposit it at the bank. If he wants to spend a coin in another shop, he has to withdraw a
new coin from his account, similar to the usual payment using cheques. In contrast, there
are protocols where coins are also transferable, i.e., coins do not need to be deposited
directly after each spend, but can be used again, e.g., [OO89,CGT08].
To be secure, an e-cash protocol should not only ensure the client’s privacy, but must
also ensure that a client cannot forge coins which were not issued by the bank. Moreover,
it must protect against double spending – otherwise a client may use the same coin
multiple times. This can be achieved by using online payments, i.e., a seller has to contact
the bank at payment before accepting the coin, however it is an expensive solution. An
alternative solution, which is usually used to support oﬄine payments (i.e., a seller can
accept the payment without contacting the bank), is to reveal the client’s identity if he
spends a coin twice. Note that to avoid double spending, systems like Bitcoin [Nak08]
uses a decentralized approach, where a consensus among users substitutes the bank. So,
when a transaction is made it exposure to double spending with less and less risk as it
gains confirmations. Finally, exculpability ensures that an attacker cannot forge a double
spend, and hence incorrectly blame an honest client for double spending.
Contributions. We provide in this chapter the following contributions:
− We propose a formal framework to verify security properties of non-transferable
e-cash protocols. We model e-cash systems in the Applied pi-Calculus [AF01]. Then,
we define two client privacy properties and three properties to prevent forgery.
− We illustrate our model by analyzing using ProVerif [Bla01] three case studies:
the Chaum protocol [Cha82], the DigiCash protocol, and the Chaum et al. proto-
col [CFN88].
Outline of the Chapter. In Section 4.2, we discuss the related work. We formally
model e-cash protocol in Applied pi-Calculus in Section 4.3. Then, we define the forgery
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related properties in Section 4.4.1 and the privacy properties in Section 4.4.2. In Sec-
tions 4.5.1, 4.5.2, and 4.5.3, we respectively analyze the protocols due to Chaum [Cha82],
DigiCash [Sch97], and Chaum et al. [CFN88]. Finally, we conclude in Section 4.6.
4.2 Related Work
In the literature, several e-cash protocols have been proposed [Cha82,CFN88,Dam88,
DC94,Cre94,Bra93,AF96,KO02,FHY13]. For example, Chaum [Cha82] has proposed an
online e-cash protocol based on blind signature. Latter, Chaum et al. [CFN88] presented
an oﬄine variant of this protocol. Berry Schoenmakers has described a real e-cash
protocol that is implemented by DigiCash based on online Chaum protocol [Cha82]. Abe
et al. [AF96] have introduced a scheme based on partial blind signature, which allows the
signer (the bank) to include certain information in the blind signature of the coin, for
example the expiration date or the value of the coin. Kim et al. [KO02] have proposed an
e-cash system that supports coin refund and assigns them a value, based again on partial
blind signature.
At the same time, several attacks have been found against various existing e-cash
protocols: for example Pfitzmann et al. [PW91,PSW95] break the anonymity of [Dam88,
DC94,Cre94]. Cheng et al. [CYS05] show that Brand’s protocol [Bra93] allows a client
to spend a coin more than once without being identified. Aboud and Agoun [AA14]
show that [FHY13] cannot ensure the anonymity and unlinkability properties that were
claimed. These numerous attacks triggered some first work on formal analysis of e-cash
protocols in the computational [CG08] and symbolic world [LCPD07,SK14]. Canard and
Gouget [CG08] provide formal definitions for various privacy and unforgeability properties
in the computational world, but only with manual proofs as their framework is difficult
to automate. In contrast, Luo et al. [LCPD07] and Thandar et al. [SK14] both rely on
automatic tools (ProVerif [Bla01], and AVISPA [ABB+05] respectively). Yet, they only
consider a fraction of the essential security properties, and for some properties Luo et al.
only perform a manual analysis. Moreover, much of their reasoning is targeted on their
respective case studies, and cannot easily be transferred to other protocols.
4.3 Modeling E-cash Protocols
In this section, we model e-cash protocol in the Applied pi-Calculus. An e-cash system
involves the following parties: the client C who has an account at the bank, the seller S
who accepts electronic coins, and the bank B, which certifies the electronic coins. E-cash
protocols typically run in three phases:
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1. Withdrawal: the client withdraws an electronic coin from the bank, which debits
the client’s account.
2. Payment: the client spends the coin by executing a transaction with a seller.
3. Deposit: the seller deposits the transaction at the bank, which credits the seller’s
account.
In addition to these three main phases, some systems allow the clients:
(a) to return coins directly to the bank without using them in a payment, for instance
in case of expiration, or to re-distribute the coins denominations, and
(b) to restore coins that have been lost, for instance due to a hard disk crash.
As these functionalities are not implemented by all protocols, our model does not require
them. Moreover, we assume that the coins are neither transferable nor divisible. We
define an e-cash protocol as a tuple of processes each representing the role of a certain
party.
Definition 4.1. (E-cash Protocol). An e-cash protocol is a tuple (B,S,C, n˜p), where
B is the process executed by the bank, S is the process executed by the sellers, C is the
process executed by the clients, and n˜p is the set of the private channel names used by the
protocol.
To reason about privacy properties, we use concrete instances of an e-cash protocol, called
e-cash processes.
Definition 4.2. (E-cash Process). Given an e-cash protocol, an e-cash process is a
closed plain process:
CP ≡ νn˜.(B|Sσids1 | . . . |Sσidsl |
(Cσidc1σc11σids11 | . . . |Cσidc1σc1p1σids1p1 )|
...
|(Cσidckσck1σidsk1 | . . . |Cσidckσckpkσidskpk ))
where n˜ is the set of all restricted names which includes some of the protocol’s private
channels n˜p; B is the process executed by the bank; Sσidsi is the process executed by the
seller whose identity is specified by the substitution σidsi; Cσidciσcijσidsij is the process
executed by the client whose identity is specified by the substitution σidci , and which spends
the coin identified by the substitution σcij to pay the seller with the identity specified by
the substitution σidsij . Note that idci can spend pi coins.
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Similar to previous chapter, we introduce the notation of e-cash context in order to
improve the readability of our definitions. An e-cash context CPI [ ] is an e-cash
process CP with “holes” for all processes executed by the parties whose identities
are included in a set I. For example, to enumerate all the sessions executed by
the Client idc1 without repeating the entire e-cash instance, we can rewrite CP as
CP{idc1}[Cσidc1σc11σids11 | . . . |Cσidc1σc1p1σids1p1 ].
Definition 4.3. (E-cash Context). Let I be a set such that I ⊆ IS ∪ IC ∪{idB} where
IS is the set of all sellers, IC is the set of all clients, idB identifies the bank B. Then,
given an e-cash process
CP ≡ νn˜.(B|Sσids1 | . . . |Sσidsl |
(Cσidc1σc11σids11 | . . . |Cσidc1σc1p1σids1p1 )|
...
|(Cσidckσck1σidsk1 | . . . |Cσidckσckpkσidskpk ))
we define e-cash context CPI [ ] as follows:
CPI [ ] ≡ νn˜.
(
(B)k|Sσidsi
idsi /∈I
| |(Cσidci
idci /∈I
σci1σidsi1 | . . . |Cσidciσcipiσidsipi )
)
where k = 0 if idB ∈ I, and k = 1 otherwise.
We also use the notation Cw to denote a client that withdraws a coin, but does not spend
it in a payment: Cw is a variant of the process C that halts at the end of withdrawal
phase, i.e., where the code corresponding to the payment phase is removed. Note, only
honest parties are modeled in an e-cash process. Honest parties are those that follow the
protocol’s specification, and particularly neither reveal their secret data (e.g., account
numbers, keys etc.) to the attacker, nor take malicious actions such as double spending a
coin or generating fake transactions. In addition to the attacker, we consider corrupted
parties, who communicate with the attacker, share personal data with him, or receive
orders from him. Again as in exams, we model a corrupted party as P ch1,ch2 which is
introduced in the Definition 2.2 in Section 2.1.1.
To define forgery related properties, we use the following events, sets, and function:
− withdraw(c): is an event emitted when the coin c is withdrawn. This event is
placed inside the bank process just after the bank outputs the coin’s certificate
(e.g., a signature on the coin).
− spend(c): is an event emitted when the coin c is spent. This event is placed inside
the seller process just after he receives and accepts the coin.
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− TR: is the set of all possible transactions.
− ID: is the set of all client identities.
− D: is a special data set that includes the data known to the bank after the protocol
execution, e.g., the data presents in the bank’s database.
− transId: is a function that takes a transaction tr ∈ TR and returns a pair (s, c),
where s identifies tr and c is the coin involved in tr. Such a pair can usually be
computed from a transaction.
4.4 Security Properties
We first define three forgery related properties: Unforgeability, Double Spending Identifi-
cation, and Exculpability, before defining two privacy properties: Weak Anonymity and
Strong Anonymity.
4.4.1 Forgery-Related Properties
In an e-cash protocol a client must not be able to create a coin without involving the
bank, resulting in a fake coin, or to double spend a valid coin he withdrew from the bank.
This is ensured by Unforgeability, which says that the clients cannot spend more coins
than they withdrew.
Definition 4.4. (Unforgeability). An e-cash protocol ensures Unforgeability if for
every e-cash process CP on every possible execution trace, each occurrence of the event
spend(c) is preceded by a distinct occurrence of the event withdraw(c).
If a fake coin is successfully spent, the event spend will be emitted without any matching
event withdraw, violating the property. Similarly, in the case of a successful double
spending the event spend will be emitted twice, but these events are preceded by only one
occurrence of the event withdraw. In the rest of this chapter, we illustrate all our notions
with the “real cash” system (mainly coins and banknotes) as a running example. We
hope that it helps the reader to understand the properties but also to feel the difference
between real cash and e-cash systems.
Example 4.1. (Unforgeability in Real Cash). In real cash, unforgeability is ensured
by physical measures that make forging or copying coins and banknotes difficult, for
example by adding serial numbers, using ultraviolet ink, holograms and so on.
Since a malicious client might be interested to create fake coins or double spend a coin,
it is particularly interesting to study Unforgeability with an honest bank and corrupted
clients. A partially corrupted seller, which e.g., gives some information to the attacker
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but still emits the event spend correctly, could also be considered. This allows us to
check if a seller colluding with the client and the attacker can result in a coin forging.
Note that, if the seller is totally corrupted then Unforgeability can be trivially violated,
since a corrupted seller can simply emit the event spend for a forged coin, although there
was no transaction.
In case of double spending, the bank should be able to identify the responsible client.
This is ensured by Double Spending Identification (DSI), which says that a client cannot
double spend a coin without revealing his identity. To deposit a coin at the bank the seller
has to present a transaction which contains, in addition to the coin, some information
certifying that he received the coin in a payment. A valid transaction is a transaction
which could be accepted by the bank, i.e., it contains a correct proof that the coin is
received in a correct payment. The bank accepts a valid transaction if it does not contain
a coin that is already deposited using the same or a different transaction.
Definition 4.5. (Double Spending Identification). An e-cash protocol ensures Dou-
ble Spending Identification if there exists a test TDSI : TR× TR× D 7→ ID ∪ {⊥} satisfying:
for any two valid transactions tr1 and tr2 that are different but involve the same coin (i.e.,
transId(tr1) = (s1, c), and transId(tr2) = (s2, c) for some coin c with s1 6= s2), there
exists p ∈ D such that TDSI(tr1, tr2, p) outputs (idc, e) ∈ ID × D, where e is an evidence
that idc withdrew the coin c.
Double Spending Identification allows the bank to identify the double spender by running
a test TDSI on two different transactions that involve the same coin. For example, consider
a protocol where after a successful transaction the seller gets x = m.id+ r where id is
the identity of the client (e.g., his secret key), r is a random value (identifies the coin)
chosen by the client at withdrawal, and m is the challenge of the seller. So, if the client
double spends the same coin then the bank can compute id and r using the two equations:
x1 = m1.id+ r and x2 = m2.id+ r. The data p could be some information necessary to
identify the double spender or to construct the evidence e. This data is usually presented
to the bank at withdrawal or at deposit. The required evidence depends on the protocol.
Note that e is an evidence from the point of view of the bank, and not necessarily a
proof for an outer judge. Thus, the goal of Double Spending Identification is to preserve
the security of the bank so that he can detect and identify the responsible of double
spending when this event occurs. Note that, if a client withdraws a coin and gives it to
an attacker which double spends it, then the test returns the identity of the client and
not the attacker’s identity.
Example 4.2. (DSI in Real cash). In real cash, double spending is prevented by
ensuring that notes cannot be copied. However, Double Spending Identification is not
ensured: even if a central bank is able to identify copied banknotes using, e.g., their
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serial numbers, this does not allow it to identify the person responsible for creating the
counterfeit notes.
Double Spending Identification gives rise to a potential problem: what if the client is
honest and spends the coin only once, but the attacker (e.g., a corrupted seller) is able to
forge a second spend, or what if a corrupted bank is able to simulate a coin withdrawal
and payment i.e., to forge a coin withdrawal and payment that seems to be made by
a certain client. For instance, in the example mentioned above, the two equations are
enough evidence for the bank. However, if the bank knows id he can generate the two
equations himself and blame the client for double spending. So, to convince a judge, an
additional evidence is needed, e.g., the client’s signature. If any of the two situations
mentioned above is possible, then a honest client could be falsely blamed for double
spending, and also it gives raise to a corrupted client which is responsible of double
spending to deny it. To solve this problem we define Exculpability, which says that the
attacker, even when colluding with the bank and the seller, cannot forge a double spend
by a honest client in order to blame him. More precisely, provided a transaction executed
by a client idc, the attacker cannot provide two different valid transactions which involves
the same coin, and the data p necessary for the test TDSI to output the identity idc with
an evidence. Note that Exculpability is only relevant if Double Spending Identification
holds: otherwise a client cannot be blamed regardless of the ability to forge a second
spend or to simulate a coin withdrawal and payment, as his identity cannot be revealed.
Definition 4.6. (Exculpability). Assume that we have a test TDSI as specified in
Definition 4.5, i.e., Double Spending Identification holds, and that the bank is corrupted.
Let idc be a honest client (in particular he does not double spend a coin), and ids be a
corrupted seller. Then, Exculpability is ensured if, after observing a transaction made
by idc with ids, the attacker cannot provide two valid transactions tr1, tr2 ∈ TR that are
different but involve the same coin c, and some data p such that TDSI(tr1, tr2, p) outputs
(idc, e) where e is an evidence that idc withdrew the coin c.
The intuition is: if the attacker can provide two transactions tr1, tr2 such that TDSI(tr1, tr2)
returns a client’s identity (that is, two different valid transactions involve the same coin),
then it was able to forge (at least) one transaction since the honest client performs (at
most) one transaction per coin. If after observing a transaction executed by a client idc,
the attacker can provide a different valid transaction which involves the same coin, and
the required data p, then the test returns the identity idc with the necessary evidence,
thus the property will be violated. Similarly, in the case where the attacker can forge a
coin withdrawal and payment seems to be made by a client idc, then the attacker can
obtain two transactions satisfying the required conditions, together with the necessary
data p, so that the test returns the identity idc with an evidence. Note that, Double
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Spending Identification and Exculpability are only relevant in case of oﬄine e-cash systems
where double spending is possible.
4.4.2 Privacy Properties
We express our privacy properties as observational equivalence. We use the labeled
bisimilarity (≈l) to express the equivalence between two processes [AF01]. To ensure the
privacy of the client, the following two notions have been introduced by cryptographers
and are standard in the literature e.g., [CG08,Fer93,Sch97].
1. Weak Anonymity : the attacker cannot link a client to a spend, i.e., he cannot
distinguish which client makes the payment.
2. Strong Anonymity : additionally to weak anonymity, the attacker should not be able
to decide if two spends were done by the same client, or not.
Canard and Gouget [CG08] define Weak Anonymity as the following. Two honest clients
each withdraw a coin from the bank. Then one of them (randomly chosen) spends his
coin to the adversary. The adversary already knows the identities of these two clients,
and also the secret key of the bank. It wins the game if it guesses correctly which client
spends the coin. Inspired by this definition, we define Weak Anonymity as follows.
Definition 4.7. (Weak Anonymity). An e-cash protocol ensures Weak Anonymity if
for any e-cash process CP , any corrupted Seller ids, and any two honest Clients idc1 and
idc2, we have that:
CPI [Cσidc1σc1σids|Cwσidc2σc2 |(Sσids)ch1,ch2 |Bch1,ch2 ]
≈l
CPI [Cwσidc1σc1 |Cσidc2σc2σids|(Sσids)ch1,ch2 |Bch1,ch2 ]
where c1, c2 are any two coins (not previously known to the attacker) withdrawn by idc1
and idc2 respectively, I = {idc1, idc2, ids, idB}, idB is the bank’s identity, and Cw is a
variant of C that halts at the end of the withdrawal phase.
Weak anonymity ensures that a process in which the client idc1 spends the coin c1 to
the corrupted seller ids1, is equivalent to a process in which the client idc2 spends the
coin c2 to the corrupted seller ids1. We assume a corrupted bank represented by Bch1,ch2 .
Note that the client that does not spend his coin still withdraws it. This is necessary
since otherwise the attacker could likely distinguish both sides during the withdrawal
phase, as the bank is corrupted and typically the client reveals his identity to the bank
at withdrawal. We also note that we do not necessarily consider other corrupted clients,
however this can easily be done by replacing some honest clients from the context CPI
(i.e., other than idc1 and idc2) with corrupted ones.
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Example 4.3. (Weak anonymity in Real cash). Real coins ensure weak anonymity as
two coins (assuming the same value and production year) are indistinguishable. However,
banknotes do not ensure weak anonymity according to our definition, as they include serial
numbers. Since the two clients withdraw a note each, the notes hence have different serial
numbers which the bank can identify. In reality this is used by central banks to trace notes
and detect suspicious activities that, e.g., could hint at money laundering. Note however
that banknotes ensure a weaker form of anonymity: if two different clients use the same
note, one cannot distinguish them.
A stronger privacy property is Strong Anonymity, which is defined in [CG08] using
a similar game as Weak Anonymity with the difference that the adversary may have
previously seen some coins being spent by the two honest clients explicitly mentioned in
the definition. Such definition of anonymity resembles untraceability. In symbolic model,
we define Strong Anonymity as follows:
Definition 4.8. (Strong Anonymity). An e-cash protocol ensures Strong Anonymity
if for any e-cash process CP , any corrupted seller ids, and any two honest clients idc1
and idc2, we have that:
CPI [ | Cσidc1
0≤i≤m1
σci1
σids | Cσidc2
0≤i≤m2
σci2
σids|Cσidc1σc1σids|Cwσidc2σc2 |(Sσids)ch1,ch2 |Bch1,ch2 ]
≈l
CPI [ | Cσidc1
0≤i≤m1
σci1
σids | Cσidc2
0≤i≤m2
σci2
σids|Cwσidc1σc1 |Cσidc2σc2σids|(Sσids)ch1,ch2 |Bch1,ch2 ]
where c1 and c11 . . . c
m1
1 are any coins withdrawn by idc1, c2 and c
1
2 . . . c
m2
2 are any coins
withdrawn by idc2, I = {idc1, idc2, ids, idB}, idB is the bank’s identity, and Cw is a
variant of C that halts at the end of the withdrawal phase.
Strong Anonymity ensures that the process in which the client idc1 spends m1 + 1 coins,
while idc2 spends m2 coins and additionally withdraws another coin without spending it,
is equivalent to the process in which the client idc1 spends m1 coins and withdraws an
additional coin, while idc2 spends m2 + 1 coins. The definition assumes that the bank
is corrupted, and that the seller receiving the coins from the two clients idc1 and idc2
is also corrupted. Note that, we consider Cw to avoid distinguishing from the number
of withdrawals by each client. Again, we can replace some honest clients from CPI by
corrupted ones.
Example 4.4. (Strong Anonymity in Real cash). Again, real coins ensure strong
anonymity as, assuming the same value and production year, two coins are indistinguish-
able. Yet, for the same reason as in weak anonymity, banknotes do not ensure strong
anonymity according to our definition: the serial numbers allow an attacker to identify
the different clients.
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We note that any protocol satisfying Strong Anonymity also satisfies Weak Anonymity,
as Weak Anonymity is a special case of Strong Anonymity for m1 = m2 = 0, i.e. when
the two honest clients do not make any previous spends.
4.5 Case Studies
David Chaum proposed an online e-cash system in [Cha82] based on blind signature.
An oﬄine variant of this protocol is proposed by Chaum et al. in [CFN88]. A real
implementation based on Chaum protocol (in its two variants), which allows to make
purchases over open networks such as the Internet, put in service by the DigiCash Inc.
which was founded by David Chaum in 1990. The corporation declared bankruptcy
later in 1998, and was sold to Blucora2 (formerly Infospace Inc.). The online protocol
implemented by DigiCash is presented by Berry Schoenmakers in [Sch97]. In this section,
we describe and analyze both the Chaum (online) protocol [Cha82] and the Chaum et al.
(oﬄine) protocol [CFN88], as well as, the online protocol implemented by DigiCash [Sch97]
(DigiCash protocol). For this we use ProVerif an automatic tool that verifies cryptographic
protocols. Note that, all the verification presents in this section are carried out on a
standard PC (Intel(R) Pentium(R) D CPU 3.00GHz RAM 2GB).
4.5.1 Chaum Protocol
The Chaum Protocol is proposed in [Cha82] and summarized in [CFN88]. It allows a
client to withdraw a coin blindly from the bank, and then spend it later in a payment
without being traced even by the bank. We start by given a description of the protocol,
then we show how we model it in ProVerif and discuss the obtained results.
Description. The Chaum Protocol is an online protocol in the sense that the seller
does not accept the payment before contacting the bank to verify that the coin is not
deposited before, this is to prevent double spending. The Chaum Protocol is composed
of the following phases:
Withdrawal Phase. To obtain an electronic coin, the client communicates with the bank
using the following protocol:
1. The client randomly chooses a value x, and a coefficient r, the client before sending
to the bank his identity u and the value b = blind(x, r), where blind is a blinding
function.
2. The bank signs the blinded value b using a signing function sign and his secret key
skB, before sending the signature bs = sign(b, skB) to the client. The bank also
debits the amount of the coin from the client’s account.
2 http://www.blucora.com/
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3. The client verifies the signature and removes the blinding to obtain the bank’s
signature s = sign(x, skB) on x. The coin consists of the pair (x, sign(x, skB)).
Payment (and deposit) Phases. To spend a coin the following steps are taken:
1. The client sends the pair (x, sign(x, skB)) to the seller.
2. After checking the bank’s signature, the seller sends the coin (x, sign(x, skB)) to
the bank to verify that it is not deposited before.
3. The bank verifies the signature, and that the coin is not in the list of deposited
coins. If these checks succeed the bank credits the seller’s account with the amount
of the coin and informs him of acceptance. Otherwise, the payment is rejected.
Modeling in ProVerif. We use ProVerif to perform the automatic protocol verification.
We model privacy properties as equivalence properties, and we use events to verify the
other properties. The equational theory depicted in Figure 4.1 models the cryptographic
primitives used within Chaum protocol. It includes well-known model for digital signature
(functions sign, getmess, and checksign). The functions blind/unblind are used
to blind/unblind a message using a random value. We also include the possibility of
unblinding a signed blinded message, so that we obtain the signature of the message –
the key feature of blind signatures.
getmess(sign(m, k)) = m
checksign(sign(m, k), pk(k)) = m
unblind(blind(m, r), r) = m
unblind(sign(blind(m, r), k), r) = sign(m, k)
Figure 4.1: Equational theory for our model of Chaum protocol.
Analysis. The result of the analysis is summarized in Table 4.1. We model Unforgeability
as an injective correspondence between the two events withdraw and spend, they are
placed in their appropriate position, according to the Definition 4.4, inside the bank and
seller processes respectively. We consider a honest bank and a honest seller but corrupted
clients. We assume that the bank sends an authenticated message through private channel
to inform the seller about a coin acceptance. Otherwise, the attacker can forge a message
which results in an acceptence of already deposited coin. However, ProVerif still found
an attack against Unforgeability that is when two copies of the same coin spent at the
same time. In this case the bank makes two parallel database lookup to check if the coin
is deposited before. Each lookup confirms that the coin is not deposited before if the
parallel lookup not finished yet and thus the coin is not yet inserted in the database.
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Property Result Time
Unforgeability × < 1s
Weak Anonymity X < 1s
Strong Anonymity X < 1s
Table 4.1: Results of our analysis on the formal model of the Chaum protocol. (X)
indicates that the property holds. (×) indicates that it fails (ProVerif shows an attack).
This results in an acceptance of two spends of the same coin. The latter attack may be
avoided with some synchronization like locking the table when a coin deposit is initiated
and then unlock it when the operation is finished. However, such a locking mechanism
may create deadlocks in practice. ProVerif does not support such an feature. Protocols
that rely on databases can be analyzed using the Tamarin Prover [MSCB13] thanks to
the SAPIC3 [KK14] tool. Note that, corrupted client cannot create a fake coin as the
correspondence holds without injectivity. In case of online protocols, Double Spending
Identification and Exculpability are not relevant as online protocols tackle double spending
by calling of the bank at payment. Thus, they do not have any kind of test to identify
double spender.
For privacy properties, we assume corrupted bank and corrupted seller, but honest
client. ProVerif confirms that the privacy of the client is preserved, as both Weak
Anonymity, and Strong Anonymity are satisfied. This due to the fact that the coin is
signed blindly during the withdrawal phase, and thus cannot be traced later by the
attacker even when colludes with the bank and the seller. Note that, we have to perform
some “shuﬄing” of the coins at payment in order to verify privacy properties using
ProVerif4. Note also that, for Strong Anonymity we consider unbounded number of
spends by each client with one spend that is made by either the first client or by the
second one.
4.5.2 DigiCash Protocol
Chaum protocol is implemented by DigiCash Inc. We analyze the specification the
implemented protocol as presented by Berry Schoenmakers in [Sch97]. In the following,
we give the description of the protocol, our modeling in Proverif, and the result of our
analysis.
Description. The DigiCash protocol has the same withdrawal phase as Chaum protocol,
except that the client sends an authenticated coin to the bank in order to sign it. However,
the paper [Sch97] does not specify the way of authentication. We ignore this authentication
as its purpose is to ensure that the bank debits the correct client account. Hence, we
believe that it does not effect the privacy and unforgeability properties (analysis confirms
3 http://sapic.gforge.inria.fr/ 4 Similar, for using out(a, choice[m,n]) | out(a, choice[n,m]) instead
of out(a, choice[m,m]) | out(a, choice[n, n]) to prove observational equivalence.
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Property Result Time
Unforgeability × < 1s
Weak Anonymity X < 1s
Strong Anonymity X < 1s
Table 4.2: Results of our analysis on the formal model of the DigiCash protocol. (X)
indicates that the property holds. (×) indicates that it fails (ProVerif shows an attack).
that as we can see in Table 4.1). The payment and deposit phases are different from
those of Chaum protocol. They are summarized by the following steps:
1. The client sends to the seller pay = enc((ids, h(pay-spec), x, sign(x, skB)), pkB)
which is the encryption, using the public key of the bank pkB , of the seller’s identity
ids, hash of the payment specification pay-spec (specification of the sold object,
price etc), and the coin (x, sign(x, skB)).
2. The seller signs (h(pay-spec), pay) and sends it with his identity ids to the bank.
3. The bank verifies the signature, decrypts pay then verifies the value of h(pay-spec)
and that the coin is valid and not deposited before. If so it informs the seller to
accept the coin, and to reject it otherwise.
Modeling in ProVerif. Additionally to the equational theory of the Chaum protocol
(Table 4.1), the equational theory of DigiCash protocol includes well-known model of the
public key encryption represented by the following equation: dec(enc(m, pk(k)), k) = m,
where pk(k) represents the public key corresponding to the key k.
Analysis. The result of analysis of DigiCash protocol using ProVerif is summarized
in Table 4.2. ProVerif shows the same result obtained for Chaum protocol. Namely, it
shows that Weak Anonymity, and Strong Anonymity are satisfied, and it outputs the
same attack presented in Section 4.5.1 against Unforgeability. Again Double Spending
Identification and Exculpability are not relevant. Note that, obtaining the same result for
the two protocols, even that they have different payment and deposit phases, confirms
that the blind signature used during the withdrawal phase plays the key role in preserving
the privacy of the client, as claimed by David Chaum when he introduced it.
4.5.3 Chaum et al. Protocol
An oﬄine variant of the Chaum protocol is proposed in [CFN88], called Chaum et al.
protocol. The Chaum et al. protocol removes the requirement that the seller must contact
the bank during every payment. This introduces the risk of double spending a coin by a
client.
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Description. The three phases of Chaum et al. protocol are described as follows.
Withdrawal Phase. To obtain an electronic coin, the client randomly chooses a,
c and d, and calculates the pair H = (h(a, c), h(a ⊕ u, d)), where u is the client
identity, h is a hash function, and ⊕ is XOR operator. The client then proceed as
in the Chaum protocol but with x (the potential coin) replaced with the pair H.
Namely, the client blinds the pair H and sends it to the bank. Then the bank signs
and returns it to the client. The main difference from the Chaum online protocol is
that the coin has to be of the following form
(h(a, c), h(a⊕ u, d))
where the client identity is masked inside it. This allows the bank to reveal the
identity of a double spender. In order for the bank to be sure that the client provides
a message of the appropriate form, Chaum et al. used in [CFN88] the well known
“cut-and-choose” technique. Precisely, the client computes n such a pair H where n
is the system security parameter. The bank then selects half of them and asks the
client to reveal their corresponding parameters (a, b, c and r). If n is large enough
the client can cheats with a low probability.
At the end of this phase the client holds the electronic coin composed of the pair
H, and the bank’s signature S = sign(H, skB). The client also has to keep the
random values a, c, d which are used later to spend the coin.
Payment Phase. The payment is made oﬄine according to the following steps:
1. To make the payment, the client presents the pair H and the bank’s signature
S to the seller. The seller checks the signature, if it is correct then he chooses
and sends a random binary bit y, a challenge, to the client. The client returns
to the seller:
– The values a and c if y is 0.
– The values a⊕ u and d if y is 1.
2. The seller checks the compliance of the values sent with the pair H. If
everything (the signature and the values) is correct, the payment is accepted.
At the end of the payment phase, the seller holds the pair H, the signature S, the
values of either (a, c) or (a ⊕ u, d), and the challenge y. All these data together
compose the transaction the seller has to present to the bank at deposit.
Note that, in case where n pairs are used for the coin, the challenge y will be a n
bits string and for each bit either the corresponding values of (a, c) or (a⊕ u, d) are
revealed to the seller.
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Deposit Phase. To deposit a coin:
1. The seller provides to the bank the transaction (H, S, y, (a, c)) or (H, S, y,
(a⊕ u, d)).
2. The bank checks the signature and also whether the values (a, c) or (a⊕ u, d)
correspond to their hash value in H. If any of these values is incorrect, the
fault is on the seller’s part, as he was able to independently check the regularity
of the coin at payment. If the coin is correct, the bank checks its database
to see whether the same coin had been used before. If it has not, the bank
credits the seller’s account with the appropriate amount. Otherwise, the bank
rejects the transaction.
Note that, Chaum et al. protocol does not prevent double spending, however it preserve
client’s anonymity only if he spends a coin once. However, a double spender can be
identified when the coin has the form (h(a, c), h(a⊕u, d)). However, the bank can simulate
the coin withdrawal and payment (as the bank knows the identities of all the clients),
thus the bank can blame a honest client for double spending. As a countermeasure,
the authors propose to concatenate two values z and z′ with u inside the pair H to
have (h(a, c), h(a⊕ (u, z, z′), d)) and provide to the bank, at withdrawal, additionally the
client’s signature on h(z, z′).
Modeling in ProVerif. To model the Chaum et al. protocol in ProVerif, in addition
to the equational theory used for the Chaum protocol (Table 4.1), we use the function
xor to represent the exclusive or (⊕) of two values. Given the first value, the second
value can be obtained using the function unxor. Such an – admittedly limited – modeling
for ⊕ operator is sufficient to catch the functional properties of the scheme required
by Chaum et al. protocol, but does not catch all algebraic properties of this operator.
However, there are currently no tools that support observational equivalence – which
we need for the anonymity properties – and all algebraic properties of ⊕. Küsters et
al. [KT11] proposed a way to extend ProVerif with ⊕. Their tool translates a model
of the protocol to a ProVerif input where all ⊕ are ground terms to enable automated
reasoning. However, this tool can only deal with secrecy and authentication properties,
and does not support equivalence properties. The xor function is only used to hide the
client’s identity u using a random value a (i.e., a⊕ u), which we model as xor(a, u). The
bank then uses a to reveal the client’s identity u if he double spends a coin. This is
modeled by the following two equations
unxor(xor(a, u), a) = u
unxor(a, xor(a, u)) = u
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which represents the various ways: ((a⊕ u)⊕ a) = u, or (a⊕ (a⊕ u)) = u. We always
assume that identity is the second value, and this is how we model it inside honest
processes.
Analysis. As expected ProVerif confirms that Unforgeability is not satisfied, a corrupted
client can double spend a coin. In fact the seller cannot know whether a certain coin
is already spent or not, he accepts any coin that is certified by the bank. However, a
collusion between a client and the attacker cannot lead to forging a coin.
In case of double spending, the bank may receive two transactions of the form tr1 =
(h, hx, sign((h, hx), skB), 0, a, c) and tr1 = (h, hx, sign((h, hx), skB), 1, xor(a, u), d). The
bank can apply a test to obtain the identity u. This is done using the unxor function
as unxor(xor(a, u), a) = u. The evidence here is showing that the identity of the client
is masked inside the coin. This can be done thanks to the values of (a, c, xor(a, u), d)
which are initially known only to the client. Spending the coin only once reveals either
(a, c) or (xor(a, u), d) which does not allow to obtain the identity u. Note that, if the two
sellers provide the same challenge the two transactions are exactly equal. In this case
no double spending is detected and the second transaction will be rejected by the bank.
Actually, the bank cannot know whether a client double spends the same coin (with same
challenge provided in the two spends), or the seller deposits again another copy of the
same transaction. In practice this can be avoided with high probability if n pairs coin
(“cut-and-choose” technique) is used and thus n bits challenge. However, considering only
one pair there is a probability of one to half (at most) for the bank to identify a double
spender (cases where same challenge is provided in both spends are eliminated).
In ProVerif, we model the output of an identity and an evidence of the test TDSI by
an emission of the event OK, and event KO otherwise. To say that Double Spending
Identification is satisfied we should have that the test TDSI does not emit the event KO
for every two valid transactions tr1, tr2 that are different but involves the same coin, i.e.,
it always emits event OK for such transactions. Note that, our test TDSI does not capture
the case explained above where the two transactions have the same challenge since same
coin and same challenge results in same transaction. Regardless of that, ProVerif shows
that the test can emit the event KO for certain two transactions satisfying the required
conditions. Actually, a corrupted client can withdraw a coin that does not have the
appropriate form (e.g., client’s identity is not masked inside it), thus the bank cannot
obtain the identity in case of double spending. Note that, if the bank only certifies coins
with the appropriate form at withdrawal (i.e., of the form (h(a, c), h(a ⊕ u, d))), then
the property holds, ProVerif confirms that. Again, in practice applying the “cut-and-
choose" technique can guarantee with high probability that the coin is in the appropriate
form. However, applying this technique using Proverif does not make any difference
since ProVerif works under symbolic model which deals with possibilities and not with
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Property Result Time
Unforgeability × <1s
Double Spending Identif. × <2s
Double Spending Identif.∗ X <2s
Exculpability∗ × < 6s
Exculpability† X < 6s
Weak Anonymity X <1s
Strong Anonymity X <1s
Table 4.3: Results of our analysis on the formal model of the Chaum et al. protocol.
(X) indicates that the property holds. (×) indicates that it fails (ProVerif shows an
attack). (∗) Only coins with the appropriate form are considered. (†) After applying
the countermeasure.
probabilities. For instance, the attacker still can guess the pairs that the bank requests
to reveal and construct them in the appropriate form but cheats with the others which
composes the coin.
We analyze Exculpability in the case where only coins of appropriate form are considered
i.e., the case where Double Spending Identification holds. ProVerif confirms that a
corrupted bank can blame a honest client. The bank can simulate the withdrawal and the
payment since the bank knows the identity of the client. Thus obtaining two transactions
satisfying the required conditions. This is due to the fact that the evidence obtained
by the test, which is showing that the client’s identity is masked inside the coin, is not
strong enough to act as a proof. However, the attacker cannot re-spend a coin withdrawn
and spent by a honest client. After applying the countermeasure that is including some
terms z and z′ so that the client signs h(z, z′). ProVerif confirms that Exculpability
holds. Applying the countermeasure results in a new test which takes, in addition to
the two transactions, the client’s signature on h(z, z′). The test shows, in case of double
spending, that the identity u and the preimage (z, z′) of the hash signed by the client are
masked inside the coin. This represents a stronger evidence which acts as a proof that
the client withdrew the coin since the bank cannot forge the client’s signature (under
perfect cryptographic assumption).
We note that, Ogiela et al. [OS14] show an attack on Chaum et al. protocol: when
a client double spends a coin, the sellers can forge additional transactions involve the
same coin, so that the bank cannot know how many transactions are actually result
from spends made by the client and how many are forged by the sellers. In such a case
according to our definition Unforgeability does not hold since the client have at least to
spends the coin twice. But, corrupted sellers can blame a corrupted client who double
spends a coin for further spends. Moreover the bank can still identify the client and
punish him as the bank can be sure that he at least spent the coin twice.
Concerning privacy properties, ProVerif shows that Chaum et al. protocol still satisfies
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both Weak Anonymity and Strong Anonymity. Note that (for honest client), we fix the
value of the challenge. Otherwise, since ProVerif internally repeats actions, the attacker
can use all possible challenges, and thus leads to double spending a coin by the (honest)
client which reveals his identity at payment.
To sum up, ProVerif confirms the claim about preserving client’s anonymity. ProVerif
also was able to show that a client can double spend a withdrawn coin but cannot forge a
coin, and that the bank can identify the double spender if the coin is in the appropriate
form. ProVerif also shows, in case where the coins are in the appropriate form, that
the bank can simulate a withdrawal and payment, and thus can blame him for double
spending. After applying the countermeasure no attack against Exculpability is found.
4.6 Conclusion
E-cash protocols can offer anonymous electronic payment services. Numerous protocols
have been proposed in the literature, and multiple flaws were discovered. To avoid further
bad surprises, formal verification can be used to improve confidence in e-cash protocols.
In this chapter, we developed a formal framework to automatically verify e-cash protocols
with respect to multiple essential privacy and forgery properties. Our framework relies
on the Applied pi-Calculus and uses ProVerif as the verification tool.
As case studies, we analyzed using ProVerif three e-cash protocols: the Chaum
protocol [Cha82], the DigiCash protocol, and the Chaum et al. protocol [CFN88]. Our
results confirm some claims and already known weaknesses. We also identified that some
synchronization is necessary in case of online protocols to prevent double spending.
As future work, we would like to investigate further case studies and to extend our
model to cover transferable protocols with divisible coins. Also we would like to use the
tool SAPIC based on Tamarin, in order to see how it can help to analyze e-cash protocols.
Furthermore, as we did not model the details of “cut-and-choose" technique of the Chaum
et al. protocol, one could perform an analysis in the computational world in order to take
this into account.
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e-Reputation Protocols
Reputation protocols are tools to quantify the trustworthiness of users (or entities) based
on their past behavior. In such protocols, for each user a reputation score, which reflects
the trust of the others on him, is computed based on the opinions of other users. Thus,
for reputation protocols to serve the purpose expected from them users must provide
feedbacks that reflect their opinions. Moreover, reputation scores must be correctly
computed from these feedbacks. In order for users to provide honest feedbacks without a
fear from a potential revenge their privacy must be preserved, and to trust reputation
scores they must be verified. In this chapter, we model reputation protocols in Applied
pi-Calculus, and formally define several related authentication and privacy properties.
Then, we define two verifiability properties in an abstract way. Finally, we validate our
model by analyzing, using ProVerif, the security of a simple reputation protocol presented
in [PRT04].
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5.1 Introduction
A reputation protocol computes and publishes reputation scores for a set of entities (e.g.,
service providers, goods) within a community, based on a collection of opinions that the
users provide about these entities. In a typical reputation protocol, a user interacts with
a certain entity, and then provides a rate that reflects his satisfaction on this entity. The
reputation score of that entity is then computed from all the rates provided about it.
In this sense, reputation is a quantity derived from the underlying network, and which
is globally visible to all members of the network [Fre78]. An example of a reputation
protocol is the one used by eBay: after a buyer buys a good from a seller, both the buyer
and the seller may provide a rate (+1, 0, or -1). The reputation score of a user is simply
the sum of all the rates he received. For most transactions, the buyer can additionally
provide a detailed rate reflecting his satisfaction about good description, communication,
shipping time and charges.
Reputation systems have been implemented in e-commerce systems, such as e-Bay,
and have been contributed to the success of these systems [RKZF00]. Without reputation
mechanisms, opportunistic behavior of some users can lead to peer mistrust and eventual
system failure [Ake70]. For example, Resnick and Zeckhauser have analyzed the e-
Bay reputation system and have concluded that the system does seem to encourage
transactions [RZ02]. Moreover, several researches have found that sellers reputation has
significant influences on auction prices [HW06]. An important issue with reputation
systems is that the users hesitate to submit negative feedbacks when these feedbacks are
public [RZ02]. A main reason behind such behavior is that the users have the fear of
future revenge. Having honest feedbacks, reputation based-systems help users to decide
who to trust, encourage trustworthy behavior, and detect dishonest users. In order to
incentivize the users to provide honest rates, a reputation protocol has to preserve their
anonymity.
Further privacy and security properties are also significant for reputation protocols as
they can be affected by several adversarial behaviors. For instance, a user may provide
himself very positive feedback. Assuming that a user is not eligible to give himself a
feedback, property Rate Origin Authentication, which states that only eligible users can
give rates (at most one each), fails if a user rates himself or if Moreover, property User
Eligibility Verification allows one to verify that only eligible users gave rates. Another
interesting scenario is when two users exchange positive rates. We can limit such a scenario
by preserving the anonymity of the rates and ensuring recipient-freeness, which are capable
of prohibiting a user from proving to the another that he rates him positively. Note that
for a reputation protocol, only users that interacts with, e.g., a service providers should
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be eligible to rate him. This prevents users from collude, for instance, to advertise the
reputation a certain user more than its real value, known as ballot-stuffing attack [Del00].
Note that, our properties cannot detect attacks such as bad-mothing and ballot-
stuffing attacks, but properties such as: User Eligibility Verification, Receipt-Freeness,
and Coercion-Resistance can minimize them. As User Eligibility Verification imposes
some constraints on the users in order to provide a rate (e.g., accomplish a successful
interaction); Receipt-Freeness can limit the bribing and positive rate exchange between
users as they cannot provide a proof that they provided a certain rate; similarly does
Coercion-Resistance even when interacting with a coercer.
Contributions. Toward security analysis of reputation protocols we provide, in this
chapter, the following contributions:
− We model reputation protocols in the Applied pi-Calculus [AF01]. Then, we propose
formal definitions of eight authentication and privacy properties of reputation
protocols.
− We define two verifiability properties that allow us to verify users eligibility and
reputation scores correctness.
− We discus our definitions by analyzing using ProVerif the simple protocol proposed
in [PRT04].
Outline of the Chapter. We discuss the related work in Section 5.2. We formally
model reputation protocol in Applied pi-Calculus, and define eight authentication and
privacy properties in Section 5.3. Then in Section 5.4, we give high-level definitions of
two verifiability properties related to e-reputation protocols. In Section 5.5, we analysis
the protocol by Pavlov et al. [PRT04]. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.6.
5.2 Related Work
Reputation Protocols. Marsh [Mar94] has provided one of the first formal treatment
of trust. However, the proposed model emphasis on users’ own experiences rather than
allowing them to collectively build the trustworthiness in each other. Moreover, it is
complex to be implemented in today’s systems. Latter, Rahman and Hailes [AH00] have
simplified and adopted the Marsh’s model to be implemented in peer-to-peer networks.
However, the developed approach suffers from scalability problems, and requires every user
to keep a knowledge about the whole network. Aberer and Despotovic have proposed an
approach that adresses reputation-based trust management in the context of peer-to-peer
systems [AD01]. The proposed approach allows to assess trust by computing a user
reputation from his previous interactions with other users.
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In the other hand, several (claimed) secure reputation protocols have been proposed.
Androulaki et al. [ACBM08] have proposed a reputation protocol that relies on trusted
central authority to demonstrate the validity of rates. Pavlov et al. [PRT04] have
proposed a decentralized reputation protocol to preserve users privacy. Others have
tried to have privacy preserving protocols [AGLM+13a, Ste06, Ste08] by dealing with
untraceability that is to ensure that an attacker cannot distinguish whether the same
user is involved in two interactions or not. Bethencourt et al. [BSS10] have formally
defined the anonymity of both the users and the target, and propose a protocol argued
informally to satisfy those definitions. Anceaume et al. [AGLM+13b] have extended
their work to handle non-monotonic ratings and mention additional security properties
concerned in reputation scores correctness. However, to best of our knowledge no
general formal framework that allows the verification of the security properties in e-
reputation protocols have been given. In some related domains, there are numerous papers
presenting the formalization and verification of the security properties, for instance in
e-voting [DLL11,DLL12b,BHM08,DKR09], in e-auction systems [DJP10,DLL13,DJL13].
Link to Voting Systems. Some of the security properties we present herein for
reputation protocols seem to relate with those studied in other applications such as voting.
For instance, user eligibility is analogous to voter eligibility, and rate privacy reminds vote
privacy. However, still there are fundamental differences between the two applications. A
main difference between the two applications is that in voting normally each voter can
cast only one vote, while in reputation each user can rates several users. This affects
the adversary model. For instance, in voting a collusion between two candidates by
exchanging votes provides no gain for any of them as each of them loses his vote in this
process. While in reputation exchanging positive rates benefits both users. Moreover
as each user can give several rates, properties such as untraceability are interesting in
reputation protocols, but we do not find such a property in voting as each votes can cast
at most one vote. Note also, in reputation each user can play at the same time both roles
a (normal) user and a target.
Furthermore, in voting the candidates and the voters (and thus the maximum possible
number of votes) are already known, and after voting process the total number of votes
and that taken by each candidate will be publicly available. Thus, there is a certain
leakage of information. For example, if a candidate does not receive any vote, the attacker
can exclude this previously possible option. While in reputation all users can rate each
others playing two rules at the same time (rate provider and target). Also, the number
of provided rates is not (necessarily) publicly known. Thus, having a reputation score
does not give us any information about the number of the rates provided by the users.
Note that, in reputation protocols that support both negative and positive rates, a score
zero does not necessarily means zero rates. Even in case of only positive rates, a score
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zero might be due to the fact that this user did not make any interaction with the others
yet, not necessarily means that users provide their rates to other targets like in voting.
Actually, in reputation a user do not have to choose between different targets as he can
provides rates for all users he interacted with. Note also that, providing a rate for a
certain user is not always good like when you vote for a certain candidate in voting, as
the rate could be a bad one.
5.3 Authentication and Privacy in Reputation
In this section, we model reputation protocols in the Applied pi-Calculus, then we propose
formal definitions for two authentication and six privacy properties.
5.3.1 Modeling Reputation Protocols in the Applied pi-Calculus
A reputation protocol may involves users who interact and provide rates about each other,
and authorities who often handles the rates, and calculates and publishes the reputation
scores. Without loss of generality, we distinguish the user that provides the service, the
target, from the user that provides a feedback on the target or the service, the normal
user (in short the user). A reputation protocol specifies the processes executed by users,
targets, and authorities.
Definition 5.1. (Reputation Protocol in the Applied pi-Calculus). A reputation
protocol is defined by a tuple (U, T,A1, . . . , Al, n˜p), where U is the process executed by
the users, T is the process executed by the targets, Ai’s are the processes executed by the
authorities, and n˜p is the set of the private channels used in the protocol.
The process U is instantiated for each user with different, e.g., keys, identity, and rates.
Similarly, the process T is instantiated for each target. Note that, if the target is an
object (e.g., service, or good) or does nothing then T is simply the null process. A
protocol can have several authorities, for example a registrar, a collector, a publisher
or has no authority at all. In the latter case, again we have that Ai is equal to null
process. Note also that, even decentralized protocols may require an agent that initiates
a reputation score calculation for a certain target. Such an agent is considered as an
authority. To reason about privacy properties, we define a reputation process as an
instance of a reputation protocol.
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Definition 5.2. (Reputation Process). Let (U, T,A1, . . . , Al, n˜p) be a reputation
protocol, then we define a reputation process as the following closed plain process:
νn˜.(A1 | . . . | Al′ | Tσidt1 | . . . | Tσidtm |
(Uσidu1σr11σidt11 | . . . | Uσidu1σr1p1σidt1p1 ) |
...
| (Uσidukσrk1σidtk1 | . . . | Uσidukσrkpkσidtkpk ))
where n˜ is the set of all restricted names, which includes some of the protocol’s private
channels n˜p; A1, . . . , Al′ (l′ 6 l) are the processes executed by the honest authorities;
Tσidti is the process executed by the target idti; Uσiduiσrijσidtij is the process executed by
the user idui, which rates the target idtij with the rate rij. Note that, idui can provide pi
rates on different targets.
A party can play both roles of user and target in a reputation process as both processes U
and T can be instantiated with the same identity. Note that, in some protocols a certain
property may hold even if some of the authorities are dishonest, while other protocols may
require all the authorities to be honest. During the analysis, we choose which authorities
A1, . . . , Al′ are honest by including them in the reputation process. Only honest parties
are modeled in a reputation process. Dishonest parties are left to the attacker. The
attacker has complete control to the network, except private channels (e.g., Dolev-Yao
attacker [DY83]).
To capture threats due to bribing and coercion, we consider corrupted parties P ch1
and P ch1,ch2 from [DKR09], which we respectively recalled by the Definitions 2.1 and 2.2
in Section 2.1.1. The process P ch1 is a variant of P which shares with the attacker
channel ch1. Through ch1, P ch1 sends all its inputs and freshly generated names (but not
restricted channel names). The process P ch1,ch2 does not only reveal the secret data on
channel ch1, but also takes orders from the attacker on the channel ch2 before sending
a message or branching. Given a reputation process any process P can be replaced by
either P ch1 or P ch1,ch2 . Note that, in particular we use P ch1 and P ch1,ch2 to respectively
define Receipt-Freeness and Coercion-Resistance. For the sake of simplicity in notations,
we define a reputation context which we use inside our the definitions of our properties.
Definition 5.3. (Reputation Context). Given a reputation process, a subset of users
IU , and a subset of targets IT , we define the reputation context RPI [ ], where I = IU∪IT ,
as follows:
RPI [ ] ≡ νn˜.(A1 | . . . | Al′ | Tσidti
idti /∈I2
| | (Uσidui
idui /∈I1
σri1σidti1 | . . . | Uσiduiσripiσidtipi ))
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A reputation context RPI [ ] is the process RP without all the processes of the par-
ties included in the set I; they are replaced by “holes”. We use this notation, for
instance, to enumerate all the sessions executed by the user idu1 without repeating
the entire reputation instance; in this case, we can rewrite the reputation instance as
RP{idu1}[Uσidu1σr11σidt11 | . . . Uσidu1σr1p1σidt1p1 ].
To define authentication properties, we use the following events:
− Event sent(idu, idt, r) emitted when the user idu sends a rate r (or sum of rates)
for the authority (or responsible party) to evaluate the target idt. This event is
emitted just before sending the message containing the rate.
− Event record(idu, idt, r) emitted when the rate r (or sum of rates) from the user
idu provided about the target idt is received by the authority (or the intended
party). This event is placed after receiving the rate and performs the required
checks before accepting it, if any.
− Event eligible(idu, idt) emitted when the user idu is certified as an eligible user to
provide a rate about the target idt. It is placed just before providing the credential
by the responsible party.
5.3.2 Authentication Properties
We define two authentication properties Rate Integrity and Rate Origin Authentication.
After placing the events inside the reputation processes, the authentication properties
can then be defined as follows.
Rate Integrity ensures that the rate is not altered and received by the responsible party
as provided by the user.
Definition 5.4. (Rate Integrity). A reputation protocol ensures Rate Integrity if
for any reputation process RP on every possible execution trace, each occurrence of the
event record(idu, idt, r) is preceded by a distinct occurrence of the corresponding event
sent(idu, idt, r).
Rate Origin Authentication ensures that only the users that have a certain credential
can provide a rate. The credential can be a certificate from an authority, an entry in a
database, or a proof which indicates that he has been interacted with the target.
Definition 5.5. (Rate Origin Authentication). A reputation protocol ensures Rate
Origin Authentication, if for any reputation process RP on every possible execution trace,
each occurrence of the event record(idu, idt, r) is preceded by a distinct occurrence of the
corresponding event eligible(idu, idt).
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5.3.3 Privacy Properties
We define six privacy properties: User Privacy, Rate Privacy, Rate Anonymity, Untrace-
ability, Receipt-Freeness, and Coercion-Resistance.
Definition 5.6. (User Privacy). A reputation protocol ensures User Privacy if for any
reputation process RP , any two users idu1, idu2, any target idt, and any rate r, we have
that: RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu1σrσidt|Tσidt] ≈l RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu2σrσidt|Tσidt].
The intuition is that if an attacker cannot detect if a rate is provided by a honest user
idu1 or by idu2, then he cannot know anything about the users idu1 and idu2. Note that
this definition is robust even in situations where only two users (idu1 or idu2) provide
rates, i.e., the context RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[ ] contains no honest user.
As already noted, in some protocols the User Privacy may hold even if the authorities
are dishonest, while other protocols may require the authorities to be honest. When
proving privacy, we choose which authorities we want to model as honest, by including
them inside the context RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[ ]. It is also particularly interesting for User
Privacy to consider a corrupted target t. This results in a similar definition but with a
process (Tσidt)ch1,ch2 instead of Tσidt. We can also consider corrupted users other than
idu1 and idu2, as well as, other corrupted targets than t.
Note that, User Privacy is a strong property to be satisfied by a protocol since user’s
identities may be revealed for an authority, and the target may knows the identity of all
the users interacted with him, and thus a set includes all those that rate him. A similar
property is Rate Privacy, which says that an attacker cannot know the rate provided by
a certain user.
Definition 5.7. (Rate Privacy). A reputation protocol ensures Rate Privacy if for
any reputation process RP , any user idu, any target idt, and any two rates r, r′, we have
that: RP{idu,idt}[Uσiduσrσidt|Tσidt] ≈l RP{idu,idt}[Uσiduσr′σidt|Tσidt].
Rate Privacy states that two processes with different rates have to be observationally
equivalent. Again, we can consider corrupted targets and corrupted users other than idu.
Note that like User Privacy, Rate Privacy is also strong. Consider for instance the case
where there is only one rate, then as the reputation score is published the rate provided
by the honest user can be obtained. A weaker property is Rate Anonymity which says
that an attacker cannot associate a certain rate to its corresponding user. Note that, an
attacker might know all users’ identities and all rates, but he cannot link between a user
and his rate.
Definition 5.8. (Rate Anonymity). A reputation protocol ensures Rate Anonymity,
if for any reputation process RP , any users idu1, idu2, any target idt, and any rates r1,
r2, we have that:
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RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu1σr1σidt|Uσidu2σr2σidt|Tσidt]
≈l
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu1σr2σidt|Uσidu2σr1σidt|Tσidt]
Rate Anonymity states that the process where user idu1 provides a rate r1 and user idu2
provides a rate r2 is equivalent to the process where idu1 provides a rate r2 and idu2
provides a rate r1. This prevents the attacker from obtaining the identity of the user who
provides a certain rate. Note that, a protocol that ensures User Privacy also ensures Rate
Anonymity. Similarly, a protocol that ensures Rate Privacy also ensures Rate Anonymity.
Theorem 5.1. A reputation protocol that satisfies User Privacy, also satisfies Rate
Anonymity.
Proof. Suppose that a reputation process satisfies User Privacy, then we have that
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu1σrσidt|Tσidt] ≈l RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu2σrσidt|Tσidt]
Let RP ′{idu1,idu2,idt}[ ] ≡ RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[ |Uσidu2σr2σidt|Tσidt] be an reputation con-
text where RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[ ] is any reputation context, idu1 and idu2 are any two users,
r is any rate, and t is any target. Then, by User Privacy, we have that:
RP ′{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu1σr1σidt] ≈l RP ′{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu2σr1σidt]
Thus, by substituting RP ′{idu1,idu2,idt}[ ] with its value we get:
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu1σr1σidt|Uσidu2σr2σidt|Tσidt]
≈l
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu2σr1σidt|Uσidu2σr2σidt|Tσidt]
Similarly, we have that
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu2σr1σidt|Uσidu2σr2σidt|Tσidt]
≈l
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu2σr1σidt|Uσidu1σr2σidt|Tσidt]
Hence, we can deduce that
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu1σr1σidt|Uσidu2σr2σidt|Tσidt]
≈l
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu2σr1σidt|Uσidu1σr2σidt|Tσidt]
Therefore, Rate Anonymity is satisfied by the reputation process.
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Theorem 5.2. A reputation protocol that satisfies Rate Privacy, also satisfies Rate
Anonymity.
Proof. Suppose that a reputation process satisfies Rate Privacy, then we have that
RP{idu,idt}[Uσiduσrσidt|Tσidt] ≈l RP{idu,idt}[Uσiduσr′σidt|Tσidt]
Let RP ′{idu1,idu2,idt}[ ] ≡ RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[ |Uσidu2σr2σidt|Tσidt] be an reputation con-
text where RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[ ] is any reputation context, idu1 and idu2 are any two users,
r is any rate, and t is any target. Then, by Rate Privacy, we have that:
RP ′{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu1σr1σidt] ≈l RP ′{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu1σr2σidt]
Thus, by substituting RP ′{idu1,idu2,idt}[ ] with its value we get:
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu1σr1σidt|Uσidu2σr2σidt|Tσidt]
≈l
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu1σr2σidt|Uσidu2σr2σidt|Tσidt]
Note that, only the rate provided by the user idu1 is changed from r1 in the left side to
r2 in the right one. The processes of idu2 and t are the same on both sides. Similarly, we
have that
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu1σr2σidt|Uσidu2σr2σidt|Tσidt]
≈l
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu1σr2σidt|Uσidu2σr1σidt|Tσidt]
Hence, we can deduce that
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu1σr1σidt|Uσidu2σr2σidt|Tσidt]
≈l
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu1σr2σidt|Uσidu2σr1σidt|Tσidt]
Therefore, Rate Anonymity is satisfied by the reputation process.
The next property is Untraceability which states that an attacker cannot decide whether
or not two rates have been produced by the same user.
Definition 5.9. (Untraceability). A reputation protocol ensures Untraceability if for
any reputation process RP , any two users idu1, idu2, any targets idt, idt11, . . . , idt1m1,
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idt21, . . . , idt2m2, and any rates r, r11, . . . , r1m1, r21, . . . , r2m2 , we have that:
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[ | Uσidu1
0≤i≤m1
σr1iσidt1i | Tσidt1i
0≤i≤m1
| Uσidu2
0≤i≤m2
σr2iσidt2i | Tσidt2i
0≤i≤m2
| Uσidu1σrσidt]
≈l
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[ | Uσidu1
0≤i≤m1
σr1iσidt1i | Tσidt1i
0≤i≤m1
| Uσidu2
0≤i≤m2
σr2iσidt2i | Tσidt2i
0≤i≤m2
| Uσidu2σrσidt]
Untraceability ensures that the process in which the user idu1 provides m1 + 1 rates,
while idu2 provides m2 rates, is equivalent to the process in which the user idu1 provides
m1 rates, while idu2 provides m2 + 1 rates. The intuition is that an attacker cannot
distinguish whether idu1 or idu2 provides a rate r even if both users previously provided
some rates. Note that, a protocol that satisfies Untraceability also satisfies User Privacy,
as User Privacy is a special case of Untraceability for m1 = m2 = 0, i.e., when the two
honest users do not provide any previous rates.
For Receipt-Freeness and Coercion-Resistance we follow the definitions introduced
in [DKR09]. A protocol is receipt-free, if an attacker cannot distinguish between a
situation where a user idu1 provides a rate rc according to the attacker’s wishes and
reveals his data on a channel ch, and a situation where idu1 actually provides a rate r1
of his choice and pretends to reveal his secret data (this is modeled by process U ′). The
process U ′ is a process in which user idu1 provides a rate r1, but communicates with the
attacker (coercer) to trick him by saying that his desired rate rc is provided. This can
be done by providing the attacker a fake receipt, e.g., using a trapdoor to generate a
different opening key.
Definition 5.10. (Receipt-Freeness). A reputation protocol ensures Receipt-Freeness
if for any reputation process RP , any users idu1, idu2, any target idt, and any rates r1,
rc, there exists a closed plain process U ′ such that:
− U ′\out(ch,.) ≈l Uσidu1σr1σidt, and
− RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[(Uσidu1σrcσidt)ch|Uσidu2σr1σidt|Tσidt]
≈l RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[U ′|Uσidu2σrcσidt|Tσidt].
The user idu2 is needed to provide a counterbalancing rate. Note that, Receipt-Freeness
is stronger than Rate Anonymity.
Theorem 5.3. A reputation protocol that satisfies Receipt-Freeness, also satisfies Rate
Anonymity.
Proof. Suppose that a reputation process satisfies Receipt-Freeness then, by Defini-
tion 5.10, there exists a closed plain process U ′ such that:
− U ′\out(ch,.) ≈l Uσidu1σr1σidt, and (1)
147
Chapter 5. e-Reputation Protocols
− RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[(Uσidu1σrcσidt)ch|Uσidu2σr1σidt|Tσidt]
≈l RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[U ′|Uσidu2σrcσidt|Tσidt]. (2)
Thus, by applying the evaluation context C ≡ νch.( | !in(ch, x)) on both sides of (2), we
get1:
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[(Uσidu1σrcσidt)
ch|Uσidu2σr1σidt|Tσidt]\out(ch,·)
≈l
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[U
′|Uσidu2σrcσidt|Tσidt]\out(ch,·)
In the other hand, we have, by Lemma 2.2, that
C[RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[(Uσidu1σrcσidt)ch|Uσidu2σr1σidt|Tσidt]]
≡
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[C[(Uσidu1σrcσidt)ch|Uσidu2σr1σidt|Tσidt]]
Thus,
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[(Uσidu1σrcσidt)
ch|Uσidu2σr1σidt|Tσidt]\out(ch,·)
≡
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[((Uσidu1σrcσidt)
ch)\out(ch,·)|Uσidu2σr1σidt|Tσidt]
Similarly, we get:
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[U
′|Uσidu2σrcσidt|Tσidt]\out(ch,·)
≡
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[(U
′)\out(ch,·)|Uσidu2σrcσidt|Tσidt]
Hence, by comparison on (≡), we have that:
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[((Uσidu1σrcσidt)
ch)\out(ch,·)|Uσidu2σr1σidt|Tσidt]
≡
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[(U
′)\out(ch,·)|Uσidu2σrcσidt|Tσidt]
Lastly, since U ′\out(ch,.) ≈l Uσidu1σr1σidt by (1), and (P ch)\out(ch,·) ≈l P for any closed
plain process P such that ch /∈ fn(P ) ∪ bn(P ) by Lemma 2.1, we get:
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu1σrcσidt|Uσidu2σr1σidt|Tσidt]
≡
RP{idu1,idu2,idt}[Uσidu1σr1σidt|Uσidu2σrcσidt|Tσidt]
Therefore, Rate Anonymity is satisfied by the protocol.
1 Note that, we have A\out(ch,·) ≡ νch.(A | !in(ch, x)) by Definition 2.3
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A property stronger than Receipt-Freeness is Coercion-Resistance which preserves rate
anonymity in the case where the attacker cannot only ask for a receipt, but is also allowed
to interact with the user during the rating process and to provide the messages the user
should send.
Definition 5.11. (Coercion-Resistance). A reputation protocol ensures Coercion-
Resistance if for any reputation process RP , and any rates r1, rc there exists a closed
plain process U ′ such that for any σr, a plain process P , and context C = νch1.νch2.( |P )
satisfying n˜ ∩ fn(C) = ∅ and
RPI [C[(Uσidu1σrσidt)ch1,ch2 ]|Uσidu2σr1σidt|Tσidt]
≈l
RPI [(Uσidu1σrcσidt)
ch|Uσidu2σr1σidt|Tσidt]
where I = {idu1, idu2, idt}, we have that:
− C[U ′]\out(ch,.) ≈l Uσidu1σr1σidt, and
− RPI [C[(Uσidu1σrσidt)ch1,ch2 ]|Uσidu2σr1σidt|Tσidt] ≈l RPI [C[U ′]|Uσidu2σrcσidt|Tσidt].
The context C models the attacker’s behaviors which tries to force the user to provide
a rate rc. Note that, no matter what rate the user idu1 intends to provide (σr), the
attacker will force him to provide the rate rc. U ′ is a process that provides a rate r1 of
user’s choice and at the same time fakes the attacker. Coercion-Resistance is satisfied
when the attacker cannot distinguishes between process U ′ and a really coerced voter.
Again a counterbalancing rate is required.
Theorem 5.4. A reputation protocol that satisfies Coercion-Resistance, also satisfies
Receipt-Freeness.
Proof. Suppose that a reputation process satisfies Coercion-Resistance, and let C =
νch1.νch2.( |P ) be an evaluation context from some plain process P such that
RPI [C[(Uσidu1σrσidt)ch1,ch2 ]|Uσidu2σr1σidt|Tσidt]
≈l
RPI [(Uσidu1σrcσidt)
ch|Uσidu2σr1σidt|Tσidt] (1)
where I = {idu1, idu2, idt}. Then, by Definition 5.11, we have that:
− C[U ′]\out(ch,.) ≈l Uσidu1σr1σidt, and
− RPI [C[(Uσidu1σrσidt)ch1,ch2 ]|Uσidu2σr1σidt|Tσidt] ≈l RPI [C[U ′]|Uσidu2σrcσidt|Tσidt]
Thus, by (1) and transitivity on (≈l) we get:
− C[U ′]\out(ch,.) ≈l Uσidu1σr1σidt, and
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UntraceabilityCoercion-Resistance
User PrivacyReceipt-Freeness Rate Anonymity
Rate Privacy
Figure 5.1: Relations between privacy properties of reputation protocols.
− RPI [(Uσidu1σrcσidt)ch|Uσidu2σr1σidt|Tσidt] ≈l RPI [C[U ′]|Uσidu2σrcσidt|Tσidt]
Now, let U ′′ = C[U ′], hence:
− (U ′′)\out(ch,.) ≈l Uσidu1σr1σidt, and
− RPI [(Uσidu1σrcσidt)ch|Uσidu2σr1σidt|Tσidt] ≈l RPI [U ′′|Uσidu2σrcσidt|Tσidt]
Therefore, Receipt-Freeness is satisfied by the protocol.
Figure 5.1 shows all the relations we have shown between our privacy properties for
reputation protocols.
5.4 Verifiability in Reputation
In this section, first we define an abstract model of reputation protocols, which defines
the data involved in a reputation instance (e.g., list of provided rates), as well as, some
black box functions to perform some computations or checks on these data. Then, we
define at high level two verifiability properties which allow a party to check the eligibility
of users that provide rates and the correctness of reputation scores.
Definition 5.12. (Reputation Protocol). A reputation protocol is a tuple (U, T, A, L,
isEligible, compRep, rs) where
− U is the set of users.
− T is the target.
− A is the authority.
− L : List(Rate) is a list of rates provided by the users in U about the target T;
− isEligible : Rate 7→ {true, false} is a function which takes a rate and outputs
true if the rate was provided by an eligible user, and false otherwise.
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− compRep is a function that computes the reputation score given a list of rates L.
− rs is a variable referring to the reputation score assigned to the target, i.e., the
published score;
The function compRep may simply compute the summation of all the rates, but it may
also perform more complex operations to determine the value of the reputation score. An
eligible user, e.g., is a user that has successfully finished an interaction with the target T.
Note that, our definition of reputation protocol does not specify how the users and the
targets interacts before the rating procedure starts. For example, the user may purchase
some goods from the target.
We define the verification properties using tests. A test is an algorithm that takes as
input the data visible to a participate of the reputation protocol and returns a boolean
value (true or false). The first verifiability property is User Eligibility Verification which
allows any party to check if every counted was provided by an eligible user.
Definition 5.13. (User Eligibility Verification). A reputation protocol ensures User
Eligibility Verification if there exists a test UEV respecting the following conditions:
− Soundness: UEV = true⇒ ∀r ∈ L, isEligible(r) = true;
− Completeness: if all participants follow the protocol correctly, then
∀r ∈ L, isEligible(r) = true⇒ UEV = true.
The second verifiability property is Reputation Score Verification which allows any party
to verify the correctness of the target’s reputation score.
Definition 5.14. (Reputation Score Verification). A reputation protocol ensures
Reputation Score Verification if there exists a test RSV respecting the following conditions:
− Soundness: RSV = true⇒ rs = compRep(L);
− Completeness: if all participants follow the protocol correctly, then
rs = compRep(L)⇒ RSV = true.
5.5 Case Study: Protocol by Pavlov et al. [PRT04]
In this section, we applied our definitions using ProVerif on (the first) reputation protocol
proposed by Pavlov et al. in [PRT04]. This protocol was designed to provide privacy
of the rates in decentralized additive reputation systems if all users follow the protocol
correctly, i.e., all users are honest. It also assumes that all users provide honest rating
about the target (i.e., rating that correctly reflects their satisfaction), as the protocol
cannot prevent the users from providing an unfair rating to increase (resp. decrease) the
reputation score of the target more (resp. less) than its real value.
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Description. The basic idea behind the protocol is to consider the rate provided by
each user to be his secret information. The rates are cumulatively added to each other,
without revealing them, to obtain a sum that represents the reputation score of the target.
The protocol is initiated by a querying agent Aq looking to know the reputation score of
the target, and proceeded as follows.
1. Initialization Step: the querying agent Aq orders the users in a ring: Aq → U1 →
, . . . ,→ Un → Aq, and sends to each user Ui the identity of his successor in the
ring, i.e., for i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} it sends the identity of Ui+1 to Ui, and for Un it
sends its identity.
2. Aq chooses a random number rq 6= 0 and sends it to U1.
3. Upon reception of rp from his predecessor in the ring, each user Ui for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
calculates rp + ri and sends the obtained value to his successor in the ring, where
ri is the reputation rate of the user Ui about the target.
4. Upon reception of the feedback from Un, Aq subtracts rq from it in order to obtain
the reputation score of the target represented by the sum of all rates.
To ensure secrecy and authentication, the designers of the protocol assume an authenti-
cated secure channel between every two users.
Formal Model. Generally, it is difficult to model arithmetic operations in formal
protocol provers such as ProVerif. However, we build a simple equational theory, depicted
in Figure 5.2, which handles the required arithmetics to verify the Pavlov et al. protocol
for the case where we have two users U1 and U2 in addition to the querying agent. Note
that, we use the same model to verify authentication and privacy properties, as well as,
verifiability properties.
We model the protocol in ProVerif using a well-known equational theory for symmetric
encryption (functions senc and sdec), senc(m, k) represents the symmetric encryption
of the message m with the key k and sdec represents the decryption function; and an
equational theory for arithmetic addition and subtraction (functions sum and sub). The
function sum takes two values x and y and return their sum sum(x, y). Having x or y we
can obtain the other one from sum(x, y) using the function sub. Similarly, we can obtain
sum(y, z) and sum(x, z) from sum(sum(x, y), z) having x and y respectively. Note that
with our equational theory, having x or y, one cannot obtain sum(z, y) or sum(z, x) from
sum(z, sum(x, y)). Solving this requires two additional equations similar to the last two
equations shown in Figure 5.2. One could ask why we do not model sum as a commutative
function, i.e., sum(x, y) = sum(y, x), which solves this problem and moreover allows us
to represent the subtraction using only two equations instead of four. This is due to a
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ProVerif limitation as this solution causes non termination. Note that in our model, we
provide the value rp received by the user process Ui as the first argument to the function
sum, and his rate ri as the second argument. Thus, such a term sum(z, sum(x, y)) does
not appear between the messages involved in our model of the protocol.
sdec(senc(m, k), k) = m
sub(sum(x, y), x) = y
sub(sum(x, y), y) = x
sub(sum(sum(x, y), z), x) = sum(y, z)
sub(sum(sum(x, y), z), y) = sum(x, z)
Figure 5.2: Equational theory for our model of Pavlov et al. protocol.
An alternative equational theory could model the sum of two values x and y as their
exclusive-or (XOR), i.e., xor(x, y) instead of sum(x, y). In this case the subtraction will
be represented by another XOR application, i.e., xor(xor(x, y), y) = x. However, there
are currently no tools that support the algebraic properties of XOR operator and at
the same time support observational equivalence – needed for the privacy properties.
Küsters et al. [KT11] have shown how to reduce the derivation problem for Horn theories
with XOR to the XOR-free case. Their reduction allows one to carry out the analysis of
the protocols that involve XOR operator using tools, such as ProVerif. However, their
result is valid only with secrecy and authentication properties, but not with equivalence
properties.
We assume that all the parties (querying agent and users) are honest. To model the
authenticated secure channel, we assume that all messages are exchanged encrypted with
a shared symmetric key, which ensures the secrecy of the messages. Moreover, we assume
that the unique identities of the sender and the receiver are included in the message. This
allows the receiver to authenticate the sender, and also ensures that the message will
considered only by the intended receiver as all users are honest.
Analysis. The results of our analysis is detailed below. A summery for the results is
shown in Table 5.1.
User Privacy: ProVerif shows that User Privacy is not satisfied, simply since the set of
all users’ identities that provides rates on the target is public (at least known by the
querying agent).
Rate Privacy: in case where we have only one user, it is clear that we do not have
Rate Privacy as the reputation score will be equal to the rate of this user, and thus the
querying agent can knows this rate. We show, using ProVerif, that the protocol ensures
Rate Privacy in the case of two users (other than the querying agent). As we already
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Property Result Time
User Privacy × < 1 s
Rate Privacy X < 1 s
Rate Anonymity X < 1 s
Untraceability × -
Receipt-Freeness × -
Coercion-Resistance × -
Rate Origin Authentication X < 1 s
Rate Integrity∗ X < 1 s
User Eligibility Verification × < 1 s
Reputation Score Verification X < 1 s
Table 5.1: Results of our analysis on the formal model of the Pavlov et al. protocol.
(∗) means that without injectivity. (-) indicates that the property is not verified using
ProVerif.
mentioned, to model the authenticated channel we add the identities to the messages.
Note that, if the identity of the receiver is removed from the messages, the attacker can
re-direct the message sent by the first user, which contains sum(rq, r1), to the querying
agent instead of the second user, and thus the rate of the first user will be enclosed to
the querying agent even if he acts honestly. A similar attack will enclose the rate of the
last user (herein user two) if the attacker re-direct the first message by querying agent,
which contains rq to the last user. To make the attack on the intermediate users (in
case of more than two users) the attacker needs two sessions to be initiated by the same
querying agent. Note that, in all these attacks the rate will only enclosed to the querying
agent and not to the attacker unless that the obtained reputation score is published by
the querying agent.
Rate Anonymity: ProVerif shows that the protocol ensures Rate Anonymity in the case
of two users (other than the querying agent).
Untraceability: since User Privacy is not satisfied Untraceability is also not satisfied.
Receipt-Freeness: the protocol does not ensure Receipt-Freeness since the shared key k
can be used as a receipt which allows the attacker to enclose the value of the message
received by the victim user and that sent by him, then subtract them from each other to
check whether the difference is equal to the rate rc he wants, or not. Note that, the user
cannot lie about the key by giving the attacker an different key k′ unless he can obtain a
key k′ 6= k such that rc = sub(sdec(senc(sum(rp, ri), k), k′), sdec(senc(rp, k), k′)) where
ri is the user’s rate, and rp is the sum he received from his predecessor.
Coercion-Resistance: as Receipt-Freeness does not hold, then Coercion-Resistance also
does not hold since by the Theorem 5.4 if a protocol ensures Coercion-Resistance then it
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also ensures Receipt-Freeness.
Rate Origin Authentication: we show with ProVerif that Rate Origin Authentication is
ensured by the protocol. We assume that the users included in the ring are eligible as
they are registered in a certain database. Thus, the event eligible is emitted when the
querying agent chooses the user as a node in the ring. The event record emitted when
the rate is received by his successor in the ring (actually the summation of all previous
rates is received).
Rate Integrity: we check the integrity of the messages exchanged between the parties
(querying agent and users). Thus events are placed in both querying agent and user
processes. ProVerif shows that the integrity of the messages is preserved if the correspon-
dence is modeled without injectivity, and terms types (sorts) are respected. Note that,
the injectivity does not hold since the attacker can re-play the message several times, and
thus we will have several emissions of the event record preceded by only one emission of
event sent. Note also that a flaw exists if we ignore the types of the terms: for example,
the first message sent by the querying agent to the first user to inform him about the
identity of his successor might be received by this user as a rate rq, which has a different
type. Thus, the event record will be emitted but not the event sent.
User Eligibility Verification: users do not provide any proof (e.g., certificate) which
could allow one to verify their eligibility (i.e., they have been interacted with the target).
Actually, the protocol assumes a set of eligible users each with a certain rate. Note that,
as user eligibility is ensured, according to the definition of User Eligibility Verification
the test that always gives true is sound and complete. However, this test is dummy as it
does not provide any information for the verifier to be sure about user’s eligibility.
Reputation Score Verification: the users can only get the reputation score, however they
have no means to check if this score is calculated correctly from the users rates. However,
if the rates are published encrypted, with a certain key whose public part is known, in a
Bulletin Board then we can design a test that allows the users to verify the reputation
score. The test takes users’ rates and the reputation score of the target, and simply
checks if the summation of all rates is equal to the score. Note that, verifiability could
destroys the privacy of the rates. We show using ProVerif that such a test is sound and
complete.
5.6 Conclusion
We set the first research step on the formal understanding of e-reputation systems, and
establishes a framework for the analysis of their security requirements. In particular, we
show how to model reputation protocols in the Applied pi-Calculus, and how security
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properties such as privacy, authentication, and verifiability properties can be expressed.
We validate our model and definitions by analyzing, using ProVerif, the security of an
e-reputation protocol, the protocol by Pavlov et al. [PRT04]. It has been informally
argued to preserve rate privacy. Our analysis shows that it satisfies five properties,
namely Rate Privacy, Rate Anonymity, and Rate Origin Authentication, Rate Integrity
(without injectivity), and Reputation Score Verification (if users can have an access to
the set of rates). While it fails to satisfy the other five: User Privacy, Untraceability,
Receipt-Freeness, Coercion-Resistance, and User Eligibility Verification.
As a future work it would be interesting to analyze more e-reputation protocols. Several
e-reputation protocols are highly depends on algebraic properties such as arithmetic
operations and homomorphic encryptions, e.g. [PRT04,HBBS13,AGLM+13b,BSS10].
Developing automatic tools that can deal with these properties is still a real challenge for
the community. However, researches goes some way in the direction of finding solutions
for such a problem, for instance the result obtained by Küsters et al. [KT11] allows us
to analyze secrecy and authentication properties for protocols with XOR operator using
ProVerif.
156
Chapter6
Analyzing Routing Protocols in Presence
of Multiple Independent Attackers
Several cryptographic routing protocols aim at ensuring the route validity in a network,
i.e., ensuring that the established route is an existing path in the network. However,
flaws have been found in some protocols that are claimed secure. Cortier et al. [CDD12]
show that when looking for attacks on properties such as route validity, it is sufficient
to consider only five typologies with four nodes each. The authors assume cooperative
attackers, i.e., several attackers (compromised nodes) that share their knowledge using
out-of-band resources or hidden channel. In this chapter, we extend their result to the
case of non-cooperative attackers where several independent attackers that do not share
their knowledge are considered. Such non-cooperative model is more realistic, particularly
in the case of wireless sensor networks where nodes have low communication powers.
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6.1 Introduction
Wireless ad-hoc networks have no existing infrastructure. This enables them to play a more
and more important role in extending the coverage of traditional wireless infrastructure
(e.g., cellular networks, wireless LAN, etc.). These networks have no central administration
control, and thus the presence of dynamic and adaptive routing protocol is necessary for
them to work properly. Routing protocols aim to establish a route between distant nodes,
enabling wireless nodes to communicate with the nodes that are outside their transmission
range. As an example of routing protocols, we describe the Secure Routing Protocol
SRP [PH02] applied on the Dynamic Source Routing protocol DSR [JMB01]. SRP is
actually not a routing protocol by itself. However, it can be applied to an on-demand
source routing protocol, such as DSR, in order to obtain a secure variant of this protocol.
DSR is a protocol which is used when the source node (S) wants to communicate with
another non-neighbor node, the destination node (D). DSR consists of two phases: the
request phase, and the reply phase. After applying SRP, the two phases are as follows
(assuming that each node already knows its neighbors).
− Request phase: The source node S broadcasts to its neighbors the request message:
〈req, S,D, Id, [S], hmac(〈req, S,D, Id〉,KSD)〉, where req is an identifier indicating
the request phase, [S] is the initial route list, hmac is a message authentication
code (MAC) function, and KSD is a symmetric key shared between S and D. Then,
each intermediate node that receives the request, locally checks the route list: if the
last (added) node in the list is one of its neighbors, then it broadcasts the request
after appending its name (identifier) to the list, and drops the request message
otherwise.
− Reply phase: Once the request reaches the destination D, it checks that the last
node in the route is one of its neighbors, and that the MAC is correct. Then,
D constructs a route reply, in particular it computes a new hmac over the route
accumulated in the request message and sends the following message back over the
network: 〈rep,D, S, Id, l, hmac(〈rep,D, S, Id, l〉,KSD)〉, where rep is an identifier
indicating the reply phase, l is the obtained route list. Then, each intermediate
node checks if its name appears in the route list between two of its neighbors, if so
it forwards the message to the next node. Once the source S receives a message
containing a route to D. Before accepting, it checks that the MAC is correct, that
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the route does not contain loops, and that its neighbor in the route is indeed one of
its neighbor in the network.
Security of routing protocols is a crucial for wireless ad-hoc networks since attacking
routing protocol may disable the whole network operation. For example, forcing two
nodes to believe in an invalid route (i.e., a route that does not represent a real path in
the network) will prevent them from communicating with each other. Several routing
protocols [PH02,HPJ05,SDL+02] have been proposed to provide more guarantees on the
resulting route in ad-hoc networks. However, they may still be subject to attacks. For
example, a flaw has been discovered on SRP when applied to DSR allowing an attacker
to modify the route [BV04], thus forcing the source node to believe in an invalid route.
Another attack has also been found on the Ariadne protocol [HPJ05] in the same paper.
This shows that, like other cryptographic protocols, designing routing protocols is a
difficult and error-prone task. Thus, they have to be formally verified before they are
used. However, decision procedures (e.g., [Bla01,RT01]) that are applied on standard
protocols such as confidentiality and secrecy, and tools such as AVISPA, ProVerif, and
Scyther are not well-adapted to the case of routing protocols. A main reason for this is
that, in contrast to standard security protocols where the attacker is assumed to control
all the communications, an attacker for routing protocols has to be localized somewhere
in the network. Thus, it can only control a finite number of nodes, and only listen to the
messages sent by the nodes that are neighbors to the compromised nodes.
In 2010, Arnaud et al. [ACD10] proposed an NP decision procedure for analyzing
routing protocols looking for attacks on route validity. However, in case of routing
protocols the existence of an attack strongly depends on the network topology, i.e., how
nodes are connected and where malicious (compromised) nodes are located. This results
in an infinite number of network topologies to verify, which is not tractable. Later in
2012, Cortier et al. [CDD12] proposed a reduction proof when looking for route validity
property in presence of cooperative attackers that share their knowledge using out-of-band
resources. The applied reduction technique results in only five topologies with four nodes
each. However, it is not always realistic to consider cooperative attackers as this may
results in an unpractical attacks. As an example, consider the case of ad-hoc sensors
that are thrown from a plane into the enemy field during a battle. Indeed, due to their
minimal configuration and quick deployment ad-hoc networks are suitable for emergency
situations like natural disasters or military conflicts where no infrastructure is available.
Thus, usually it is difficult to have out-of-band resources between malicious nodes. Note
that, using hidden channels (e.g., running other instances of routing protocol and using
the obtained route) is unfeasible in some cases where nodes have low power capabilities
(e.g., sensor networks).
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6.1.1 Contributions
In this chapter, we consider route validity property in presence of multiple independent
(non-cooperative) attackers, i.e., attackers that can not share their knowledge between
each other. Then, we show that the reduction result obtained by Cortier et al. in [CDD12]
in presence of cooperative attackers is also applicable to the case of the independent
attackers. As the original paper the reduction proof consists of two steps: firstly, we
show that if there is an attack on a routing protocol in a certain topology, then there
is an attack on this protocol in a smaller topology obtained from the original topology
by a simple reduction. Secondly, we show that applying the reduction procedure to
any topology leads to (at most) five small topologies. We use the process calculus and
the transition rules (after updating them to handle the behavior of the non-cooperative
malicious nodes instead of the cooperative ones) presented in [CDD12], which are adapted
to model routing protocols. Finally, we prove that a protocol satisfies the route validity
property in presence of cooperative attackers in every network topology, if and only if,
it satisfies the route validity in presence of non-cooperative attackers in every network
topology.
6.1.2 Related work
Multiple attackers that do not share their knowledge are already considered in [ACRT11]
to analyze the web-service applications looking for attacks that exploit XML format.
Verifying protocols (for properties such as route validity) in presence of multiple inde-
pendent attacker is equivalent to satisfiability of general constraints where knowledge
monotonicity does not hold. The satisfiability of such kind of constraints has been proven
to be NP-complete [Maz05,ACRT11]. However, in the case of routing protocols an infinite
number of topologies have to be considered.
Some case studies and formal techniques dedicated for analyzing routing protocols
have been proposed. For example, Ács et al. [ÁBV06] have developed a framework for
analyzing on-demand source routing protocols. Benetti et al. [BMV10] have analyzed
the ARAN [SLD+05] and endairA [ÁBV06] protocols with the AVISPA tool, and have
discovered three attacks on ARAN protocol. Nanz and Hankin [NH06a] have proposed
a formal framework for analyzing routing protocols of mobile wireless networks, and
have shown how to automatically analyze a finite number of attack scenarios. Arnaud et
al. [ACD10] have proposed an NP decision procedure for analyzing routing protocols for
a finite number of sessions.
Few other works have presented reduction results in context of routing protocols. The
first such approach was proposed by Andel et al. [ABY11]. They have shown how to
reduce the number of network topologies one has to consider, taking advantage of the
symmetries. However, the total number of networks is still large even when considering a
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bounded number of nodes. Recently, Cortier et al. [CDD12] have shown that only five
topologies (four nodes each) need to be considered when looking for attacks on route
validity in presence of attackers that share their knowledge. We show that the reduction
proof presented in [CDD12] can be extended to the case of multiple independent attackers
that do not share their knowledge. Note that, none of the previously mentioned work on
routing protocols consider independent attackers.
6.1.3 Outline
In Section 6.2, we recall the syntax of the process calculus we use, and show how a routing
protocol can be modeled using this calculus. We define route validity property and the
corresponding attack in Section 6.3. Then in Section 6.4, we present a reduction proof
and show that only five topologies are sufficient. Next in Section 6.5, we show that, for
every network, a protocol satisfies route validity in presence of cooperative attackers, if
and only if, it satisfies route validity in presence of non-cooperative attackers. Finally, we
conclude in Section 6.6.
6.2 Modelling Routing Protocols
The Applied pi-Calculus we used in previous chapters to model standard cryptographic
protocols, and other calculi that have been proposed for the same purpose (e.g., [AG97,
MPW92]) are not well-adapted for routing protocols. For instance, in routing protocols
the nodes have to perform some specific checks (e.g., checking that a route is loop free, or
that two nodes are neighbors) that cannot be easily modeled in such calculi. Moreover,
network topology and broadcast communications have to be taken into account. A
process calculus that is adapted to model routing protocol (and which follows the Applied
pi-Calculus) is presented in [CDD12] 1. In this section, we recall the syntax of this calculus,
then we adapt the related execution model to the case of multiple independent attackers
(instead of attackers that share their knowledge).
6.2.1 Syntax
Similar to Applied pi-Calculus, terms and function symbols are respectively used to
represent messages and cryptographic primitives. Terms are names, variables, or function
symbols applied to names and variables. An infinite set of names N and an infinite set of
variables X are considered. A term is ground if it does not contain any variable. Each
function symbol has a certain arity, and can only applied to terms of specific types (sorts).
1 Note that, this calculus generalize the calculus give in [ACD10], which is is inspired by CBS# [NH06b],
by allowing processes to perform any operation on the terms they receive and considering an arbitrary
signature of function symbols.
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Two special types are assumed: the type Agent that only contains agent’s names and
variables, and the type Term that subsumes all other types so that any term is of the
type Term.
Example 6.1. (Signature [CDD12]). A typical signature for representing the prim-
itives used in SRP protocol is the signature ΣSRP = {hmac(·, ·), 〈·, ·〉, · :: ·, [], req, rep},
where req and rep are unitary constants identify the request and response phases respec-
tively, [] represents an empty list and other symbols are defined as follows:
〈·, ·〉 : Term× Term→ Term · :: · : Agent× List→ List
hmac(·, ·) : Term× Term→ Term
The symbol hmac(·, ·) takes two terms and computes the message authentication code of
the first term with the second one as a key. The operator 〈·, ·〉 produces a concatenation
of two terms, and the operator · :: · is the list constructor. We write 〈t1, t2, t3〉 for the
term 〈〈t1, t2〉, t3〉 , and [t1, t2, t3] for (([] :: t1) :: t2) :: t3.
Substitutions (σ) are well-sorted, and cycle-free. A substitution σ is extended to a
homomorphism on functions, processes and terms as expected. Two terms t and s are
unifiable if there exists a substitution θ, called unifier, such that θ(t) = θ(s). The most
general unifier (for short mgu) of two terms t and s is a unifier, denoted mgu(t, s), such
that for any unifier θ of t and s there exists a substitution σ with θ = σ ◦ mgu(t, s)
where ◦ is a composition of two mappings. We write mgu(t, s) =⊥ when t and s are not
unifiable.
The calculus is parameterized by a set P of predicates to represent the checks performed
by the agents, and a set F of functions over terms to represent the computations
performed by the agents. The set of functions F contains functions that are more
complex than basic cryptographic primitives represented by Σ, for example a function
f : (x, y, z) 7→ hmac(〈x, y〉, z) which takes three terms, concatenates the first two and
then computes the MAC over them with the third term. They can also be used to model
operations on lists, for example we can define a function that takes a list [A1, . . . , An]
and returns its reverse [An, . . . , A1].
The intended behavior of each node in the network can be modeled by a process
defined using the grammar given in Figure 6.1. The process out(f(t1, . . . , tn)).P computes
the term t = f(t1, . . . , tn), emits t, and then behaves like P . The reception process
in(t).P expects a message m matching the pattern t and then behaves like σ(P ) where
σ = mgu(m, t). The process “if Φ then P ” behaves like P if Φ is true. Two processes P
and Q running in parallel represented by the process P |Q. The replication process !P
denotes an infinite number of copies of P , all running in parallel. The process new m.P
creates a fresh name m and then behaves like P . Sometimes, for the sake of clarity we
omit the null process. A ground process P is a process that have no free variables (we
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P,Q ::= Processes
0 null process.
out(f(t1, . . . , tn)).P emission
in(t).P reception
if Φ then P conditional
P |Q parallel composition.
!P replication
new m.P fresh name generation
where t, t1, . . . , tn are terms, m is a name, f ∈ F , and
Φ is a formula:
Φ,Φ1,Φ2 ::= Formula
p(t′1, . . . , t′n) p ∈ P, t′1, . . . , t′n are terms
Φ1 ∧ Φ2 conjunction
Figure 6.1: Processes grammar
denote free variables of P by fv(P )), and a parameterized process P (x1, . . . , xn) is a
process that has n variables x1, . . . , xn of type Agent, and such that fv(P ) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xn}.
A routing role is a parameterized process that does not contain any name of type Agent.
A routing protocol is then simply a set of routing roles.
The predicates p ∈ P are given together with their semantics that may depend on the
underlying graph G that models the topology of the network. Such a graph G = (E, V ) is
given by a set of vertices V ⊆ {A ∈ N | A of type Agent}, and a set of edges E ⊆ V × V
where E is a reflexive and symmetric relation. There are two kinds of predicates: a set
PI of predicates whose semantics is independent of the graph and a set PD of predicates
whose semantics is dependent on the graph. For a graph dependent formula Φ and a
graph G, JΦKG = true (resp. false) denotes that Φ is true (resp. false) in G.
Example 6.2. (Predicates [CDD12]). For example, one can use the predicates
PSRP = PI ∪ PD for SRP, with PI = {checksrc, checkdest} and PD = {check, checkl}.
The purpose of the PI predicates is to model some checks that are performed by the source
when it receives the route. The semantics of these predicates is defined as follows:
− checksrc(S, l) = true, if and only if, l is of type List and its first element is S,
− checkdest(D, l) = true, if and only if, l is of type List and its last element is D (i.e.,
l = l1 :: D where l1 is of type List).
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The predicates checksrc(S, l) and checkdest(D, l) are used by the source process to verify
that the first and last nodes of the established route are the source and destination of
the route discovery respectively. While, the purpose of the PD predicates is to model
neighborhood checks. Given a graph G = (V,E), their semantics is defined as follows:
− Jcheck(A,B)KG = true, if and only if, (A,B) ∈ E or (B,A) ∈ E,
− Jcheckl(C, l)KG = true, if and only if, C appears in l, and for any l′ subterm of l
we have (A,C) ∈ E if l′ = l1 :: A :: C and (C,B) ∈ E if l′ = l1 :: C :: B.
The aim of the predicate Jcheck(A,B)KG is to check if A and B are neighbors in G, while
the aim of the predicate Jcheckl(C, l)KG is to check if the node C appears in l between two
neighbors in G. We assume that each node knows its neighbors in the network, this can
be achieved by running a certain neighbor discovery protocol in advance.
The secure routing protocol SRP applied on DSR has been modeled in [CDD12]. Here
we give only the source process as an example.
Example 6.3. (SRP Source Process [CDD12]). Considering the signature ΣSRP
and the predicates PSRP introduced before, and the set FSRP of functions over terms that
only contains the identity function (omitted for sake of clarity), the process played by the
source xS initiating the search of a route towards a destination xD is given as follows:
Psrc(xS , xD) = new id.out(u1).in(u2).if ΦS then 0
where id is a constant that identifies the request, xS and xD are variables of type Agent,
xL is a variable of type List, and u1, u2 and ΦS are defined as follows:
u1 = 〈req, xS , xD, id, [] :: xS , hmac(〈req, xS , xD, id〉, kxSxD)〉
u2 = 〈req, xD, xS , id, xL, hmac(〈req, xD, xS , id, xL〉, kxSxD)〉
ΦS = checkl(xS , xL) ∧ checksrc(xS , xL) ∧ checkdest(xD, xL)
6.2.2 Attacker Capabilities
We consider multiple independent attackers that do not have the ability to share knowledge
between each other using any out-of-band-resources or hidden channels. Each attacker
compromises a node in the network, and thus can only listen and send messages to its
neighbors. We assume that the capabilities of each attacker are modeled by a deduction
relation `. The relation I ` t means that the term t is deducible from the set of terms I.
Such a deduction relation can be defined through an inference system, i.e., a finite set
of rules of the form
t1 · · · tn
t
, where t, t1, . . . , tn are of type Term. It follows that I ` t if
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there exists a proof tree with a root labeled by t and leaves labeled by t′ ∈ I and every
intermediate node is an instance of one of the rules of the inference system.
Example 6.4. (Inference System [CDD12]). One can associate to the SRP signature
ΣSRP , the following inference system:
t ∈ I
I ` t
I ` t1 I ` t2
I ` 〈t1, t2〉
I ` 〈t1, t2〉
I ` ti
i ∈ {1, 2}
I ` l1 I ` l2
I ` l1 :: l2
l1 :: l2
li
i ∈ {1, 2}
I ` t1 I ` t2
I ` hmac(t1, t2)
where I is the knowledge of the attacker, t, t1 and t2 are variables of type Term, l1
is a variable of type List, and l2 is a variable of type Agent. The system gives the attacker
an ability to concatenate terms, build lists, as well as to retrieve their components. The
first rule is an axiom, and the last rule models the fact that the attacker can also compute
a MAC provided he knows the corresponding key.
6.2.3 Configuration and Topology
Each process is located at a specified node of the network. Unlike the classical Dolev-Yao
model, the attackers does not control the entire network but can only interact each with
its neighbors. More specifically, we assume that the topology of the network is represented
by a tuple T = (G,M, S,D) where:
− G = (V,E) is an undirected graph with V ⊆ {A ∈ N | A of type Agent}, where an
edge in the graph models the fact that two agents are neighbors. We only consider
graphs such that {(A,A)|A ∈ V } ⊆ E which means that an agent can always
receive a message sent by himself;
− M = {Mi}i=ki=1 is a set of nodes that are controlled by k attackers we have in the
network, where each attacker controls only one node. Note thatM ⊆ V . These
nodes that are inM are called malicious whereas nodes not inM are called honest;
− S and D are two honest nodes that represent respectively the source and the
destination for which we analyze the security of the routing protocol.
Note that malicious nodes cannot communicate using out-of-band resources or hidden
channels.
Example 6.5. (Topology). A possible topology T0 = (G0,M0, S,D) is depicted in Fig-
ure 6.2, where S ( ) is the source, D ( ) is the destination, A is a honest
node (colored in white), and M1 and M2 are two malicious nodes (colored in black), i.e.,
M0 = {M1,M2}.
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S
M1
AM2
D
Figure 6.2: Topology T0
A configuration of a network is a pair specifying the process to be executed by each node,
and the initial knowledge of each attacker (malicious node).
Definition 6.1. (Configuration [CDD12]). A configuration of a network is a pair
(P, I) where:
− P is a multiset of expressions of the form bP cA that represents the process P
executed by the agent A ∈ V . We write bP cA ∪ P instead of {bP cA} ∪ P;
− I = {Ii}i=ki=1 is a set of sets of ground terms, where the set Ii represents the messages
seen by the malicious node Mi ∈M as well as its initial knowledge.
Example 6.6. (Configuration [CDD12]). A typical initial configuration for the SRP
protocol is: K = (bPsrc(S,D)cS | bPreq(A)cA | bPrep(A)cA | bPdest(D)cD; I).
6.2.4 Execution Model
The communication system is formally defined by the rules of Figure 6.3. These rules are
parameterized by the underlying topology T = (G,M, S,D) with G = (V,E). They are
similar to the ones used in [ACD10,CDD12] with the differences that we use a separate
set of knowledge for each attacker, and we assume that the message sent by a certain
malicious node can be captured by its malicious neighbors due to broadcast nature of the
communications in wireless add-hoc networks (rule IN). The COMM rule allows nodes to
communicate provided that they are directly connected in the underlying graph. The
exchanged message is added to the knowledge Ii of the malicious node Mi if the agent
emitting the message is a direct neighbor of Mi, this reflects the fact that a malicious
node can listen to the communications of its neighbors. The IN rule allows a malicious
node Mi to send any message it can deduce from its knowledge Ii to any of its neighbors,
and like in COMM rule this message can be captured by neighbor malicious nodes. The
rule IF-THEN states that a node A executes the process P only if the formula Φ is
true. PAR rule says that parallel processes are equivalent to parallel nodes running these
processes. The replication process !P is expanded using the rule REPL. The last rule
NEW says that nodes can use fresh names of their choice when required. The relation
→∗T is the reflexive and transitive closure of →T .
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COMM ({bin(t′j).PjcAj | mgu(t, t′j) 6= ⊥, (A,Aj) ∈ E} ∪ bout(f(t1, . . . , tn).P cA
∪P; I)→T (bPjσjcAj ∪ bP cA ∪ P; I ′)
where σj = mgu(t, t′j) with t = f(t1, . . . , tn), and for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, if (A,Mi) ∈ E
then I ′i = Ii ∪ {t} else I ′i = Ii.
IN (bin(t′).P cA ∪ P; I)→T (bPσcA ∪ P; I ′) if (A,Mj) ∈ E, Ij ` t and Mj ∈M
where σ = mgu(t, t′), and if (Mj ,Mi) ∈ E then I ′i = Ii ∪ {t} else I ′i = Ii.
IF-THEN (bif Φ then P cA ∪ P; I)→T (bP cA ∪ P; I) if JΦKG = true.
PAR (bP1|P2cA ∪ P; I)→T (bP1cA ∪ bP2cA ∪ P; I)
REPL (b!P cA ∪ P; I)→T (bP cA ∪ b!P cA ∪ P; I)
NEW (bnew m.P cA ∪ P; I)→T (bP{m 7→ m′cA} ∪ P; I)
where m′ is a fresh name.
Figure 6.3: Transition system.
6.3 Route Validity Property
A routing protocol satisfies route validity property if it results in a valid route. In this
section, we define the valid route and the attack on a routing protocol. Note that, we do
not consider the case of wormhole attack, so a route that contains where two successive
non-neighboring malicious nodes is considered a valid route.
Definition 6.2. (Valid route [CDD12]). Let T = (G,M, S,D) be a topology with
G = (V,E), we say that a list l = [A1, . . . , An] of agent names is a valid route in T , if
and only if, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, we have that (Ai, Ai+1) ∈ E or Ai, Ai+1 ∈M.
After successfully executing a routing protocol, the source node stores the resulting
received route. We assume that processes representing instances of routing protocols
contain a process that has a special action of the form out(end(l)). The list l represents
the established route so that we can check whether it is valid or not. Checking whether
a routing protocol ensures route validity property can be defined as a reachability
property [CDD12]. The attack on the configuration of a routing protocol is defined as
follows.
Definition 6.3. (Attack on a configuration [CDD12]). Let T = (G,M, S,D)
be a topology and K be a configuration. We say that K admits an attack in T if
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K →∗T (bout(end(l)).P cA ∪ P; I) for some A, P , P, I, and some term l that is not a
valid route in T .
For a given routing protocol Prouting, we only consider configurations that are made up
using a routing role P0 and roles of the protocol, such that P0 is the only process that
contains a special action out(end(l)). Moreover, we check whether the security property
holds when the source and the destination are honest. Note that, we consider the case
where an honest source initiates a session with a malicious node (Psrc(S,M) for M ∈M
can occur in the configuration).
Definition 6.4. (Configuration valid for Prouting and P0 [CDD12]). Let T =
(G,M, S,D) be a topology with G = (V,E), and I be a set of sets representing the initial
knowledge of the attackers. A configuration K = (P, I) is valid for the routing protocol
Prouting and the routing role P0 with respect to T if
− P = bP0(S,D)cS
⊎P ′ and for every bP ′cA1 ∈ P ′ there exist P (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
Prouting, and A2, . . . , An ∈ V such that P ′ = P (A1, . . . , An).
− the only process containing a special action of the form out(end(l)) is P0(S,D)
witnessing the storage of a route by the source node S.
The attack on a routing protocol Prouting and a routing role P0 with respect a topology
T is defined as follows.
Definition 6.5. (Attack on Prouting and P0 [CDD12]). We say that there is an
attack on the routing protocol Prouting and the routing role P0 given an initial knowledge I
if there exist a topology T = (G,M, S,D) and a configuration K that is valid for Prouting
and P0 with respect to T , such that K admits an attack in T .
6.4 Reduction Procedure
In this section, we present a reduction procedure, and we show that if there is an attack
on route validity in a given topology then there is an attack in a smaller topology obtained
by applying the reduction procedure to the initial one. Hence, applying the reduction
to a certain topology allows us to verify a protocol in a smaller topology. We show
that applying the reduction procedure on any topology results in one of five topologies,
each consists of only four nodes. Then, we show that considering only five topologies is
sufficient when looking for attacks on route validity. Following [CDD12], our reduction
procedure consists of two main steps:
1. Adding edges to the graph yielding a quasi-complete topology.
2. Merging nodes that have the same nature (honest or malicious) and same neighbors.
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6.4.1 From an Arbitrary Topology to a Quasi-Complete One
In order to merge nodes while preserving the attack, they must have the same nature
and same neighbors. To ensure that most of the nodes have the same neighbors we first
add edges to the graph. Actually, we add all edges except one. We show that the attack
is preserved when we add these edges.
Definition 6.6. (Quasi-completion [CDD12]). Let T = (G,M, S,D) be a topology
with G = (V,E), and let A, B be two nodes in V that are not both malicious and
such that (A,B) /∈ E. The quasi-completion of T with respect to (A,B) is a topology
T + = (G+,M, S,D) such that G+ = (V,E+) with E+ = V × V r {(A,B), (B,A)}.
Example 6.7. (Quasi-completion). A possible quasi-completion T +0 of the topology
T0 shown in Figure 6.2 is the one with respect to the pair (S,D) given below. As we see
the graph is almost highly connected, the only missing edge is (S,D).
S
M1
AM2
D
Note that, predicates have to be completion-friendly so that their values are preserved
when adding some edges to the graph.
Definition 6.7. (Completion-friendly [CDD12]). A predicate p is completion-
friendly if Jp(t1, . . . , tn)KG = true implies that Jp(t1, . . . , tn)KG+ = true for any ground
terms t1, . . . , tn and any quasi-completion T + = (G+,M, S,D) of T = (G,M, S,D). We
say that a routing protocol (resp. a configuration) is completion-friendly if the predicates
PD, i.e., the predicates that are dependent of the graph are completion-friendly.
Lemma 6.1. (Quasi-completion). Let T be a topology, K0 be a configuration that is
completion-friendly. If there is an attack on K0 in T , then we can find two non-neighboring
nodes B,C ∈ V that are not both malicious and a topology T + quasi-completion of T
with respect to (B,C), such that there exists an attack on K0 in T +.
Proof. Let T = (G,M, S,D) be a topology with G = (V,E) and K0 be a configuration
that is completion-friendly. Assume that there is an attack on K0 in T . Then, by
the definition of the attack, there exist A, P , P, I and l0 = [A1, . . . , An], such that
K0 →∗T (bout(end(l0)).P cA ∪ P; I) = K and l0 is not a valid route in T , i.e., there
exists 1 ≤ a ≤ n such that (Aa, Aa+1) /∈ E and (Aa /∈ M or Aa+1 /∈ M). Let
T + = (G+,M, S,D) be a quasi-completion of T with respect to (Aa, Aa+1). Then, we
have that G+ = (V,E+) with E+ = V × V r {(Aa, Aa+1), (Aa+1, Aa)}. We show by
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induction on the length r of a derivation K0 →rT Kr2 that Kr is completion-friendly and
that K0 →rT + Kr. This will allow us to obtain that K0 →∗T + (bout(end(l0)).P cA ∪ P ; I),
and as by definition of T +, l0 is not a valid route in T + we conclude that K0 admits an
attack in T +.
For r = 0, since K0 is completion-friendly, we can easily conclude. Now, assume that
K0 →r−1T Kr−1 then, by induction hypothesis, we have that Kr−1 is completion-friendly
and K0 →r−1T + Kr−1. Suppose that, Kr−1 →T Kr. Since Kr−1 is completion-friendly,
then Kr is Completion-friendly as there is no rule that introduce new predicates or
functions. We show that Kr−1 →T + Kr by case analysis on the rule involved in the step
Kr−1 →T Kr:
Case of the rule IF-THEN: we have that Kr−1 = (bif Φ then P cA ∪ P; I), Kr =
(bP cA ∪P ; I) and JΦKG = true. Since Kr−1 is completion-friendly and JΦKG = true thenJΦKG+ = true, it follows that we can apply the rule IF-THEN on Kr−1 in T +, and thus
we get that Kr−1 →T + Kr.
Case of the rule IN: in such a case, we have that Kr−1 = (bin(t′).P cA ∪ P; I),
Kr = (bPσcA ∪ P; I ′) where σ = mgu(t, t′), (A,Mj) ∈ E for some Mj ∈ M, Ij ` t and
for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, if (Mj ,Mi) ∈ E then I ′i = Ii ∪ {t}, else I ′i = Ii. We have that E ⊆ E+,
then (A,Mj) ∈ E+ and if (Mj ,Mi) ∈ E then (Mj ,Mi) ∈ E+. Thus, we can conclude
that Kr−1 →T + Kr.
Rule COMM: we have that: Kr−1 = ({bin(t′j).PjcAj | mgu(t, t′j) 6= ⊥, (A,Aj) ∈ E} ∪
bout(f(t1, . . . , tn).P cA∪P ; I) and Kr = (bPjσjcAj ∪bP cA∪P ; I ′) where t = f(t1, . . . , tn),
σj = mgu(t, t
′
j), and for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, if (A,Mi) ∈ E then I ′i = Ii ∪ {t}, else I ′i = Ii.
As E ⊆ E+, then (A,Aj) ∈ E implies that (A,Aj) ∈ E+, and (A,Mi) ∈ E implies that
(A,Mi) ∈ E+. Thus, we have that Kr−1 →T + Kr.
Case of the rules PAR, REPL, and NEW: these rules do not depend on the
underlying graph. This allows us to easily conclude.
6.4.2 Reducing the Size of the Topology
In this step, we merge nodes that have the same nature and same neighbors. The initial
knowledge of malicious nodes are joined when they are merged. In fact, sometimes one
malicious node could do the job of several malicious nodes if we give it the required initial
knowledge, for instance the case where we have a chain of malicious nodes. Also, in some
cases existence or absence of some malicious nodes has no effect. We show that if there
exists an attack in a given topology T then there exists an attack in a reduced topology
ρ(T ) (some times written T ρ) where ρ is a node renaming mapping.
2 K0 →rT Kr means that Kr is obtained from K0 in r steps
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Let T = (G,M, S,D) be a topology with G = (V,E) and E a reflexive and symmetric
relation, and let ρ be a renaming on the agent names (not necessarily a one-to-one
mapping). We say that the renaming ρ : V 7→ V
− preserves honesty of T if A, ρ(A) ∈M or A, ρ(A) /∈M for every A ∈ V .
− preserves neighborhood of T if ρ(A) = ρ(B) implies that {A′ ∈ V | (A,A′) ∈ E} =
{B′ ∈ V | (B,B′) ∈ E}. Note that, we use the notation NG(A) to denote the set
of all neighbors of A in G.
Given a term t, we denote by tρ the term obtained by applying the renaming ρ on
t. This notation is extended to set of terms, configurations, graphs, and topologies.
In particular, given a graph G = (V,E), we denote Gρ the graph (V ρ,E′) such that
E′ = {(ρ(A), ρ(B))|(A,B) ∈ E}. Note that when we apply a renaming ρ to a configuration
K = (P, I) then the knowledge Ii ∈ I of Mi ∈ M is joined with the knowledge Ii′ of
Miρ = Mi′ and the Ii is removed from I.
Example 6.8. (Renaming Mapping) Consider the quasi-completion T +0 we have seen
in Example 6.7, a possible renaming ρ0 that preserves neighborhood and honesty and that
allows us to reduce the size of the graph is defined by: ρ0(S) = S, ρ0(A) = A, ρ0(M1) =
ρ0(M2) = M1, ρ0(D) = D. The resulting topology T +0 ρ0 is as follows:
S
M1
A
D
Here, the two malicious nodes M1 and M2 are merged in M1 then the knowledge I2
corresponding to M2 should be pooled with I1 (the knowledge of M1). For instance,
assume that we have initially I1 = {M1, S,D}, I2 = {M2, S,A} and I = {I1, I2} then
after merging we have that I1ρ0 = {M1, S,D,A} and Iρ0 = {I1ρ0}. Note that, ρ0 does
not preserve neighborhood of the topology T0 shown in Figure 6.2, which emphasizes the
importance of the completion step in order to make a safe merging.
Definition 6.8. (Projection-friendly [CDD12]). A predicate p is projection-friendly
if Jp(t1, . . . , tn)KG = true implies Jp(t1ρ, . . . , tnρ)KGρ = true for any ground terms
t1, . . . , tn and any renaming ρ that preserves neighborhood and honesty. A function
f over terms is projection-friendly if f(t1ρ, . . . , tnρ)) = f(t1, . . . , tn)ρ for any ground
terms t1, . . . , tn and any renaming ρ that preserves neighborhood and honesty. We say that
a routing protocol (resp. a configuration) is projection-friendly if the predicates PI ∪PD
and the functions in F are projection-friendly.
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Lemma 6.2. (Reducing). Let T be a topology, K0 be a configuration that is projection-
friendly, and ρ be a renaming that preserves neighborhood and honesty in T . If there
is an attack on K0 in T , then there exists an attack on K ′0 in T ′ where K ′0 and T ′ are
obtained by applying ρ on K0 and T respectively.
Proof. Let T = (G,M, S,D) be a topology with G = (V,E) and K0 be a configuration
that is projection-friendly. Assume that there is an attack on K0 in T . Then, by
the definition of the attack, there exist A, P , P, I and l0 = [A1, . . . , An], such that
K0 →∗T K = (bout(end(l0)).P cA ∪ P; I) and l0 is not a valid route in T . Let K ′0 = K0ρ
and T ′ = T ρ = (Gρ,Mρ, Sρ,Dρ) where Gρ = (V ρ,Eρ). We show by induction on the
length r of a derivation K0 →rT Kr that Kr is projection-friendly and K ′0 →rT ′ K ′r with
K ′r = Krρ. This will allow us to obtain that K ′0 →∗T ′ K ′ with K ′ = Kρ.
For r = 0, since K ′0 = K0ρ and K0 is projection-friendly, we can easily conclude.
Assume that K0 →r−1T Kr−1, then, by induction hypothesis, we have that Kr−1 is
projection-friendly and K ′0 →r−1T ′ K ′r−1 with K ′r−1 = Kr−1ρ. Suppose that, Kr−1 →T Kr.
Since Kr−1 is projection-friendly, then Kr is projection-friendly as there is no rule that
introduce new predicates or functions. We show that K ′r−1 →T ′ K ′r with K ′r = Krρ by
case analysis on the rule involved in the step Kr−1 →T Kr:
Case of the rule IF-THEN: we have that Kr−1 = (bif Φ then P cA ∪ P; I), Kr =
(bP cA ∪P ; I) and JΦKG = true. Since Kr−1 is projection-friendly and JΦKG = true, thenJΦρKGρ = true, it follows that we can apply the rule IF-THEN on K ′r−1 = Kr−1ρ =
(bif Φρ then PρcAρ ∪ Pρ; Iρ), and thus we get that K ′r−1 →T ′ K ′r with K ′r = (bPρcAρ ∪
Pρ; Iρ) = Krρ.
Case of the rule IN: in such a case, we have that Kr−1 = (bin(t′).P cA ∪ P; I),
Kr = (bPσcA ∪ P; I ′) where σ = mgu(t, t′), (A,Mj) ∈ E for some Mj ∈M, Ij ` t, and
for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, if (Mj ,Mi) ∈ E then I ′i = Ii ∪ {t}, else I ′i = Ii. Furthermore, we have
that K ′r−1 = Kr−1ρ = (bin(t′ρ).PρcAρ ∪ Pρ; Iρ), (Aρ,Mjρ) ∈ Eρ since (A,Mj) ∈ E,
Mjρ ∈Mρ since Mj ∈M and ρ preserve honesty, Iiρ ` tρ, and if (Mj ,Mi) ∈ E for some
Mi ∈ M, then (Mjρ,Miρ) ∈ Eρ and Miρ ∈ Mρ since ρ preserves neighborhood and
honesty. Thus, K ′r−1 →T ′ (b(Pρ)σ′cAρ ∪ Pρ; I ′ρ) = K ′r, where σ′ = mgu(tρ, t′ρ). Note
that, (Pρ)σ′ = (Pσ)ρ, and thus K ′r = (b(Pσ)ρcAρ ∪ Pρ; I ′ρ) = Krρ.
Case of the rule COMM: in this case Kr−1 = ({bin(t′j).PjcAj | mgu(t, t′j) 6= ⊥, and
(A,Aj) ∈ E} ∪ bout(f(t1, . . . , tn).P cA ∪P ; I) and Kr = (bPjσjcAj ∪ bP cA ∪P ; I ′) where
t = f(t1, . . . , tn), σj = mgu(t, t′j), and for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, if (A,Mi) ∈ E then I ′i = Ii∪{t},
else I ′i = Ii. We have that, K
′
r−1 = Kr−1ρ = ({bin(t′jρ).PjρcAjρ | mgu(tρ, t′jρ) 6=
⊥, (Aρ,Ajρ) ∈ E′}∪bout(f(t1, . . . , tn)ρ).PρcAρ∪Pρ; Iρ), f(t1, . . . , tn)ρ = f(t1ρ, . . . , tnρ)
since f is projection-friendly, and (Aρ,Miρ) ∈ E′ if (A,Mi) ∈ E, then K ′r−1 →T ′
(b(Pjρ)σ′jcAjρ ∪ bPρcAρ ∪ Pρ; I ′ρ) = K ′r, where σ′j = mgu(tρ, t′jρ). Thus, as (Pjρ)σ′j =
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(Pjσj)ρ, K ′r = (b(Pjσj)ρcAjρ ∪ bPρcAρ ∪ Pρ; I ′ρ) = Krρ.
Case of the rules PAR, REPL, and NEW: these rules do not depend on the
underlying graph. This allows us to easily conclude.
Hence, K ′0 = K0ρ→∗T ′ (bout(end(l0ρ)).PρcAρ ∪ Pρ; Iρ) = K ′ = Kρ. In order to con-
clude that there is an attack on K ′0 in T ′, it remains to show that l0ρ = [A1ρ, . . . , Anρ] =
[A′1, . . . , A′n] is not a valid route in T ′. First, we note that: (i) If B /∈M then Bρ /∈Mρ.
Assume that, B /∈ M and Bρ ∈ Mρ. Then there exists C ∈ M such that Bρ = Cρ.
Thus, as ρ preserve honesty we have that B and C are both malicious or both hon-
est, which leads to a contradiction. (ii) If (B1, B2) /∈ E then (B1ρ,B2ρ) /∈ Eρ. Let
B1, B2 ∈ V , ρ(B1) = D1 and ρ(B2) = D2 such that(B1, B2) /∈ E. Suppose that
(D1, D2) = (B1ρ,B2ρ) ∈ Eρ, then by definition of Eρ there exist two nodes C1, C2 ∈ V
such that ρ(C1) = D1, ρ(C2) = D2 and (C1, C2) ∈ E. Since ρ(B1) = ρ(C1) = D1
and ρ preserves neighborhood, we get that NG(B1) = NG(C1). It follows that B1 and
C2 are neighbors in G since C1 and C2 are neighbors in G. Similarly, we have that
NG(B2) = NG(C2). Thus B1 and B2 are also neighbors in G, i.e., (B1, B2) ∈ E which
leads to a contradiction. Hence, (B1ρ,B2ρ) /∈ Eρ.
Now, as l0 is not a valid route in T , there exists 1 ≤ a ≤ n such that (Aa, Aa+1) /∈ E and
(Aa /∈ M or Aa+1 /∈ M). Then, (Aaρ,Aa+1ρ) /∈ Eρ and (Aaρ /∈ Mρ or Aa+1ρ /∈ Mρ).
Hence, l0ρ is not a valid route in T ′ and we can conclude.
6.4.3 Five Topologies are Sufficient
We show that for a routing protocol Prouting there is an attack on an arbitrary topology
if and only if there is an attack on one of five particular topologies. Our result holds for
an unbounded number of sessions since we consider arbitrarily many instances of the
roles occurring in Prouting.
Theorem 6.1. (Five topologies). Let Prouting be a routing protocol and P0 be a routing
role which are both completion-friendly and projection-friendly and I be a set of knowledge.
There is an attack on Prouting and P0 given the knowledge I for some T , if and only if,
there is an attack on Prouting and P0 given the knowledge I for one of five particular
topologies T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5 (see below).
Proof. If there is an attack on Prouting and P0 given I for one of the five particular
topologies, we easily conclude that there is an attack on Prouting and P0 given I for some
topology T . We consider now the other implication. Let T = (G,M, S,D) be a topology
with G = (V,E), I be a set of knowledge and K = (P, I) be a valid configuration for
Prouting and P0 with respect to T , such that there is an attack on K in T . Without lost
of generality, we assume that V contains at least three distinct honest nodes and two
distinct malicious nodes.
173
Chapter 6. Routing Protocols
We have that K is completion-friendly as Prouting and P0 are both completion-friendly.
Moreover, we can deduce, by Lemma 6.1, that there exist two non-neighboring nodes
B,C ∈ V that are not both malicious and a topology T + = (G+,M, S,D), a quasi-
completion of T with respect to (B,C), such that there is an attack on K in T +. As
T + is a quasi-completion of T with respect to a pair (B,C), then NG+(B) = V r {C},
NG+(C) = V r{B}, and NG+(W ) = V for any W ∈ V r{B,C}. Since we have assumed
that V contains at least three distinct nodes that are not inM and two distinct nodes
in M, we deduce that V r {B,C} contains at least an honest node let us say A and
a malicious one let us say M . Let ρ be a renaming on the agent names such that for
any W ∈ V r {B,C}, ρ(W ) = A if W /∈M and ρ(W ) = M otherwise. We have that ρ
preserves honesty and neighborhood. Then, by Lemma 6.2, we deduce that there is an
attack on K ′ = Kρ in T ′ = (G+ρ,Mρ, Sρ,Dρ) = T +ρ. The topology T ′ has four nodes:
one honest, one malicious and two nodes B,C. We distinguish cases depending in the
nature of the nodes B and C, which are not both malicious:
1. B honest and C malicious (the reverse is the same due to symmetry). In this
case T ′ has two honest nodes, thus according to the position of the source and
destination we have the following four possibilities:
T1 T2 T3 T4
Note that the topology T4 can obtained only if the source and destination are the
same in the original topology.
2. Both are honest. So T ′ has three honest nodes in this case. Depending on the
position of the source and destination we have nine possibilities, but due to symmetry
four of them can be eliminated. This results in only five topologies:
T ′1 T ′2 T ′3
T ′4 T5
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The topologies T ′1 , T ′2 , T ′3 and T ′4 are respectively subsumed by T1, T2, T3 and T4
since if there is an attack in T ′i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, then this attack can be mounted
in Ti where an honest node is now malicious.
So T ′ is one of the five topologies T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5. Finally, since Prouting and P0
do not contain any names, Definition 6.4 is satisfied and thus K ′ = (Pρ, Iρ) is a valid
configuration with respect to T ′. Hence, we can conclude.
6.5 Equivalence Result
In this section we show that a given protocol satisfies route validity for every topology in
presence of cooperative attackers, if and only if, it satisfies route validity for every topology
in presence of non-cooperative (independent) attackers. We note that, Theorem 6.2 allow
us to dispense of Theorem 6.1 since, as a consequence of the former, one could use the
result of Cortier et al. [CDD12] when looking to verify a protocol for every topology. Still
Theorem 6.1 shows that one will obtain one of the five presented topologies when apply
the reduction procedure to a certain topology.
Lemma 6.3. (Preservation of the attack). LetK0 be a configuration that is completion-
friendly. If there exists a topology T such that K0 admits an attack in T in presence of
cooperative attackers, then there exists a topology T ′ that can be obtained from T such
that K0 admits an attack in T ′ in presence of non-cooperative attackers.
Proof. Let T = (G,M, S,D) be a topology with G = (V,E) and K0 be a configuration
that is completion-friendly. Suppose that there is an attack on K0 in T then, by
the definition of the attack, there exist A, P , P, I and l0 = [A1, . . . , An] such that
K →∗T (bout(end(l0)).P cA ∪ P; I) and l0 is an invalid route in T , i.e., there exists
1 ≤ a ≤ n such that (Aa, Aa+1) /∈ E and (Aa /∈M or Aa+1 /∈M). Let T ′ = (G′,M, S,D)
be a topology such that G′ = (V,E′) with E′ = E∪(M×M). According to the definition
of l0, since it is invalid in T , it is also invalid in T ′. To deduce that there is an attack
on K0 in T ′ we show that K0 →∗T ′ (bout(end(l0)).P cA ∪ P; I). Note that, we assume
the same initial knowledge for all attackers, if its not the case we can reach this state by
applying successively the COMM rule a certain number of times as all malicious nodes
are connected in T ′. With maintaining the same knowledge for all the attackers, we
simulate the cooperative case in an indirect way.
We show by induction on the length r of a derivation K0 →rT Kr that Kr is completion-
friendly and K0 →∗T ′ Kr. This will allow us to deduce that K0 →∗T ′ (bout(end(l0)).P cA ∪
P; I). For r = 0, as Kr = K0, K0 is completion-friendly, E ⊆ E′, and (Aa /∈ M or
Aa+1 /∈M), then we can easily conclude. Assume that K0 →r−1T ′ Kr−1 then, by induction
hypothesis, we have that Kr−1 is completion-friendly and K0 →∗T ′ Kr−1. Suppose that,
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Kr−1 →T Kr. Since Kr−1 is completion-friendly, then Kr is completion-friendly as there
is no rule that introduce new predicates or functions. We show that, by case analysis on
the rule involved in the step Kr−1 →T Kr with cooperative attackers, the equivalence rule
or rules that can be applied in T ′ with non-cooperative attackers to get Kr−1 →∗T ′ Kr:
− Case of the rule IF-THEN: since K is completion friendly then any formula φ
that is true for T , its true also for T ′. Thus, the rule IF-THEN can also be applied
in T ′ in this case.
− Case of the rule IN: since E ⊆ E′ the same rule can be applied and as all
malicious nodes are connected in T ′ the sent message is received by all attackers so
the knowledge remains equal.
− Case of the COMM: since E ⊆ E′ we can apply the rule COMM. However, in
case where we have a malicious node M that is neighbor to the node that plays the
role of the sender, the COMM rule should be followed by a certain number (equal
to the number of other malicious nodes) of rule IN applications between M and
each of the other malicious nodes. The last step is to share in an indirect way the
message received by one of the malicious nodes as it is a neighbor of the sender.
− Case of the rules PAR, REPL, and NEW: these rules do not depend on the
underlying graph. So same rules can be applied in T ′.
Theorem 6.2 (Equivalence). Let Prouting be a routing protocol and P0 be a routing role.
Then, Prouting and P0 are secure for every topology in presence of cooperative attackers
with a knowledge I, if and only if, Prouting and P0 are secure for every topology in presence
of non-cooperative attackers, each with the same knowledge I.
Proof. First direction: the non-cooperative attackers have weaker abilities than the
cooperative ones. So, if there is no attack on Prouting and P0 given I in presence of
cooperative attackers then there is no attack on Prouting and P0 in presence of non-
cooperative attackers.
Second direction: Suppose that there is no attack on Prouting and P0 given I for any
topology with non-cooperative attackers. Assume that there exists a topology T such
that there is an attack on Prouting and P0 given I in T with cooperative attackers. Then,
by the definition of the attack 6.5, there is a configuration K that is valid for Prouting
and P0, such that there is an attack on K in T with cooperative attackers. Thus, by
Lemma 6.3, there is a topology T ′ that can be obtained from T such that there is an
attack in it on the configuration K with non-cooperative attackers. Hence, there is an
attack on Prouting and P0 given I in T ′ which leads to a contradiction.
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Note that, by considering one fixed topology T this equivalence does not hold anymore
as we can find an attack on a protocol in T in presence of cooperative attackers, while
this protocol is secure in T in presence of non-cooperative attackers. This due to the fact
that with cooperative attackers, we give the malicious nodes a powerful capability (i.e.,
sharing of knowledge) that is difficult to exist in reality, which may result into attacks
that can not be mounted in practice. Having a fixed known topology one could choose
in presence of which kind of the attacker to verify the used protocol, depending on the
application and the level of the security required.
6.6 Conclusion
We consider multiple independent attackers (compromised nodes) that do not have the
ability to share their knowledge with each other. We extend the reduction proof proposed
in [CDD12] to the case of multiple independent attackers. That is when looking for
attacks on route validity, it is sufficient to verify only five topologies with four nodes each.
This entails updating the transition execution rules to handle the case of independent
attackers, and revisiting the proofs. We also show that a protocol is secure in any topology
with cooperative attackers, if and only if, it is secure for any topology with independent
(non-cooperative) attackers.
For future work, we would like to conduct some case studies for analyzing route validity
in presence of independent attackers. It could be interesting to develop an automatic
tool that is able to analyze route validity in presence of multiple independent attackers.
Another research direction is to study route validity in wireless sensor networks with
attackers that only have a limited power for communications (a battery).
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Conclusion
In this document we provide symbolic definitions of security properties for exam, e-
cash, and e-reputation protocols. Particularly, we studied authentication, privacy and
verifiability properties of these protocols. Moreover, we develop a reduction result for
verification of route validity in presence of multiple independent attackers. We also
provide a case study concerning runtime verification of e-exams. In this chapter, we
summarize our results, and we discuss the limitations of our work and directions for
future research.
7.1 Summary
In Chapter 1, we introduced the context and motivated our work. We recalled the syntax
and semantics of the Applied pi-Calculus in Chapter 2. We also provided a brief overview
of ProVerif tool, QEA syntax, and MarQ tool.
We then studied the security of exam protocols in Chapter 3. We formalize nine
authentication and privacy properties in the Applied pi-Calculus, and automatically
analyzed using ProVerif three case studies: the protocols due to Huszti & Pethő [HP10],
Giustolisi et al. [GLR14], and Université Grenoble Alpes1 exam (Grenoble exam). Our
analysis shows that Huszti & Pethő protocol satisfies none of the nine properties. Au-
thentication is compromised because of inaccuracies in the protocol design, whereas most
of attacks invalidating privacy exploit a vulnerability in a component that the protocol
uses, namely the RARC. The attacks compromise secrecy and anonymity of the messages
taking advantage of the absence of a proof of knowledge of the submitted message to the
RARC, a vulnerability that allows the attacker to use the RARC as a decryption oracle.
We proposed a few modifications on the H&P protocol in order to guarantee a subset
of the authentication properties. ProVerif confirms that the modified protocol ensures
these properties. However, even when assuming a perfect RARC ensuring anonymity,
1 www.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr
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we still have attacks on privacy properties. Thus, we think that fixing the RARC is not
sufficient, and that the protocol requires fundamental changes. Remark! protocol presents
a weakness that violates Form Authenticity when a corrupted candidate is considered. We
propose a fix and formally verify that the fixed protocol satisfies all the properties herein
considered. Grenoble exam satisfies seven properties (all but Anonymous Examiner and
Mark Privacy). ProVerif finds a counterexample against Anonymous Examiner that is
difficult to mount in practice. The attacker can distinguish which “unseen”2 exam-form
the examiner accepts for marking (the one he can “seen” using his secret key). This is not
a real attack, since the examiner will only accept exam-form from the exam authority, not
an attacker. Assuming a private channel between the exam authority and the examiner,
ProVerif confirms that Anonymous Examiner is satisfied by Grenoble exam. Concerning
Mark Privacy, ProVerif finds an attack (when all parties are honest), this was expected
as in Grenoble exam the marks are published in clear-text by the exam authority.
In the second part of the Chapter 3, we abstractly defined exam Verifiability. We
identified eleven verifiability properties. For each property, we define the soundness and
completeness conditions for the related verification test. Then, we analyzed with the
help of ProVerif two exam protocols: the protocol due to Giustolisi et al. [GLR14], and
Grenoble exam. The analysis of Giustolisi et al. shows that all properties but three are
satisfied without assuming that the exam’s roles are honest. But Marking Correctness
holds only assuming an honest exam authority. In fact, a student can check her mark
by using the exam table, but this is posted on the bulletin board by the exam authority
who can nullify the verification of correctness by tampering with the table. Whereas the
analysis of Grenoble exam shows that it satisfies all the verifiability properties under
the assumption that authorities and examiner are honest. This seems to be peculiar to
paper-and-pencil exams, where log-books and registers are managed by the authorities
that can tamper with them. Only Marking Correctness holds even in presence of dishonest
authorities and examiner: here, a candidate can consult her exam-test after marking,
thus verifying herself whether her mark has been computed correctly.
In the final part of the Chapter 3, we defined monitors that allows to check exam
requirements at runtime. Then, we implemented these monitors and analyzed logs
extracted from real e-exam organized by Université Joseph Fourier (UJF) using MarQ
tool. The analysis reveals some students that violate the requirements, and also some
discrepancies between the specification and the implementation. Due to the lack of logs
about the marking and notification phases, we were not able to analyze all properties.
The UJF exam case study clearly demonstrates that the developers do not think to log
these two phases where there is less interaction with the candidates. However, we believe
that monitoring the marking phase is essential since a successful attempt from a bribed
examiner or a cheating student can be very effective.
2 unseen function is similar to an asymmetric encryption.
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Next in Chapter 4, we define security properties of e-cash protocols We proposed
two client privacy properties and three properties to prevent forgery. Then, we applied
our definitions using ProVerif to analyze the Chaum protocol [Cha82], the DigiCash
protocol presented in [Sch97], and the Chaum et al. protocol [CFN88]. Our analysis
confirms several already known attacks, and reveals a flaw that confirms the necessity of
synchronization in online cash protocols.
In Chapter 5, we established a formal framework for the security analysis of e-reputation
protocols. In particular, we show how to model reputation protocols in the Applied
pi-Calculus, and defined eight privacy, authentication, and verifiability properties. We
validate our definitions by analyzing, using ProVerif, the security of a simple e-reputation
protocol, the protocol by Pavlov et al. [PRT04]. It has been informally argued to preserve
rate privacy. Our analysis shows that it satisfies five properties, namely Rate Privacy,
Rate Anonymity, and User Eligibility, Rate Integrity (without injectivity), and Reputation
Score Verification (if users can have an access to the set of rates). While it fails to satisfy
the other five: User Privacy, Untraceability, Receipt-Freeness, Coercion-Resistance, and
User Eligibility Verification.
Finally in Chapter 6, we considered the non-cooperative attacker model where there
are multiple attackers working independently, so that no one shares any of its knowledge
with the others. We then extended the reduction proof proposed in [CDD12] to the case
of multiple independent attackers. That is when looking for attacks on route validity, it
is sufficient to verify only five topologies with four nodes each. This entails updating the
transition execution rules to handle the case of independent attackers, and revisiting the
required proofs. We also showed that a protocol is secure in any topology with cooperative
attackers, if and only if, it is secure for any topology with independent attackers.
7.2 Limitations and Directions for Future Works
Concerning the work on exam protocols several avenues for future works are open. The
current model of the protocol by Huszti & Pethő used for privacy an authentication
properties is a simplification, and we did not model the full protocol with RARC due to
ProVerif termination problem (instead we analyzed RARC alone). It would be interesting
to extend this to a more precise model. The main obstacles are too complex equational
theories. A step in this direction was undertaken by Smyth et al. [SAR13]. They propose
to replace the complex equational theory with a simpler, but equivalent one which can
then be treated by ProVerif. Moreover, KISS [cCDK12] and AKISS [CcCK12] can deal
with more complex equational theories.
Concerning verifiability, we use ProVerif to verify universal verifiability properties,
we were unable to prove the general case directly and had to provide a manual proof to
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show that the result holds for any number of candidates. It would be great to automatize
these proofs. Note that, an extension of ProVerif with loops could permit to obtain
the general proof directly. Another line of research is to study novel properties such
as accountability, which allows them to identify which party is responsible when the
verification fails. Few works go in this direction: Küsters et al. [KTV10] have studied
accountability, however, their framework needs to be instantiated for each application
by identifying relevant verifiability goals. As we identified several verifiability properties
relevant for exam protocols, one may study how their accountability framework can be
applied to case of exam protocols. Bella et al. [BGLR15] have proposed an accountability
property, which allows to identify the responsible party when a candidate fails to submit
an answer or to receive the corresponding mark. They have analyzed their protocol
and have shown that it satisfies this property. However, more accountability properties
need to be defined to identify the responsible parties when the verifiability properties we
propose in this thesis fails.
With respect to runtime verification, one direction is to perform the verification of
marking related properties, as well as, to perform online verification with our monitors
during live e-exams, and to study to what extent runtime enforcement can be applied
during a live e-exam run. Online verification requires to deliver events to the monitor
at the time they are generated by the system in order to check them and take a verdict.
This introduces additional overheads and may cause scalability problems depending on
the size of the system and number of events generated per second. Another direction is
to study more expressive and quantitative properties that might detect possible collusion
between students through similar answer patterns.
For e-cash protocols, an interesting line of research is to extend our model to cover
transferable protocols with divisible coins. A limitation in our analysis of Chaum et al.
protocol is that we did not model the details of “cut-and-choose" at withdrawal phase. A
computational variant of our definition would be able to take this into account. Actually
in symbolic model we did not consider probabilities. So even if there is a low probability
for the attacker to guess the parameters the bank requests, then such possibility is
considered. With respect to the flaw we found on online cash protocols is due to lack of
synchronization at deposit. We did not verify a fixed version that make synchronization.
This is due to a limitation of ProVerif when dealing with tables. To confirm our argument
concerning the need for synchronization, one could use the tool SAPIC based on Tamarin.
SAPIC is suitable to the protocols that entail database lookups. It offers the ability to
lock a table then to unlock it after the end of operations, a feature that can be used to
model synchronization.
For reputation protocols, one direction is to develop a tool that can deal with algebraic
properties such as arithmetic operations and homomorphic encryptions as e-reputation
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protocols are highly depends on such algebraic properties. Note that, developing such a
tool is still a real challenge for the community. However, researches try to find solutions
for such a problem. For instance the result obtained by Küsters et al. [KT11] allows
us to analyze protocols with XOR operator for trace based properties using ProVerif.
Extending this result to handle equivalence properties could help in analyzing protocols
with arithmetic operations, which is the case of many e-reputation protocols, if XOR
operator is used to model summation and subtraction. With respect to privacy properties,
we discussed the Receipt-Freeness and Coercion-Resistance only informally on our case
study. It would be great to construct a formal proofs for them. Other interesting research
works include the study of the relation between our security properties as well as the
definition of novel properties such as correctness of the reputation score, preventing
double rating, accountability, reliability (e.g., to prevent Sybil attacks), and addressing
fake rates.
Research directions for wireless sensor networks include performing some case studies
for analyzing route validity in presence of independent attackers. It could be interesting
to develop an automatic tool that is able to analyze route validity in presence of multiple
independent attackers Another research direction is to study route validity in wireless
sensor networks with attackers (compromised nodes) that only have a limited power for
communications (a battery).
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